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A THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY ought to explain what conditions must be satisfied for an 
agent to be responsible for something, and whether or not ordinary agents can satisfy 
those conditions, given a plausible understanding of the way our world works.  These 
goals pull against each other: the more stringent the conditions on responsibility, the 
harder they are to meet, and the greater the chance that we will be unable to satisfy them 
given a complete scientific picture of the world; the more relaxed the conditions, the 
easier they are to meet, but the more we may doubt their sufficiency for securing 
responsibility.  My dissertation argues that, perhaps surprisingly, all that is required for 
an agent to be responsible for an action or outcome is that (1) the action was voluntary; 
(2) the outcome was at least foreseen; and, (3) the agent had no relevant false beliefs 
about the nature of what he was doing.  While obviously requiring a bit of filling out and 
defense, these three conditions are both individually necessary and jointly sufficient for 
responsibility.  Moreover, they are conditions that are quite easy to satisfy by ordinary 
agents.  We should be supremely confident, therefore, that so long as we are ordinary 
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Writing a dissertation (fashioning it really) is a protracted, arduous, exhilarating, and 
exhausting task.  It has also been a deeply rewarding one.  It can seem that the project 
is never really finished: as a culmination of one’s graduate study, it is tempting to 
seek perfection in a dissertation.  What follows is far from perfect.  I still think it 
mostly correct, but there are still passages I’d change, phrases I’d rework, arguments 
I’d retool, to make it on the whole clearer, smarter, and better.  But dissertations 
aren’t finished when they’re perfected.  They’re finished when your advisor says they 
are.  Less cynically, more optimistically, dissertations are the first step towards 
working out big ideas and developing one’s views, a project hopefully continued 
throughout one’s professional career (for those of us fortunate enough to have one).  
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“[H]ow can a man be called quite free at the same moment, and with 
respect to the same action in which he is subject to an inevitable physical 
necessity? […] This is a wretched subterfuge with which some persons 
still let themselves be put off, and so think they have solved, with a petty 
word-jugglery, that difficult problem, at the solution of which centuries 
have laboured in vain…” 
 
– Immanuel Kant1 
 
 
“I’m not bad; I’m just drawn that way.” 
 




I BELIEVE WE ARE responsible for most of what we do, in a way such that we deserve 
blame for the bad things we do and praise for the good things we do.  And I believe the 
world is as science tells us: every event has a cause.  This, surprisingly enough, is not an 
uncontroversial position in philosophy.  But it is a respected one, with a long historical 
pedigree.  I also think it the simplest, most natural, best-motivated, most explanatorily 
powerful position with the weakest theoretical commitments.  In light of all this, I think it 
the best position to take, for it explains and secures responsibility even if the world is 
                                               
1 Kant [1788, 2002], Part 2. 
2 “Who Framed Roger Rabbit?”  Touchstone Pictures, 1988. 
 
 2 
thoroughly deterministic.  But I’m getting ahead of myself.  First, I want to lay out just 
why we should care about any position on responsibility.  Second, I outline why 
philosophers argue about whether we are responsible for what we do or not.  And third, I 
set out, given this background, what a philosophical theory of responsibility should do.  It 
should explain the essential notions and core phenomena associated with responsibility, 
while defending the weakest set of conditions needed to do the explaining.  Roughly, it 
should explain what is most important about responsibility in a way that is maximally 
compatible with a naturalistic view of the world.  This dissertation is a presentation of 
and argument for a philosophical theory that achieves these goals. 
 
 
1.1. The Importance of Responsibility – or – Why Care About a Dissertation on 
Responsibility? 
PHILOSOPHERS, AT LEAST as early as Aristotle, have been concerned with answering the 
questions: (1) Do we have free will? and, (2) When is someone responsible for what they 
did?  If a philosophical question has garnered interest for this long, two natural thoughts 
arise.  First, it must surely be an important question for so many people to be working on 
answering it.  And, second, how can it be that we haven’t been able to answer this 
question for nearly 2,500 years?! 
 Well, while we may not have agreement among philosophers, we do have 
proposed answers.  And we have made progress.  For instance, it seems that what looked 
like two questions is really just one.  Discussions of free will have come to focus on what 
it takes for someone to act freely, where this is understood as an important requirement 
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for responsibility.  So the big project is being able to show what it takes for people to be 
responsible for what they do, and the importance of free will is seen as a significant 
portion of that project.  But this progress returns us to that first thought I mentioned: 
what’s so important about responsibility? 
 The notions of freedom and responsibility, not to put too fine a point on it, lie at 
the center of what we care most about in life.  They underwrite our views about choice 
and being able to direct one’s own life, values enshrined in democracy and apparent in 
talk of political rights and expression, but are just as at home around the dinner table 
among teenagers arguing with parents about being able to choose for themselves.  
Responsibility also lies at the center of our interpersonal relationships.  We see the 
actions of others as telling us something important about their characters, their values, 
what they care about.  When friends do something nice for us, we treat this as expressing 
a concern for us because of a prior commitment to their being responsible.  When a 
coworker snubs us, we treat it as expressing a lack of concern or an outright disrespect 
for us.  Beyond this, our network of relationships seems to depend in important ways on 
treating individuals as responsible for what they do.  They make things happen, because 
of what they believe and desire, what they value and intend.  We often see people in light 
of their choices and commitments.  What they do affects our view of who they are.  
Friendships and loves are built on a mutual concern for one another, one that is reinforced 
and exemplified by acts of kindness.  Multiple transgressions against us by the same 
person erode a sense of concern and lead us to judge that person as holding negative 
attitudes about us.  And such judgments depend upon a belief in responsibility. 
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 Perhaps the most important feature of responsibility is that it is necessary for 
blameworthiness and praiseworthiness.  We judge people all the time.  We blame 
individuals for their transgressions against us and others.  We express our outrage at 
perpetrators of atrocities just as we resent the guy who cuts us off in traffic.  And we 
praise individuals for the good that they do.  We hand out awards for exemplary service 
just as we express gratitude to those who help us.  These actions and attitudes comprise a 
web of social practices that all depend upon individuals deserving certain types of 
treatment because they are responsible for what they’ve done.  If I’m not responsible for 
some harm, then I cannot be blameworthy for it, and you would be mistaken to blame 
me.  Similarly, if I’m not responsible for some benefit, then I cannot be praiseworthy, and 
you would be mistaken to praise me for it.  Much of interpersonal life indeed is 
comprised of the practices of holding each other responsible, demanding that others 
account for their behavior, blaming and praising conduct, and offering excuses against 
blame and considerations that mitigate praise.  All of these practices depend on seeing 
individuals as importantly connected to what they do and on this connection telling us 
something about who they are.  A good person isn’t just someone who does good things; 
it’s someone who does them on purpose, out of a concern for others.  A bad person isn’t 
just someone who does bad things; it’s someone who does them on purpose, who acts on 
a desire to hurt others (or just without concern for them).  In short, the bulk of our social 
and moral lives depends on an important relation holding between individuals, their 
characters and values, and the things that they do.  So, when we ask why responsibility is 
important, this relation gives us our answer. 
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 It’s no wonder, then, why philosophers from the beginning have been interested in 
giving an account of what’s required to be responsible for what we do.  Responsibility 
underwrites practices that concern much of what’s deeply important about our lives: our 
sense of being in control of how our lives go, the value we place on interpersonal 
relationships like friendship and romantic love, and our practices of blaming and praising 
others.  Given its importance, we might start to worry that we don’t have a professional 
consensus on what the right account is.  “Surely,” we might say, “this isn’t the sort of 
thing to still have unanswered!”  Now that we know how important the question is, we 
can look at why it has been thought difficult to answer. 
 
 
1.2. The Problem of Responsibility – or – Why Write a Dissertation on Responsibility? 
HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLES are often a good way to illustrate philosophical points, and the 
literature on responsibility is riddled with them.  This dissertation is no different, so we 
might as well start early.  Suppose that you’re out to dinner at a nice Italian restaurant.  
You’re perusing the menu.  The pasta primavera looks good, but you haven’t had 
eggplant parmesan in a while, and this particular establishment is famous for their brick-
oven pizzas.  If you’re like most people, it seems completely up to you what you will end 
up ordering and eating.3  Our futures look to us like a set of “forking paths.”  You could 
equally well choose the pasta or the eggplant or the pizza.  What you choose will depend 
on factors like what you’re in the mood for, what you ate last night, what other people at 
the table are ordering, etc.  As this example illustrates, when faced with decisions, from 
                                               
3 I’m assuming that all three options are available in the sense that the restaurant hasn’t run out of necessary 
ingredients and the oven isn’t broken, etc. 
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important ones to the more mundane, we see our choices as selecting from a range of 
genuinely available options, and we direct the course of our lives in a significant way.  If 
all the restaurant offered was eggplant parmesan, then besides being a very strange 
restaurant, your perusal of the menu would be unnecessary.  It also wouldn’t matter what 
you’re in the mood for or what other people are ordering.  There’s only one dish to order: 
eggplant parmesan.  It’s hard in such a case to see this as being your choice.  The result 
was inevitable given the starting conditions. 
 Here’s the rub: there seem to be theses about the world that, if true, would make 
all of our choices seem like a choice of eggplant parmesan from a one-item menu.  And if 
responsibility really requires a notion of choice that corresponds to our self-conception, 
then it appears that these theses are incompatible with responsibility.  These theses, if 
true, would show that we aren’t really responsible for what we do.  Historically, there are 
a number of such theses that have been examined, but one thesis has emerged as 
seemingly the most dangerous for responsibility: the thesis of determinism.  There are 
many ways to state the thesis of determinism.  Here’s Al Mele’s helpful gloss: “[A]t any 
instant exactly one future is compatible with the state of the universe at that instant and 
the laws of nature.”4  Basically, the thesis of determinism states that the conjunction of a 
complete description of the universe at some instant and the laws of nature entail every 
subsequent truth.  Every event is completely determined by the past and the laws of 
nature. 
 Determinism is a particularly dangerous thesis because of its extraordinary 
plausibility.  Science, at least for anything bigger than quantum particles, seems 
thoroughly deterministic.  Given a complete description of a system, the laws of nature 
                                               
4 Mele [2006], p.3. 
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tell us just what will happen at every instant.  So it seems we cannot easily reject 
determinism.  And if so, then the consequences seem initially dire.  If determinism means 
that we aren’t responsible, then we can only be responsible on pain of rejecting an 
eminently plausible scientific thesis.5  Three options present themselves when faced with 
this result: one can either (1) reject determinism or (2) reject responsibility or (3) reject 
our self-conception of choice.  These options correspond nicely to the contemporary 
views on responsibility.  Let’s examine each briefly. 
 Libertarians accept that responsibility is incompatible with determinism, but opt 
for rejecting determinism.  They claim that responsibility requires our self-conception of 
choice, and that if determinism were true, our self-conception of choice would have to be 
wrong.  But, they argue, determinism is false, so we can still be responsible for what we 
do.  But rejecting determinism is a difficult path to take.  First, because determinism is so 
plausible scientifically.  Second, because rejecting it doesn’t seem to secure our self-
conception of choice.  Science has been very successful in describing and explaining the 
world around us, and its achievements hardly need elaboration.  I won’t belabor the point 
here.  Instead, let us suppose that the indeterminacy in quantum mechanics raises enough 
doubts that perhaps determinism might be false as a general thesis. 
 The problem for libertarians is that it isn’t clear how indeterminism secures our 
self-conception of choice.6  Indeterminism requires that given the same initial starting 
                                               
5 Quantum mechanics are famously indeterministic, and some have exploited this fact in their accounts (see 
Kane [1998]).  But indeterminism doesn’t fare much better in securing our self-conception of choice as I 
explain below. 
6 Not all libertarians resort to indeterminism for their solution.  Some defend a view called “agent-
causation,” wherein agents can also be causes of things.  But whereas deterministic laws govern events 
causing other events, agent-causes stand outside this deterministic framework and don’t necessarily rest on 
indeterministic laws either.  However, such views not only posit a mysterious “new” type of cause, their 
thesis seems even less plausible initially than purely indeterministic libertarian accounts.  I’ll discuss agent-
causation no further. 
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conditions and laws of nature it was possible that you ordered a different meal then you 
did.  At first, this looks remarkably like our self-conception of choice.  But notice what 
the initial starting conditions include.  They include, among other things, your wants and 
desires, your beliefs and values, etc.  So indeterminacy requires that given that you 
wanted the eggplant parmesan most and believed you could order it, you still might not 
have ordered it.  Suddenly, indeterminism doesn’t look so promising for securing our 
self-conception of choice. 
 This isn’t a knockdown argument against libertarianism, of course.  Libertarians 
have resources to try and recapture our self-conception of choice.  But they bear a burden 
of showing how indeterminism in the right place is enough to secure our view of choice 
and that their account is compatible with a plausible scientific worldview.  This burden 
makes libertarianism seem, to many eyes, not a particularly attractive view. 
 Hard incompatibilists7 opt for rejecting responsibility.  They agree with 
libertarians that determinism is incompatible with our self-conception of choice, but 
argue that our self-conception of choice cannot be salvaged.  They think our self-
conception is doomed either because determinism is in fact true, or because 
indeterminism is no help after all.  And since they hold that our self-conception of choice 
is necessary for responsibility, we are never responsible for what we do.  Given the 
important role I illustrated responsibility plays, it would seem that hard incompatibilism 
is a position we should want to avoid.  If it’s true that our relationships and vital social 
and moral practices depend on our being responsible for things we do, then if we are not 
                                               
7 This is Derk Pereboom’s label for the position.  Traditionally, the rejecters of responsibility were called 
“hard determinists” who argued that because the thesis of determinism is true, we aren’t responsible for 
what we do.  But given the recent popularity of the second position, which includes arguments that 
irrespective of the truth of determinism we aren’t responsible for what we do, it’s simplest to bring both 
positions under a single heading. 
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responsible these things would either lose much of their value in our lives or else these 
practices fall apart altogether.  Because of this, many hard incompatibilists additionally 
defend the claim that much of what we value about the practices that depend on 
responsibility could be salvaged without our truly being responsible for what we do.8  
However, it would seem that if we can retain all of what is important about responsibility, 
it would be a preferable option to hard incompatibilism. 
 Again, this isn’t an argument against hard incompatibilism.  But it’s important, I 
think, to foreshadow the respective costs positions on the problem of responsibility incur.  
And it seems a reasonable aim that we should want to retain in as full a manner as 
possible all that is pretheoretically important to us regarding responsibility: our sense of 
being in control of how our lives go, the value we place on interpersonal relationships 
like friendship and romantic love, and our practices of blaming and praising others.  
Now, surely, hard incompatibilists will say they do just this, since we cannot retain 
responsibility in light of a plausible scientific picture of the world.  Nevertheless, it seems 
that if we can agree on the stated goal, we should explore every theoretical avenue 
towards doing better than hard incompatibilism offers, if at all possible.  And there is a 
final avenue to explore. 
Compatibilists argue that responsibility and determinism are perfectly compatible.  
They can do this by showing that responsibility does not in fact depend on our self-
conception of choice.  Instead, they offer alternative accounts of what sorts of abilities 
individuals must possess in order to be responsible for what they do.  They argue that the 
conditions necessary for responsibility can be satisfied even if determinism is true (i.e., 
even given the most plausible scientific picture of the world).  There is, as might be 
                                               
8 For instance, see Pereboom [2001] and Sommers [2007]. 
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expected, an enormous range of possible compatibilist views.  Instead of cataloging each 
one, I propose to make a few comments in favor of compatibilism generally. 
The promise of compatibilism is that it offers us all we could want out of a theory 
of responsibility.  Even if the world is as science tells us it is, fear not, for we are still 
responsible for what we do, and so we can retain the robust notions of friendship and 
love, the complicated social practices of blaming and praising, our genuine sense of 
accomplishment at artistic creation or scholarly achievement, all of these things we deem 
important and valuable aspects of human life that depend on our being responsible for 
what we do. 
Given this promise, I think compatibilism should be the default position.  At least, 
incompatibilist positions bear the burden of arguing us out of compatibilism.  If no fault 
can be found with a compatibilist theory, then, it should not be rejected simply because it 
abandons our self-conception of choice.  I am tempted by this picture because I see no 
way to plausibly retain our self-conception if determinism is true, and I find determinism 
too plausible to endorse a theory that requires its falsity.  I don’t expect any of this to 
convince either libertarians or hard incompatibilists.  But convincing them isn’t my aim.  
Instead, my aim is to build the most promising compatibilist theory of responsibility, and 
thus, in my view, the most promising theory of responsibility. 
 
1.3. Building a Theory of Responsibility – or – What Should a Dissertation on 
ResponsibilityDo? 
 
THE PROBLEM OF RESPONSIBILITY essentially boils down to two questions.  First, what 
conditions must individuals meet in order to be responsible for what they do?  Second, 
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are creatures such as us in a world such as ours capable of meeting those conditions?9  
These questions pull against each other.  The more stringent the conditions on 
responsibility, the harder they are to meet, and the greater the chance that we will be 
unable to satisfy them given a complete scientific picture of the world.  The more relaxed 
the conditions, the easier they are to meet, but the more we may doubt their sufficiency 
for securing responsibility. 
 This way of conceiving the dialectic is particularly helpful, since it enables a 
theorist to use these questions as a guide for building a theory of responsibility.  This is 
what my dissertation does.  It begins with an initial assumption: most people are 
responsible for many of the things they do.  I think this is a plausible assumption, one that 
is supported by our interpersonal practices and required by many of our ordinary beliefs 
and conduct.  Granting this assumption, one can build a theory in two “easy” steps.  First, 
determine the essential notions and core phenomena a theory of responsibility is 
supposed to explain.  Second, what are the weakest conditions sufficient for explaining 
such notions and phenomena.  The aim is to provide a set of conditions maximally 
compatible with the world as we know it.  The “best” theory would explain all that 
needed explaining with the conditions that are easiest to satisfy given our world. 
On this model, we can even weigh the prospective merits of various theories.  One 
that more easily secured responsibility at the cost of explaining some key notions or 
phenomena would bear a burden of showing why such notions were not really so 
                                               
9 Answering the first question requires a theory of what I call “local” responsibility (responsibility for the 
particular things individuals do).  Answering the second requires a theory of responsible agency.  A full  
theory of responsibility gives both answers.  My approach is to answer the first question first, and then use 
that answer to develop an account of responsible agency.  This is not, as I see it, the standard order of 
approach.  For examples of accounts that begin (and perhaps end) with responsible agency, see Fischer and 
Ravizza [1998]; Frankfurt [1988]; Wolf [1990]. 
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important, or else this fact would count against the theory.  A theory that explained all the 
relevant data, but was unable to secure responsibility in a wide set of cases, would bear 
the burden of showing that explaining the phenomena was worth the cost of losing such 
responsibility. 
 
1.4. My Theory of Responsibility – or – What Does My Dissertation Do? 
TO CONCLUDE THIS Introduction, I want to do two things.  First, try to give some sense of 
the historical context into which this dissertation fits.  Anyone who gives a compatibilist 
theory of responsibility is obligated, I think, to note how it is related to the dominant 
compatibilist strategy, originating with Peter Strawson.  His rich and insightful 1962 
article sparked a fascinating program for explaining responsibility, one to which all 
subsequent compatibilist accounts are at least partially beholden.  Second, I want to give 
a brief outline of the structure of the dissertation.  I turn to these tasks now. 
 
1.4.1. Strawsonian Compatiblism 
THE DOMINANT COMPATIBILIST strategy for explaining responsibility is Strawsonian 
Compatibilism.  This is a very wide label that captures many different particular 
accounts, all of which can stake a claim to Strawsonianism given the richness of the 
original article.  In 1962, Peter Strawson published “Freedom and Resentment,”10 and 
revolutionized the compatibilist program.  The Strawsonian program consists of two 
prongs.  The First Prong is to avoid the worries that determinism poses by explaining 
responsibility in terms of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness.  These latter two 
                                               
10 Strawson, P. [1962]. 
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notions he associated with our social practices of holding each other responsible, and the 
normative status of those practices in our lives, Strawson thought, would not be affected 
by the truth or falsity of determinism.  No matter our metaphysical views, we would still 
depend on viewing others as importantly connected to those actions they did on purpose, 
the ones that seem to evince their attitudes towards us and the world.  By translating 
metaphysical talk of ‘being responsible’ for something into the normative language of 
when it’s appropriate to ‘hold someone responsible’ for something, Strawson claimed we 
can avoid the threats to responsibility posed by determinism.  Such metaphysical theses 
only threaten our metaphysics, not the robust and interconnected web of normative 
practices that pervade our interpersonal relationships and social lives.  The First Prong 
boils down to treating claims of being responsible as claims about when it’s appropriate 
to blame and praise people. 
 The Second Prong is a method for determining what the conditions on 
responsibility actually are.  Strawson’s suggestion was to distill the conditions on 
responsibility out of those considerations that make it inappropriate to blame or praise 
individuals.  As Strawson saw it, if we can rule out all the potential considerations that 
would render blame or praise inappropriate, then the individual in question is responsible.  
Those considerations that undermine responsibility, then, could give us a set of negative 
conditions on responsibility.  So long as there is no undermining factor, the agent is 
responsible for the conduct in question. 
In this way, Strawson considered our social practices of blaming, praising, and 
excusing as helpful signposts to what’s necessary for responsibility.  By looking to the 
considerations we take to make blaming or praising someone inappropriate, we highlight 
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those considerations that render agents non-responsible for given actions.  If we can rule 
out the presence of any such undermining factor, then the agent is responsible: we’d be 
liable to react to their actions in the ways distinctive of our responsibility-related 
practices, blaming them for bad things, and praising them for good things. 
Strawson’s influence cannot be underestimated.  His suggestive program reoriented the 
compatibilist perspective on the problem responsibility.  If Strawson is correct, even were 
we to all become convinced of determinism’s truth, it wouldn’t undermine our 
commitment to holding others responsible.  Strawsonian’s view was an optimistic 
venture, built on the importance of our social practices to our lives as agents.  Of course, 
Strawson had and has his critics.  The main worry is that there is a natural intuition that 
the normative status of our social practices must in some way depend on some 
metaphysical truths about the sorts of creatures we are.  Critics are apt to claim that 
retaining a commitment to our social practices even in the face of evidence that we don’t 
really have the powers or abilities we think we do is something like dogmatism.  It looks 
to critics as though Strawsonianism simply assumes we are responsible and subsequently 
claims that nothing could shake our belief in this commitment.  At it’s best, then, 
Strawsonian Compatibilism is the promise of responsibility come what may; at it’s worst, 
it is pure Pollyanna-ism. 
 
1.4.2. The Structure of the Dissertation 
I AM A COMPATIBILIST, and I think Strawson was right about a good many important 
things, but his program is also fundamentally flawed.  This dissertation begins in Chapter 
2 with the promising strategy Strawson gave us for determining the conditions on 
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responsibility: look to the considerations that undermine responsibility.  I examine core 
instances of undermining factors, like accidents, inadvertence, and mistakes.  Moreover, I 
examine instances of undermining factors for both cases of blameworthiness and 
praiseworthiness.  When we look across such cases, a natural observation emerges.  The 
same considerations undermine both blameworthiness and praiseworthiness in the same 
way.  A natural conclusion to draw is that blameworthiness and praiseworthiness must 
share some feature that explains why the undermining factors have this symmetrical 
effect.  And since one can be neither blameworthy nor praiseworthy without also being 
responsible, a natural and plausible hypothesis is that the undermining factors work by 
undermining an explanatorily prior notion of responsibility shared by blameworthiness 
and praiseworthiness. 
 If this is right, it poses a severe challenge to Strawsonian Compatibilism’s First 
Prong.  Recall, the First Prong was to explain responsibility in terms of blameworthiness 
and praiseworthiness.  But if a prior notion of responsibility is required in order to 
explain the symmetrical operation of the undermining factors then it appears that 
Strawsonian Compatibilism cannot explain compelling and core data.  This is especially 
problematic for Strawsonianism because we arrive at the data by following the Second 
Prong of its own program.  As a result of this difficulty, I argue we ought to reject the 
First Prong of Strawsonian Compatibilism in favor of pursuing the promise of the Second 
Prong’s explanatory strategy.   
 I take up this task in Chapter 3, categorizing the undermining factors according to 
features about the agent or his action that each factor shares.  Using this categorization, I 
pursue a suggestive hypothesis: perhaps each category of undermining factor highlights 
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that a condition necessary for responsibility is unmet in the given case.  By looking to the 
categories of undermining factors and the features each suggests we can actually build 
positive conditions on responsibility.  After my categorization, we have three classes of 
undermining factors: those that show the action was involuntary; those that show the 
outcome was unintentional or unforeseen; and those that show the agent had false beliefs 
about the nature of his action.  According to the hypothesis, these categories give us three 
positive conditions on responsibility.  In order for an agent to be responsible for a 
particular action or outcome, it must be the case that: (1) the action was voluntary; (2) the 
outcome was at least foreseen; and, (3) the agent had no relevant false beliefs about the 
nature of his action.  These are obvious simplifications of the conditions, and they require 
much elaboration.  I conclude Chapter 3 by specifying exactly what each condition 
requires. 
 The above three conditions are, perhaps surprisingly, both individually necessary 
and jointly sufficient for responsibility.  I defend these two claims in Chapters 4 & 5, 
respectively.  My claim that the conditions are necessary is counterintuitive.  We 
commonly think that negligent agents are (or at least can be) responsible for at least some 
of the effects of their negligent conduct.  But the outcomes of negligence are often 
unforeseen.  I show that explaining responsibility in cases of negligence is a problem for 
all views about responsibility, and that the standard way of explaining it, what is known 
in the literature as ‘tracing,’ is deeply problematic.  Moreover, I give an alternative model 
for thinking about negligence cases that helps explain our reactions and judgments to 
such cases without committing to the claim that negligent agents are responsible.  
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Adopting my model preserves what’s central about cases of negligence and defends my 
conditions as necessary for responsibility. 
 Chapter 5 examines a number of separate arguments, each of which concludes 
there is a further necessary condition on responsibility, one that I’ve omitted.  I rebut 
these objections, in each case claiming that the arguments fail to secure their conclusions 
and that we can retain satisfactory explanations of the core phenomena involved without 
modifying my list of necessary conditions.  In doing so, I defend my three conditions as 
jointly sufficient as well. 
 Chapter 6 brings the discussion full circle.  In Chapter 2 I rejected the First Prong 
of the Strawsonian Compatibilist Program.  The attractiveness of and motivation behind 
that prong was to explain the metaphysically worrisome notion of responsibility in terms 
of the less tricky notions of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness.  Indeed, much of the 
attractiveness of Strawsonian Compatibilism in general lies in its promise of making the 
truth of determinism largely irrelevant to securing responsibility.  I argue in Chapter 6 
that rejecting the First Prong does not weaken my compatibilist account in the face of 
determinism, nor do my conditions rest on the truth of any tenuous metaphysical claims.  
I show that all that must be true of humans in order to be responsible is that we possess 
and regularly exercise three capacities, each corresponding to one of my three conditions 
on responsibility.  And I argue that it should be uncontroversial that ordinary agents 
possess these capacities and routinely exercise them.  We should only doubt our being 




 Thus, my view secures responsibility for what we do and all the core phenomena 
associated with such a notion so long as an agent acts voluntarily to produce an outcome 
he foresaw and had no relevant false beliefs about what he was doing.  The commitments 
of such a view are quite minimal and are compatible with a wide-range of plausible 
scientific views, including determinism.  Indeed, the commitments are so weak that we 
should have the utmost confidence that we do satisfy them most of time.  And we should 
therefore have the utmost confidence that we are responsible for most of what we do, in a 














I WILL BE DEFENDING a brand of compatibilism: that even in a deterministic world, where 
every event is entailed by the state of the world prior to that event and the laws of 
physics, agents can be morally responsible for what they do.  I motivate my 
compatibilism by illustrating a serious problem that faces the most prominent 
compatibilist strategy currently on offer.  In doing so, I aim to indirectly support an 
alternative account for explaining responsibility.  Chapters 3-5 then examine the 
prospects for such an account. 
A common compatibilist approach to analyzing moral responsibility is to explain 
it in terms of our practices of praising and blaming others.  To be responsible, on this 
approach, is to be appropriately held responsible.  The conditions on responsibility, then, 
are the conditions that make it appropriate to be blamed (or praised).  Being responsible 
is simply being blameworthy or praiseworthy.  Such an approach is thought to avoid 
difficult metaphysical commitments involved in incompatibilist accounts of 
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responsibility, while tying the notion of responsibility intimately to practices with which 
we are quite familiar and about which we hold strong intuitive judgments.  Call this the 
Strawsonian Approach to responsibility.11 
 This chapter argues that Strawsonian accounts12 of responsibility fail to 
adequately explain a set of similarities between instances of undermined blameworthiness 
and undermined praiseworthiness.  I claim that explaining these similarities suggests a 
notion of responsibility that is explanatorily prior to and significantly independent of our 
practices of praising and blaming.  Thus, Strawsonian accounts face a significant obstacle 
that has not as yet been met. 
                                               
11 The classic statement of the position is P.F. Strawson [1962], “Freedom and Resentment”, which focuses 
on the set of reactive attitudes we experience towards others in response to their conduct.  A more recent 
and more developed account can be found in R. Jay Wallace [1994], Responsibility and the Moral 
Sentiments.  Strawson’s essay is a deeply rich and fertile discussion of many aspects of the free will and 
moral responsibility issue.  Because of this complexity, many other authors consider their views 
“Strawsonian” while following his lead in only one of these many aspects.  I of course do not take issue 
with every possible aspect of every plausibly Strawsonian position.  My chief target in this paper is the 
Strawsonian strategy of explaining the notion of being responsible through our practices of praising and 
blaming.  This aspect is crucially central to “Freedom and Resentment” and I take it forms the core of 
Strawson’s approach to moral responsibility.  The Strawsonian accounts I argue against here are unified by 
this strategy.  For example, Jonathan Bennett claims that “someone is ‘accountable’ for an action…if a 
blame- or praise-related response to the action would not be inappropriate” (Bennett [1980], p.15).  For 
Bennett, ‘accountable’ simply means ‘blameworthy or praiseworthy’.  Daniel Dennett suggests that 
understanding when individuals are responsible for what they do requires first distilling the social purpose 
behind holding others responsible (most notably by punishing those that do wrong).  He states that 
“whatever responsibility is…unless we can tie it to some recognizable social desideratum, it will have no 
rational claim on our esteem” (Dennett [1984], p.163).  Throughout Dennett seems chiefly concerned with 
the social upshots of our practices and reactive attitudes, and gives them the priority of explanation and 
defense.  Pete Graham focuses on explaining blameworthiness in terms of the ‘blame emotions’ (i.e., a 
narrow class of reactive attitudes).  As he puts it, “[the blame emotions] are the emotions the appropriate 
feeling of which toward someone is constitutive of that person’s being blameworthy” (Graham [2005], p.5).  
Michael McKenna defends the Strawsonian view that “moral responsibility is constituted by a range of 
attitudes” (McKenna [1998], p.124).  Manuel Vargas offers a revisionist version of the Strawsonian 
Approach to analyzing responsibility.  As he puts it, the revisionist Strawsonian means “by ‘S is 
responsible’…that there is some justified moral consideration…that entitles us to adopt towards S the 
stance characterized by [our] responsibility-characteristic beliefs, practices, and attitudes” (Vargas [2004], 
p.232).  Watson expands and defends (at least portions of) Strawson’s original approach in “Responsibility 
and the Limits of Evil.”  To that end, he seems to endorse the view that “[i]t is not that we hold people 
responsible because they are responsible; rather, the idea…that we are responsible is to be understood by 
the practice [of holding responsible]” (Watson [1987], p.258, his italics). 
12 I will refer to “the Strawsonian Approach” and “Strawsonian accounts” interchangeably.  The distinctive 
feature of the approach, as I understand it, is that it explains ‘being responsible’ in terms of our practices of 
‘holding responsible’.  Particular accounts are united by this take on the explanatory priority of our 
practices, but could differ in other respects. 
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 The structure of the chapter is straightforward.  Section 2 considers a partial set of 
data, cases in which moral blameworthiness and praiseworthiness are presumably 
undermined.  I focus on this narrow set in order to draw out the problem that I think faces 
Strawsonian accounts.  When we look at these cases, a noticeable symmetry emerges: the 
same considerations that undermine moral blameworthiness undermine moral 
praiseworthiness too.  From this observation, I construct a constraint for explanatory 
adequacy that any account of responsibility must meet.  Specifically, I claim that all 
accounts must be able to explain why the same factors that undermine moral 
blameworthiness seem to do so in the same way for moral praiseworthiness.  I call this 
the Symmetry Challenge, and I argue that Strawsonian accounts as they are typically 
conceived face special difficulties in meeting it.  I also provide a tentative alternative 
answer to the Symmetry Challenge, claiming it is both a natural and plausible response.  
This is to highlight the fact that the problem facing Strawsonian accounts is not a general 
problem for all theories of responsibility.  In Section 3, I present what I take to be the best 
Strawsonian response to the Symmetry Challenge, drawing on the suggestion that the 
appropriateness of blame and praise depend on the agent in question manifesting a 
quality of will.  Then I show why the proposed response fails by expanding on the 
Symmetry Challenge.  I introduce the remainder of my data, widening my focus to 
include cases of seemingly undermined non-moral blameworthiness and non-moral 
praiseworthiness.  In these cases, too, it is the same considerations doing the work as in 
the moral cases.  Thus, the challenge runs even deeper than one might have initially 
thought, and proves a greater obstacle for the Strawsonian Approach.  Section 4 provides 
a final revision of the Strawsonian Approach constructed to meet the challenge, and I 
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show why it fails.  As a result, Strawsonian accounts, as yet, have failed to meet the 
Symmetry Challenge, but their failure is instructive.  In revising such an account so as to 
meet the challenge, success seems to depend on abandoning explanatory reliance on our 
practices.  Thus, the Symmetry Challenge requires that explanatorily adequate theories 
must formulate a notion of responsibility explanatorily prior to and significantly 
independent of our practices.  In light of my argument, I think such an analysis of 
responsibility is worth revisiting.  I consider some final objections in Section 5. 
 
2.2. Blameworthiness, Praiseworthiness, and Undermining Factors 
2.2.1. Moral Blameworthiness and Blame-Undermining Factors 
I BEGIN WITH A METHODOLOGICAL assumption: any account of responsibility ought to tell 
us just when an agent is responsible for something.  In order to do this, I think, an 
account must make sense of the conditions that undermine responsibility.  There are 
certain factors that, when present, undermine an agent’s blameworthiness.  Call these 
blame-undermining factors.  These are also known as excuses.13 
 The Strawsonian Approach treats being responsible in terms of being 
appropriately held responsible.  Thus, on Strawsonian accounts, being blameworthy is 
being appropriately blamed.  So on this view, it follows that blame-undermining factors 
must imply that it would be inappropriate to blame an agent under the circumstances.  For 
example, suppose Fred pokes Barney’s eye.  Normally, this would be an instance where 
                                               
13 It is perhaps more common to refer to such considerations as excuses or mitigating conditions.  I prefer to 
use ‘blame-undermining factors’ because unlike excuses or mitigations, the language of undermining 
factors applies more readily to praiseworthiness.  For that reason, and since my focus is on drawing 
particular parallels between undermined blameworthiness and praiseworthiness, I opt for the less familiar 
term.  See also n.6, below.  Moreover, I think that the term ‘excuses’ covers more considerations than only 
those that undermine responsibility.  I take up this discussion in Chapter 2, Sec.3. 
 
 23
blaming Fred would be appropriate.  But suppose that Fred was opening a bottle of 
champagne, and the cork popped, bounced off a wall and hit Barney in the eye.  It seems 
as if Fred shot Barney in the eye, but only accidentally.  And the fact that it was an 
accident seems to undermine Fred’s blameworthiness for shooting Barney.  Accidents are 
blame-undermining factors.14 
 Accidents are only one type of excuse.  Suppose that Jan takes Marsha’s jacket 
without asking.  This is another case in which blame would seem appropriate.  But 
suppose that they unknowingly wore the same jacket to the party, so Jan thought she was 
taking her own jacket home.  It seems that Jan’s blameworthiness is undermined.  She 
meant to take her jacket, and only took Marsha’s jacket by mistake.  So, mistakes are 
blame-undermining factors as well. 
 Finally, suppose Barbie hits Ken.  Here again is an intuitive case of 
blameworthiness.  But suppose they were both riding in an elevator when Barbie suffered 
an epileptic fit, and in the course of her thrashing, she hit Ken.  As in the cases above, 
Barbie’s blameworthiness seems undermined too, and it seems to be the fact that her 
behavior was involuntary that does the undermining.  Involuntariness, it seems, is also a 
blame-undermining factor. 
 Now we have a set of three blame-undermining factors: accident, mistake, and 
involuntariness.  There are others, but these shall suffice for my purposes here.15  
                                               
14 It might seem here as if I’m relying on intuitions to make my case.  But I’m not.  I avoid claiming that 
accidents intuitively undermine responsibility.  Instead, I take my examples to highlight core cases of 
undermining factors, cases which, I maintain, decisively and uncontroversially undermine responsibility.  I 
claim accidents really are blame-undermining factors, not just that this is intuitively true.  Since every 
theory must begin somewhere, my account begins with this core data.  Whatever the best theory of 
responsibility is, therefore, I submit it would have to treat the core cases of undermining factors as 
undermining responsibility. 
15 At no point in this chapter do I give an exhaustive list of the undermining factors.  Completeness would 
count in favor of such a task, but brevity and accessibility of the argument count decisively against it. 
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Accident, mistake, and involuntariness, when present, serve to undermine our ascriptions 
of blame.  It follows from my methodological approach that on a Strawsonian account 
they do so by making it inappropriate to blame the agent.  I will consider this the 
Strawsonian account of blame-undermining factors. 
 
2.2.2. Moral Praiseworthiness and Praise-Undermining Factors 
I HAVE ALREADY OUTLINED the very brief and basic account for a Strawsonian 
understanding of how undermining factors affect ascriptions of blameworthiness.  When 
blameworthiness is undermined, it is due to some blame-undermining factor, which 
makes blaming the agent inappropriate.  These blame-undermining factors count as 
considerations that mitigate our blame responses.  Now, we might also think that there 
are considerations that mitigate our praise responses.  I’ll call these praise-undermining 
factors.16  The Strawsonian Approach for praiseworthiness, then, is the analogue to the 
story for blameworthiness.  Thus, it follows that being praiseworthy just means being 
appropriately praised.  So, according to my methodological assumption, the Strawsonian 
Approach seems committed to understanding praise-undermining factors as those factors 
that show praise to be inappropriate under the circumstances.17 
                                               
16 We don’t typically refer to praise-undermining factors as excuses.  But to my mind, this is because 
excuses have become indispensable for the role they play as responses to accusations of one sort or another.  
We typically don’t accuse others of having done something good, and so praise-undermining factors are not 
needed for defenses in such cases.  Nonetheless, we do often refer to praise-undermining factors to show 
certain responses to others as inappropriate.  This section highlights some examples of when this is the 
case.  They could also be called praise-mitigating factors, or even “praisecuses”. 
17 There could be two ways we think praise inappropriate.  First, we might not think anything good has 
really come about.  Second, we might agree that good has come about, but think that nevertheless the agent 
isn’t praiseworthy on account of the outcome.  I intend for the following examples to highlight the second 
of these thoughts.  Should an example prompt the first thought, the reader is invited to construct a parallel 
case where good does come about. 
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 Suppose that Bruce saves a child’s life.  Certainly, this is normally a meritorious 
deed.  But suppose that Bruce was fishing off the pier, when his hook caught something.  
As he reels in what he thinks is a large fish, it turns out he hooked a drowning boy by his 
jacket.  It surely seems as if praise would be inappropriate in this case.  Bruce didn’t 
mean to save the child; he only did so accidentally.  And the fact that it was an accident 
seems to undermine his praiseworthiness.  Accidents are praise-undermining factors. 
 Imagine that Diana thinks she’s adding sugar to a customer’s coffee when she’s 
actually adding his heart medicine, without which he’ll die very shortly.  Diana saves the 
man’s life, and normally this would be a laudable deed, but under the circumstances it 
doesn’t seem to be appropriate to praise her.  After all, she only saves his life by mistake.  
So, it seems as if the mistake serves to undermine her praiseworthiness.  Mistake is also a 
praise-undermining factor. 
 Finally, suppose Clark saves a man’s life in the elevator.  This would indeed 
normally be a commendable act.  But suppose Clark suffered a seizure and in his flailing 
hit the man below the solar-plexus.  As it turns out, the man had just begun to choke, and 
Clark’s punch dislodged the culprit.  Clark saved the man’s life, but he did so 
involuntarily.  While we might be amazed at the “lucky” circumstances, it seems as if 
praising Clark in this case would be inappropriate.  It would be inappropriate because, 
while he saved the man’s life, he did so involuntarily.  As above, involuntariness, it 
seems, is a praise-undermining factor as well. 
 Now we have a set of three praise-undermining factors: accident, mistake, and 
involuntariness.  There are still others, but these will do for now.  When present, accident, 
mistake, and involuntariness serve to undermine our ascriptions of praise.  According to 
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the Strawsonian, they do so by making it inappropriate to praise the agent.  I will consider 
this the Strawsonian account of praise-undermining factors. 
 There is a natural observation to make at this point.  Our set of blame-
undermining factors is identical to our set of praise-undermining factors.18  The very 
same factors that make blame inappropriate also make praise inappropriate.  We now 
have a challenge we can present to any theory of responsibility: 
 
The Symmetry Challenge: Any account of the undermining factors must 
explain why the same factors undermine both 
blameworthiness and praiseworthiness, and do so 
in the same way. 
 
Failure to acknowledge the challenge commits one to denying that both blame and praise 
are undermined in the above cases.  And since I’ve assumed that any theory of 
responsibility must explain just when and why agents are or are not responsible in 
particular cases, failing to answer the challenge constitutes a failure to explain 
compelling theory-neutral phenomena regarding responsibility.  I will argue shortly that 
Strawsonian accounts have not yet met the challenge. 
 
2.2.3. A Simple Solution 
IT IS WORTH NOTING that the Symmetry Challenge is not a problem for every theory of 
responsibility.  For instance, the obvious conclusion to draw from the evidence above is 
that undermining factors affect something cases of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness 
                                               
18 I have used ‘accident’, ‘mistake’, and ‘involuntariness’ as representative examples of undermining 
factors.  As noted above, I do not mean them to be an exhaustive list.  I leave it to the reader to run parallel 
test cases with other common factors, such as ‘inadvertence’ and ‘ignorance’. 
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share.  And given the plausible assumption that being morally responsible for something 
is a necessary condition for one’s being blameworthy or praiseworthy for it, a natural 
inference to draw is that the shared component of such cases involves an explanatorily 
prior and independent notion of responsibility.19  I’ll call this the Simple Solution to the 
Symmetry Challenge.20  Blameworthiness, on this account, is explained in terms of being 
responsible for something morally bad.  Praiseworthiness is explained in terms of being 
responsible for something morally good.  An extremely appealing explanation of how 
these factors undermine blameworthiness and praiseworthiness, then, is that they do so in 
virtue of showing that the agent was not responsible for the thing in question, where the 
conditions on responsibility are in some suitable way independent of and met prior to 
those for blameworthiness or praiseworthiness.  More needs to be said to fill such an 
account out, but it meets the Symmetry Challenge in a straightforward and plausible way.  
 
  
2.3. The Strawsonian Reply 
BUT CAN THE STRAWSONIAN Approach answer the challenge?  It could, if it could show 
that its accounts of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness share some feature that an 
answer could exploit.  That would show how the same considerations could affect both 
                                               
19 By ‘independent’ here, I mean independent of the evaluative component of properties of 
blameworthiness or its positive analogue praiseworthiness.  Any view that takes the conditions on moral 
responsibility to be explanatorily prior (or more fundamental) than those on praiseworthiness and 
blameworthiness would qualify.  Examples seem to include (here I consider compatibilists only) 
Frankfurt’s view, where one is responsible so long as one has a second-order desire to have the first-order 
desire that prompted the action, or possibly Fischer and Ravizza’s view, where one is responsible so long as 
(roughly) one has guidance control over the action.  These are obvious simplifications of both views, but in 
each case, the conditions on responsibility seem to be independent of a characterization of blameworthiness 
or praiseworthiness.  For a more detailed presentation of these views, see Frankfurt [1988]; and Fischer and 
Ravizza [1998]. 
20 Manuel Vargas has a similar answer, what he calls his “agent-based account”.  See Vargas [ms 1]. 
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blameworthiness and praiseworthiness.  So, recall how the Strawsonian Approach 
distinctively understands blameworthiness and praiseworthiness.  To be blameworthy is 
to be appropriately blamed; to be praiseworthy is to be appropriately praised.  Thus, there 
are norms that tell us when blame is appropriate and there are norms that tell us when 
praise is appropriate.  Undermining factors, we might suspect on this view, show why 
blame or praise under the circumstances would violate the given norm governing the 
case.  We might hope, then, that the norms governing the appropriateness of blame and 
the norms governing the appropriateness of praise share the same source.  If that were the 
case, then the Strawsonian would have an answer to the Symmetry Challenge.  These 
factors undermine blameworthiness and praiseworthiness in the same way because they 
show the response would violate the norms the attitudes constitutive of these notions 
share in the same way.  Just as in the Simple Solution above, we would have identified 
the common component between blameworthiness and praiseworthiness. 
 
2.3.1. The ‘Fittingness of Blame’ and Quality of Will 
RECALL THAT THE STRAWSONIAN Approach explains blameworthiness and 
praiseworthiness in terms of the appropriateness of the responses constitutive of blame 
and praise.  Thus, to be blameworthy is to be appropriately blamed; to be praiseworthy is 
to be appropriately praised.  I want to consider an understanding of ‘appropriate’ that has 
gained substantial support in the philosophy of emotion, one that might prove helpful to 
the Strawsonian here. 
 In their paper “The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ‘Appropriateness’ of Emotions”, 
Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson explicate a non-moral sense of ‘appropriate’.  For 
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them, “to call an emotion appropriate is to say that the emotion is fitting: it accurately 
presents its object as having certain evaluative features.”21  Different emotions will 
present their objects as having different evaluative features.  For example, fear presents 
its object as being dangerous (or something like this).  Whether or not fear is appropriate, 
then, depends on whether or not the object really is dangerous.  Pete Graham takes up a 
similar line with respect to blame.  On his view, “[a]ny particular instance of blame...is 
appropriate just in case the object of that blame…has the features that the blame emotion 
imputes to it.”22  Just as fear is appropriate just in case it correctly presents its object as 
being dangerous, blame is appropriate just in case it correctly presents its object as 
having certain features distinctive of blame responses.  The relation between these 
responses (e.g., blame) and the properties of their objects, then, is analogous to the 
relation between belief and the world.23 
 Perhaps such an understanding of ‘appropriate’ can figure into an account of the 
undermining factors.  These factors, remember, render our responses inappropriate.  One 
hypothesis might be that the undermining factors show that the object does not actually 
possess the features presented by the response.  In order to determine the viability of such 
a hypothesis, then, we need to consider what features blame presents its object as having. 
We have a suggestion from Strawson and Wallace.  They suggest that our blame-
responses are primarily directed at the quality of will the agent’s behavior manifests.24  
This suggestion is illuminating.  Perhaps blame presents its object as having manifested 
                                               
21 D’Arms and Jacobson [2000a], p.65.  The italics are theirs. 
22 Graham [2005], p.11.  For Graham, the responses constitutive of blame are the emotions of resentment, 
indignation, and guilt. 
23 This analogy is made explicitly by D’Arms and Jacobson [2000a], p.68.  Patricia Greenspan explicitly 
offers an alternative sense of appropriateness, where ‘appropriate’ means roughly ‘fitting the reasons for 
the judgment’.  This is a radical summary of her view; details can be found in Greenspan [1988]. 
24 Wallace [1994], p.128.  Wallace is exclusively concerned with blame, but Strawson included “good will” 
in his characterization. 
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an ill quality of will.  And perhaps praise presents its object as having manifested a 
quality of good will.  The account on offer here suggests that praising and blaming are 
responses to the quality of will agents manifest towards us.  Indeed, this idea is at the 
heart of Strawson’s original proposal.25  The account on offer here, then, is that the 
undermining factors show that the agent’s behavior didn’t actually manifest a quality of 
ill will or good will.  When Fred shoots Barney by accident, it doesn’t reflect any ill will 
towards Barney on Fred’s part.  And when Bruce accidentally reels in the drowning child 
we can’t take this action to reflect Bruce’s good will for the child. 
We seem to have a promising Strawsonian answer to the Symmetry Challenge.  
The same factors undermine blameworthiness and praiseworthiness in the same way by 
showing that the quality of will blame and praise present their objects as having was not 
really there.  Therefore, blame and praise are inappropriate, and blameworthiness and 
praiseworthiness are undermined.  But there is a problem with this answer.  It fails to 
capture the full symmetrical operation of the undermining factors.  This is because the 
undermining factors affect even cases of non-moral praiseworthiness and 
blameworthiness.  In these cases, no quality of will is necessary in order for the agent to 
be praiseworthy or blameworthy.  To see this point, however, requires showing there to 
be non-moral instances of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, and that the 
undermining factors symmetrically operate even in these cases.  I turn now to that task. 
                                               
25 Compare Strawson [1962], p.63: "…it matters to us…whether the actions of other people…reflect 
attitudes towards us of goodwill, affection, and esteem, on the one hand or contempt, indifference, or 
malevolence on the other.” 
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2.3.2. The Symmetry Challenge Deepens 
THUS FAR, WE HAVE BEEN chiefly concerned with the moral appraisal of agents.  So we 
talked of moral blameworthiness and moral praiseworthiness.  We saw that the same 
kinds of factors that undermine moral blameworthiness do so for moral praiseworthiness 
as well.  Thus, I claimed, we should want an explanation of this symmetry that also 
shows why these factors undermine our responses in the same way.  This is the Symmetry 
Challenge in its first instance.  I now want to suggest that the challenge can be expanded 
in a way that further undercuts the ability for Strawsonian accounts to meet it. 
 First, there is at least one kind of non-moral appraisal that is nonetheless similarly 
susceptible to the undermining factors.  The fact that the practices involved in this mode 
of appraisal are themselves non-moral, and therefore different than those discussed 
above, deepens the set of related phenomena any satisfactory account of the undermining 
factors must explain.  The worry for Strawsonian accounts is that as the set of relevant 
practices grows larger, the prospects for distilling a common feature to explain the 
symmetry out of those practices grow smaller. 
 Second, it turns out there are actually many different kinds of non-moral appraisal, 
and that they all are susceptible to the undermining factors.  The fact that a large set of 
diverse praising and blaming practices are all similarly undermined by the same factors at 
the very least suggests that the burden placed on the Strawsonian Approach to be able to 
account for such widespread symmetry out of those practices is severe indeed.  And, I 
think, this evidence places Strawsonian accounts in the position of bearing such a burden, 
since the Simple Solution reached in Section 2.3 can be marshaled to again give a simple 




2.3.3. Artistic Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness 
WE HAVE ALREADY SEEN instances in which moral praise is warranted.  But there are also 
cases in which non-moral praise seems appropriate.  As Wallace himself notes, we 
sometimes praise an artist’s “striking and successful work of art,” and in so doing, “our 
praise and admiration reflect a kind of credit on its creator.”26  Like the moral cases, these 
cases involve taking a stance toward the agent, one that opens him “to direct assessment 
in virtue of the qualities reflected in the work.”27  We might call this particular case an 
example of ‘artistic’ praiseworthiness.  If Huckleberry paints a majestic landscape, it 
seems as if we can praise him for his artwork.  Of course, we don’t morally praise him.  
Creating a beautiful piece of art does not make one a morally good person.  But it does, it 
would seem, make one an artistically good person, at least as exemplified by that work.  
So, we can say that Huckleberry is artistically praiseworthy in this case. 
 Of particular interest, however, are the reasons for which we are apt to withhold 
our non-moral praise.28  Suppose we discover that Huckleberry painted his landscape 
while sleepwalking.  I take it we’d be far less likely to praise him for it.  In particular, 
while the painting itself may be no less aesthetically pleasing, it would not seem to reflect 
on him as an artist in the same way.  The painting seems the result of entirely involuntary 
conduct.  And it is this involuntariness which seems to undermine Huckleberry’s artistic 
praiseworthiness.  Indeed, the painting’s quality no longer reflects on him as an artist. 
                                               
26 Wallace [1994], pp.53-54. 
27 Wallace [1994], p.54. 
28 Completeness would dictate that I show the effects in each case of each type of undermining factor, but 
in the interests of space, I limit discussion in each case to a single type of undermining factor.  I leave it as 
an exercise for the reader to construct the other examples. 
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 We could run a similar example for artistic blameworthiness.  Wallace notes that 
we can “condemn the pianist’s latest performance…in a way that reflects discredit on the 
pianist, without blaming the pianist morally.”29  But as above, it would be inappropriate 
to blame the pianist if his poor performance was accidental.  Perhaps the piano was 
knocked out of tune, and so while his performance was poor, it doesn’t reflect on him 
poorly as an artist.   
 Wallace admits that we engage in artistic appraisal.  But he claims that “…this 
kind of direct appraisal does not seem especially moral in its quality.”30  From this he 
concludes that the artist is not morally responsible for his work, though he is “deeply” 
responsible, in some significant way.  Now, surely Wallace is correct to note that our 
appraisal of the artist in virtue of his work is non-moral.  But we should hesitate to draw 
too strong a conclusion from this fact.  Instead, the important observation to make is that 
even this sort of non-moral appraisal is affected by the undermining factors.  The fact that 
the action was involuntary or an accident mitigated our responses to the artist’s work in 
each case.  And the undermining factors seemed to affect our appraisal in the same way 
in each case.  The evidence suggests, therefore, that an adequate account of the 
undermining factors will not only have to explain why undermining factors make our 
practices of moral praising and blaming inappropriate, but also why it renders our 
practices of artistic praising and blaming inappropriate as well. 
 It follows that the Symmetry Challenge can be extended to instances of artistic 
appraisal.  And this extension ought to worry proponents of the Strawsonian Approach.  
For the non-moral character of the practices associated with artistic praise and blame 
                                               
29 Wallace [1994], p.54. 
30 Wallace [1994], p.53. 
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introduces an increased diversity among the range of practices from which such accounts 
seek a common feature with which to answer the challenge. 
 
2.3.4. Other Non-moral Modes of Appraisal and Undermining Factors 
THE WORRY FOR STRAWSONIAN accounts, however, is larger than the above section 
suggests.  There the worry was generated by observing that there is a non-moral mode of 
appraisal that the undermining factors nonetheless upset.  Thus, the Symmetry Challenge 
demands that a unified account be given of the undermining factors’ effect on both moral 
and artistic appraisal.31  Given the difference in the moral character of the two modes of 
appraisal, Strawsonian accounts would appear to have difficulty in locating a common 
feature to explain the symmetry out of those practices.  But the problem for Strawsonians 
is actually much larger.  It isn’t the case that there is only one mode of non-moral 
appraisal.  There are at least several non-moral modes.32 
 In addition to artistic praiseworthiness, there also seem to be cases of ‘scholastic’ 
praiseworthiness.  If Augie gets an ‘A’ on his math test, then it seems appropriate to 
praise him for this.  Praising him reflects the fact that he’s done something good and we 
are holding him responsible for it.  His test grade reflects well on him as a student.  
Again, it doesn’t make him a morally good person, but nonetheless, he seems, for lack of 
                                               
31 It is worth noting that my argument in Section 3.3 depends only on there being at least one non-moral 
mode of appraisal.  So, even if it turns out that there was good reason to reject artistic appraisal as a 
particular mode, the points in 3.3 could be restated using a different mode from this section.  I used artistic 
appraisal both because it seems intuitively plausible that such a mode exists, and because Wallace himself 
points to it as well. 
32 I do not mean the discussion below to provide an exhaustive list of the non-moral modes of appraisal, but 
merely select two additional prime examples of such modes.  Additionally, as in Section 3.3, I limit 
discussion of the undermining factors to one per mode of appraisal, in the interests of brevity. 
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a better term, ‘scholastically’ good on the basis of his test grade.  So, Augie is 
academically praiseworthy for his ‘A’. 
 Additionally, we sometimes appropriately praise athletes for at least some of their 
accomplishments.  If McGraw eagles the 14th hole at the Masters, we can rightly praise 
his performance.  Once again, this need not involve moral praise of any kind.  Such 
athletic performances don’t seem to reflect on the character of the actors in the way that 
moral actions do, and yet they do invite us to take certain stances toward their 
performers.  Something like this, I take it, serves as part of the rationale behind Most 
Valuable Player awards.  We acknowledge McGraw’s effort and the fact that he 
performed ‘athletically’ superbly.  So, I take it, McGraw is athletically praiseworthy for 
his eagle shot. 
 Now suppose that Augie merely circled answers on the test without thinking.  
While we might marvel at his luck, praise under the circumstances would be 
inappropriate.  It wasn’t as if he meant to get an ‘A’.33  The accidental nature of his ‘A’ 
seems to undermine his scholastic praiseworthiness,34 and the grade no longer reflects on 
Augie as a student.  And suppose that McGraw, for his eagle shot, mistakenly used a 7-
iron.  He meant to pull out his 4-iron (having misjudged the wind, say), but he grabbed 
the wrong club.  In this instance, praising him seems inappropriate.  While the result is 
positive, McGraw only scored an eagle by mistake.  And the fact that it was due to a 
                                               
33 This is true, I maintain, since he had no reason to think that any of his answers were likely to be correct.  
He may have ‘hoped’ to get an ‘A’, but this was a hope precisely because he no doubt believed it probable 
that he would score poorly. 
34 One might initially object to characterizing his ‘A’ as ‘accidental’.  But it surely isn’t the case that he 
meant to get an ‘A’.  He couldn’t have, as he was purely guessing.  And the result, his grade, seems 
unexpected in the way needed to classify it as accidental. 
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mistake undermines his athletic praiseworthiness.  The excellent shot no longer reflects 
on him as an athlete.35 
 Praiseworthiness is not limited to its moral instances.  We have seen cases that 
suggest praiseworthiness along alternative scales of value governed by alternative norms.  
Thus, Huckleberry is artistically praiseworthy in the sense that his painting reflects upon 
him as an artist (according to aesthetic norms, say).  Augie is academically praiseworthy 
in the sense that his test grade reflects upon him as a student (according to scholastic 
norms).  And McGraw is athletically praiseworthy in the sense that his play reflects upon 
him as an athlete (according to athletic norms).  We can no doubt see the similarity 
between these evaluations and those involved in cases of moral praising.  If Bruce had 
saved the drowning child on purpose, then the moral praise we accorded would reflect on 
him as a moral person.  We would employ a moral standard of some sort to evaluate his 
conduct and, finding it exemplary, praise him accordingly.  Similarly, in the non-moral 
cases, we measure the conduct against some other, non-moral standard; for instance, an 
artistic, scholastic, or athletic standard.  But in each case we are expressing the exemplary 
nature of that conduct with respect to the given standard.  While these happen to be non-
moral cases, the process of according praise seems strikingly similar to that of the moral 
domain.  Even more striking, however, is that the undermining factors show such praise 
to be inappropriate even in these non-moral cases. 
 We can also include analogous examples of non-moral blame.  We might evaluate 
a student’s oral presentation in a way that highlights a lack of scholarly achievement, 
without opening the student up to moral evaluation.  This would be a case of scholastic 
blame.  And we might say that Mr. Tennis-Player’s serve was unimpressive in the Men’s 
                                               
35 Or, if one prefers, as a “golf player.” 
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Final in a way that reflects poorly on Mr. T-P as an athlete without implying anything of 
his moral character.36  This would constitute athletic blame. 
 Just as in the cases of scholastic and athletic praise, the undermining factors 
operate here too.  If the student was supposed to write a report on Mother Teresa, but she 
wrote it on her mother, Teresa, then her poor report is the result of a mistake.  It seems 
that blaming her as a student would be inappropriate.37  And if Mr. T-P’s poor serve is 
the result of being drugged by his opponent, then it doesn’t reflect poorly on him as an 
athlete.  If we suppose his serve is involuntary, then this undermining factor renders even 
athletic blame inappropriate in this case.  It would seem then that blameworthiness, too, 
is not limited to its moral instances, and yet the undermining factors have a symmetrical 
effect here as well. 
 
2.3.5. The Expanded Symmetry Challenge and the Simple Solution for Non-Moral Cases 
THESE EXAMPLES SEEM sufficient for drawing out the point.  The set of undermining 
factors on these instances of non-moral appraisal is the same as the set of undermining 
factors on moral praiseworthiness and moral blameworthiness.  The undermining factors 
don’t seem to care whether the appraisal of the action is moral or non-moral in nature; 
they undermine them all in the same way.  It is the fact that something is an accident that 
                                               
36 I suspect intuitions here may differ.  But where they do, I think the objection will be that blaming in this 
way is moral in nature.  This claim, I suspect, is only justifiable if there is a moral obligation to, say, do 
well in school, or try one’s hardest in sports.  I am extremely skeptical such moral obligations exist.  But 
even if they do, and thus, academic or athletic blame is moral in nature, then these cases belong in the 
preceding discussion of moral blameworthiness.  Such a reorganization does nothing to hinder my 
argument here. 
37 This claim comes with certain caveats.  For instance, if the student simply didn’t read the assignment 
then we might still blame her for her mistake.  I still think she wouldn’t be blameworthy for the report 
itself, but that requires separate argument.  And in any case, it seems unlikely one could make the sort of 
mistake she did without reading the assignment. 
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undermines praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, whether that appraisal is moral or 
not.  Fred’s eye-poking, Bruce’s child-saving, Augie’s ‘A’ test score, and the pianist’s 
performance, are all instances of appraisal that are undermined by the presence of an 
accident.  Jan’s coat-stealing, Diana’s medication-giving, McGraw’s eagle shot, and the 
student’s report, are all instances of appraisal that are undermined by the presence of a 
mistake.  And, Barbie’s hitting, Clark’s Heimlich, Huckleberry’s somnambulistic 
painting, and Mr. T-P’s serve, are all instances of appraisal that are undermined by the 
presence of involuntariness.  It would appear the undermining factors work regardless of 
the evaluative norms being applied in each case. 
 The Symmetry Challenge stated that an account must explain why undermining 
factors mitigate both blameworthiness and praiseworthiness, and do so in the same way.  
It was initially assumed that the blameworthiness and praiseworthiness in question were 
moral in nature.  But now it seems as if we can expand the challenge to include non-
moral cases as well.  The undermining factors render blame or praise inappropriate 
whether or not that appraisal has any moral content. Thus, we can effectively widen the 
challenge.   
 
The Expanded Symmetry Challenge: An account of undermining factors 
must explain why those factors 
mitigate blameworthiness and 
praiseworthiness in both moral and 
non-moral cases, and do so in the 
same way. 
  
Now we can see just where the proposed Strawsonian response fails.  On the 
‘fittingness’ view, blame and praise are appropriate when it is true that their objects 
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possess the features these responses represent them as having.  The feature blame 
presents is that the object manifested an ill will.  Praise presents its object as having 
manifested a good will.  But this view fails to adequately cover the non-moral cases.  If 
McGraw doesn’t make a mistake, and still hits a spectacular shot, our justified praise 
would not represent his action as manifesting a good will.  In fact, he may be smug about 
the shot, intend it to show how much better he is than everyone else, and all manner of 
other morally problematic attitudes, and still, our athletic praise would be justified.  And 
given the actual scenario, in which his shot is the result of a mistake, the fact that it’s a 
mistake does not serve to show that he didn’t manifest a good will.  There need never 
have been a good will to begin with.  The non-moral cases are not concerned with 
qualities of will, thus an account that trades on such qualities won’t be able to appeal to 
that notion for these cases of undermined non-moral blameworthiness and 
praiseworthiness. 
 After full discussion of non-moral forms of praiseworthiness and 
blameworthiness, we can expand the Symmetry Challenge to include the undermining 
factors’ effect in these non-moral cases.  Despite the inclusion of a shared component, 
that blameworthiness and praiseworthiness are undermined when the action fails to 
manifest a quality of will, the Strawsonian Approach cannot meet the Expanded 
Symmetry Challenge. 
 I want to pause very briefly to note that the Expanded Symmetry Challenge, while 
seemingly a bigger problem for Strawsonian accounts than the original version, poses no 
special problems for the Simple Solution.  In fact, the Simple Solution maintains its 
appeal in accounting for the symmetrical application of the undermining factors across 
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this broader range of cases.  Just as being morally blameworthy was a matter of being 
responsible for something morally bad, we might think that being artistically 
blameworthy is being responsible for something artistically bad.  An extremely plausible 
suggestion is that the undermining factors upset in some way this explanatorily prior and 
independent notion of responsibility, one on which all of these norms of appropriateness 
depend, and thus, the various forms of appraisal (both moral and non-moral) are 
inappropriate as a result. 
 As the difficulties mount for Strawsonian accounts, a practice-independent 
approach to responsibility is left unfazed.  Part of the reason for this success is that such a 
notion of responsibility is insulated in some sense from our practices.  But since it is 
largely the diversity of such practices that poses a special problem for the Strawsonian 
Approach, perhaps an alternative Strawsonian account can be worked out that avoids the 
problems enumerated above.  I turn now to exploring a possible revised view that is 
particularly sensitive to these challenges (Section 4.1) and showing why it, too, 
nonetheless ought to be rejected (Section 4.2). 
 
 
2.4. An Alternative Strawsonian Account 
THE SYMMETRY CHALLENGE insists that any account of the undermining factors must 
show why the same factors undermine praiseworthiness and blameworthiness in the same 
way.  I have shown why the evidence supporting the challenge suggests that there’s a 
common component that blameworthiness and praiseworthiness share.  I have also 
presented what I take to be a Simple Solution to the Symmetry Challenge: 
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blameworthiness and praiseworthiness share a notion of responsibility explanatorily prior 
to and significantly independent of our practices of praising and blaming.  Undermining 
factors show that the agent wasn’t responsible for the thing done, and that explains why 
blameworthiness or praiseworthiness is undermined.38  Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, I’ve shown why this practice-independent account can explain symmetrical 
undermining across all types of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness.39 
 But aside from making the initial case for a practice-independent approach, we 
have seen the problems created for the Strawsonian Approach by our observations of 
symmetry.  In the following section, I want to present an initially promising alternative 
Strawsonian account, one specifically tailored to address the Symmetry Challenge.  In 
Section 4.2, I’ll show why this account ought to be rejected, and what’s left for the 
Strawsonian to do. 
 
2.4.1. ‘Holding Others Responsible’ 
ONE WAY WE MIGHT amend the standard Strawsonian accounts in light of this discussion 
is by suggesting that our praising and blaming practices themselves belong to a shared 
practice.  Recall that the Strawsonian Approach explains being responsible in terms of 
holding responsible.  To be responsible, on this approach, is to be appropriately held 
responsible.  Perhaps a Strawsonian account can be generated that meets the Symmetry 
Challenge by showing that praising and blaming belong to a more general practice of 
                                               
38 On this view, recall, blameworthiness and praiseworthiness require that the agent was responsible for the 
thing done, and that that thing done is bad or good, respective to the appropriate appraisal scale.  Compare 
Smart [1961], p.305.  Smart distinguishes between “grading” an outcome or action, and “ascribing” it to an 
individual.  We can still grade performances without the agent’s being responsible, and therefore properly 
evaluated, by it.  Here it seems I am in agreement with Smart. 
39 I have examined here what I take to be a comprehensive sample and believe the same approach would 
work for any undermining factor. 
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‘holding others responsible’.  The account of undermining factors, then, would be that it 
is this more general practice that is undermined in the various disparate cases.  If such a 
response existed, it might meet even the Expanded Symmetry Challenge by appeal to a 
shared component of blaming and praising. 
 The alternative approach owes us an understanding of what it is to ‘hold others 
responsible’.  One suggestion could be that it means adopting a stance of ‘standing ready 
to appraise’ the agent in the ways appropriate under the circumstances.  On this 
alternative account, ‘it being appropriate to stand ready to appraise’ is a criterion that 
must be met first before the practices of praising and blaming get their grip.  The 
undermining factors could then be reasons why adopting this stance towards the agent 
would be inappropriate, and thus praising and blaming never even get off the ground.  
Such an account seems initially promising because it might provide the fundamental 
condition on praising and blaming of all kinds (i.e., even non-moral kinds), like the one 
suggested by the Simple Solution to the Symmetry Challenge.  On this alternative 
account I am considering, then, one is responsible if it would be appropriate for others to 
stand ready to appraise (i.e., praise or blame) her. 
 We now have an alternative Strawsonian account that attempts to meet the 
Symmetry Challenge.  It does so by suggesting that there is a general practice that ties 
together our other diverse evaluative practices.  It is this general practice that is 
susceptible to the undermining factors, and this general susceptibility helps explain why 




2.4.2. Remaining Difficulties for the Alternative Strawsonian Account 
I HAVE TWO RELATED reasons for rejecting this alternative account.  First, unlike typical 
Strawsonian positions, there’s little intuitive appeal for the general stance of ‘standing 
ready to appraise’.  Its main attraction lies in its being an answer to the Symmetry 
Challenge.  Second, there is a worry that the general stance is really just a presumptive 
belief that the agent is responsible.  That is, ‘standing ready to appraise P’ is best 
characterized as ‘believing P is responsible (while open to the possibility that P is not 
responsible)’.  But obviously such a characterization is thoroughly unhelpful to a 
Strawsonian account in meeting the Symmetry Challenge, since it assumes a notion of 
responsibility independent of the general practice.  I suggest that given these objections, 
it’s left to the Strawsonian Approach to defend an independent practice of standing ready 
to appraise.  I take these concerns up in turn. 
 The initial attraction for the Strawsonian Approach is that we know so much 
about praising and blaming.  By mediating our analysis of responsibility through our 
practices of praising and blaming, it allows us to explain a difficult concept in reference 
to less tricky notions.  Metaphysical worries about the conditions on responsibility are 
largely irrelevant to our practices of evaluative appraisal.  This aspect of the strategy is 
one of the more important contributions of Strawson’s essay.  We may be led by the truth 
of determinism to doubt that we have a robustly free will, such as the ability to do 
otherwise,40 but our practices of praising and blaming will not be similarly deflated.  
Therefore, if one were able to explicate a notion of responsibility in terms of our 
evaluative practices, we might expect responsibility to withstand the threat of 
                                               
40 One need only look at the debate over “alternative possibilities” to see how divisive the purported ability 
to do otherwise is.  For lively discussion of the prospects, see Widerker and McKenna [2003].  For an 
excellent discussion of the ability to do otherwise, see van Inwagen [1975], and Vihvelin [2000]. 
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determinism as well.  There’s a methodological appeal here to using a well-understood 
idea to explicate more challenging notions, and one legacy of the Strawsonian strategy 
has been to use the norms that govern praising and blaming as a framework for 
explaining responsibility.  Praising and blaming are ordinary practices that we engage in 
all the time, and these practices are seemingly governed by familiar norms.  
Consequently, this approach is able to remove much of the “metaphysical mystery” 
surrounding discussions of moral responsibility.  Its simplification and appeal to ordinary 
notions is one of its chief attractions. 
 But there’s no such appeal with regards to the general practice of standing ready 
to appraise.  Such a practice seems substantially artificial; we have no clear and intuitive 
grasp of what it would be to stand ready to appraise an agent.  We know what it is to 
praise someone, or to blame them, and we can tell stories about what these practices 
involve without direct reference the notions of praise or blame.  Strawson’s 
characterizations, for example, involve reference to sets of attitudes that give shape to 
these practices.  But there is no immediate referent attitude to give shape to the general 
stance of standing ready to appraise.  Blame and praise are appraisals; they involve taking 
attitudes toward others.  Standing ready to appraise, in contrast, is not an appraisal.  It’s 
an ‘almost-appraisal.’  And pointing to any attitudes that might constitute such a stance 
proves a challenge in its own right. 
 We might take this general stance to be “seeing the agent as a proper target for 
appraisal.”  This sort of stance might be one way to understand a major strand of Fischer 
and Ravizza’s view.41  But their view gives us an account of responsible agency; it marks 
                                               
41 Fischer and Ravizza hold that a responsible agent is one who is the apt target of the reactive attitudes.  
See Fischer and Ravizza [1998]. 
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what sorts of creatures can be “apt targets” for assessment.  The view sketches a 
presumption that agents who are reasons-responsive in the right way can be responsible.  
But such a view will be silent on explaining the undermining factors.  For we don’t 
suppose that someone whose responsibility is undermined in a particular instance, by 
accident, say, is thereby rendered a non-responsible agent, more generally.  The 
difference here conforms well to a Strawsonian distinction between, in Wallace’s terms, 
“exemptions” and “excuses.”42  Exemptions are considerations that suggest an individual 
isn’t responsible for anything she does; she can’t be responsible because of some capacity 
she lacks or due to some pathology.  Exemptions act globally, and defeat a presumption 
that the individual is responsible generally.  Excuses, in Strawson’s usage, act locally to 
suggest that an agent isn’t responsible for a particular bit of conduct, what I am calling 
undermining factors.  But these leave intact a presumption that the agent is generally 
responsible, that there is no reason to suppose the agent couldn’t be responsible for most 
of what she does.   It follows then, that if the general stance of “standing ready to 
appraise” corresponds to the global notion of responsible agency that exemptions affect, 
then this stance is of no help to the Strawsonian for meeting the Symmetry Challenge.  
For that global notion is not one the undermining factors affect anyhow, so it couldn’t 
serve as the basis for an explanation for their symmetrical effect across the diverse range 
of cases presented.  Therefore, it seems the Strawsonian must look elsewhere for a 
characterization of a general stance that can meet the challenge. 
                                               
42 See Wallace [1994]. 
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 Indeed, the most natural characterization of such a stance seems to involve 
believing that the agent was responsible.43  If I believe you are responsible, then I am 
ready to blame or praise you, depending on the evaluative status of whatever it is I 
believe you responsible for.  I should contrast here that the proposed belief is not a belief 
in one’s global responsible agency, but rather a belief that the individual is responsible 
for the particular object under consideration.  But this is an unsatisfactory account.  It 
suggests that an agent is responsible only if it would be appropriate to believe that agent 
is responsible.  But it is entirely unhelpful to explain being responsible in terms of the 
appropriateness of our beliefs about being responsible.  This is just what it means for 
beliefs to be correct; that they correspond to facts about the world. 
 More importantly, for our purposes, such an account cannot make any headway 
toward answering the Symmetry Challenge.  The undermining factors show that the 
response in question is inappropriate; the agent isn’t praiseworthy or blameworthy.  In 
order to accommodate this effect within the current alternative account, we must say that 
an undermining factor shows that ‘believing P to be responsible’ would be inappropriate.  
Now, we can ask, how might an undermining factor show such a belief to be 
inappropriate?  One obvious way it might do so is by showing that P isn’t really 
responsible.  But this sort of answer isn’t available to the Strawsonian Approach, for the 
approach is committed to the claim that the way to explain responsibility is in terms of 
the norms that govern our practices of holding responsible.  If the general stance of 
‘holding responsible’ is just ‘believing to be responsible’, then Strawsonian accounts are 
in trouble again.  For one of the most important norms that governs the appropriateness of 
                                               
43 Watson says that, “[t]o regard people as responsible agents is to be ready to treat them in certain ways” 
(Watson [1987], p.256).  While Watson explicitly claims this involves more than just a belief, he is unable 
(in my view) to sufficiently clarify what such a regard amounts to. 
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beliefs is that beliefs should track truth.  But the truth cannot be determined by our 
beliefs; we need independent conditions to establish a fact of the matter.  Thus, in order 
to show that ‘believing P is responsible’ is appropriate (i.e., correct), we would need to 
know whether P is in fact responsible.  The undermining factors could show that belief is 
inappropriate only by way of showing that P isn’t really responsible.  But such a 
conclusion would only support a practice-independent notion of responsibility, and thus 
isn’t available to the Strawsonian Approach. 
 If a general response of ‘standing ready to appraise’ is to be successful as a means 
of answering the Symmetry Challenge, then the Strawsonian owes us a compelling story 
of just what that stance is.  And it must be something other than ‘believing the agent to be 
responsible.’  Without a clear grasp of a practice of ‘holding others responsible,’ and 
without a persuasive account of how the undermining factors would show such a practice 




I’D NOW LIKE TO CONSIDER three objections to the argument I’ve presented here.  The first 
objection concerns my insistence that blameworthiness and praiseworthiness ought to 
behave symmetrically.  The second objects to my claim that an account of the 
undermining factors fails if it can’t account for the factors symmetrical operation “in the 
same way.”  And the third objection questions whether artistic praiseworthiness is really 




2.5.1. Wolf’s Asymmetrical Freedom 
SOME HAVE ARGUED THAT blameworthiness and praiseworthiness are essentially 
asymmetrical.  For instance, Susan Wolf claims that the conditions on blameworthiness 
and those on praiseworthiness are asymmetrical, because while blameworthiness requires 
alternate possibilities, praiseworthiness does not.44  She claims that assertions like, “Jim 
had to save the child’s life,” are not mitigations of praiseworthiness, but “testimonies to 
it.”45  In contrast, one who is compelled to kill (and therefore had to do it) is excused (in 
part) by his compulsion.  If there are important asymmetries, the objection contends, this 
weakens the Symmetry Challenge’s position as a criterion of explanatory adequacy.  
Why should we demand that blameworthiness and praiseworthiness be explained 
symmetrically if we have data that suggests otherwise? 
 While I’m independently skeptical of Wolf’s argument, it is plain that this is not 
an objection to the argument I’ve given here, but rather a set of alternative data points.  
So we might construct a further constraint on theories of responsibility: they must be able 
to explain Wolf’s asymmetrical data.  But this leaves untouched the symmetrical data 
I’ve presented, and a view that met Wolf’s criterion but failed the Symmetry Challenge 
would still leave unexplained significant and substantial data.  Moreover, I suspect that 
Wolf’s data doesn’t show what she purports it does.  This is because I don’t think 
compulsion, as we understand it, really undermines responsibility.  But I take up this 
argument in Chapter 3, section 3.3, where I also discuss coercion.46 
                                               
44 See Wolf [1980]. 
45 Wolf [1980], p.156. 
46 For a different criticism of Wolf’s asymmetry argument, see Fischer and Ravizza [1992], pp. 375-380.  
There they argue that there are certain cases in which an agent is blameworthy even though he couldn’t 
have done otherwise.  Thus, in their view, neither blameworthiness nor praiseworthiness requires the ability 




2.5.2. How Much Symmetry is Required? 
A DIFFERENT OBJECTION concerns the symmetrical operation of the undermining factors 
on blameworthiness and praiseworthiness.  One might accept such symmetry and still 
deny that this establishes the Symmetry Challenge.  For the challenge claims that 
accounts of responsibility must explain how the factors undermine blameworthiness and 
praiseworthiness in the same way, and one might question why we need symmetry of 
explanation to account for symmetry in operation.47  The objection, therefore, seeks to 
defend a practice-based answer from my argument by showing that it can account for my 
symmetrical cases.  If the Symmetry Challenge isn’t entitled to its requirement of 
explanatory symmetry, then a practice-based account succeeds so long as it gives the 
right verdicts in each case.  And if we don’t require that the explanations be the same, 
then it would seem that the prospects for such a practice-based success are much better 
than my argument suggests.  So, for instance, perhaps accidents undermine 
blameworthiness by showing blame would be unfair,48 and they undermine 
praiseworthiness by showing that praise would be socially disadvantageous.  These are 
just hypothetical suggestions; they are meant simply to indicate how such a strategy 
might go about accounting for the symmetry. 
 In reply, I think it’s important to remind ourselves of how vast the symmetrical 
data I’ve presented is.  It would seem that the undermining factors operate symmetrically 
on moral blameworthiness and praiseworthiness, as well as on multiple kinds of non-
moral blameworthiness and praiseworthiness, including artistic, athletic, and scholastic 
                                               
47 My thanks to Manuel Vargas and an anonymous referee for Ethics for this criticism. 
48 For such an account, see Wallace [1994]. 
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kinds.  A Strawsonian account may be able to explain such symmetry by relying on 
different explanations in each case, or each handful of cases, perhaps.  But then we might 
reasonably ask what ties these explanations together?  The larger the set of practices that 
are symmetrically undermined by the same factors, the more improbable it seems that 
there isn’t some shared feature of the explanations accounting for such symmetry.  Even 
were such a Strawsonian view able to get the right answers across all these cases, then, it 
would seem to leave a glaring lacuna in its account, for we would still want some answer 
as to why these explanations fit together.  Without such an answer, it would appear that 
the Strawsonian account asks us to imagine that the symmetry of operation is merely a 
coincidence, without any underlying unifying explanation.  And this lack would put 
pressure on us again to reconsider the Simple Solution (or some close cousin of it). 
 
2.5.3. Artistic Praiseworthiness as a Kind of Praiseworthiness 
A FINAL OBJECTION SEEKS to distance the non-moral kinds of evaluation from the moral 
ones.  So, one might argue that artistic praiseworthiness isn’t really a kind of 
praiseworthiness; it isn’t related to moral praiseworthiness in any interesting way.49 
 But this objection misses its mark.  Nothing beyond the evidence presented so far 
is required to get my argument started.  Artistic praiseworthiness, for example, shares at 
least one interesting feature with moral praiseworthiness: both are undermined by the 
same considerations.  It is, of course, an open question what explains this shared feature.  
I have presented what I take to be a Simple Solution worth pursuing.  Nevertheless, it 
                                               
49 This is related to a criticism made by an anonymous referee for Ethics, who claimed that it wasn’t 
obvious that non-moral instances shared anything interesting with their moral counterparts besides a notion 
of “causal” responsibility. 
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would seem that the simple fact that each is affected in the same way by the same 




ANY ACCOUNT OF THE undermining factors must explain why the same factors undermine 
both blameworthiness and praiseworthiness in the same way.  Strawsonian accounts seem 
unable to meet this challenge.  In contrast, an account that stresses a practice-independent 
notion of responsibility seems able to easily and plausibly meet the challenge.  Being 
responsible is a necessary condition on being blameworthy or praiseworthy, but we 
should not explain responsibility in terms of these two evaluative concepts.  Rather, a 
better prospect would seem to lie with pursuing an explanatorily prior and independent 
notion of responsibility, along the lines of the Simple Solution to the challenge.  We are 
blameworthy when we are responsible for something bad.  We are praiseworthy when we 
are responsible for something good.  To my mind, this is an intuitive proposal to develop, 
and it can easily accommodate the Symmetry Challenge.  I turn now to developing such a 
proposal, pursuing a thoroughly compatibilist account of an independent notion of 
responsibility.  In the following chapter, I begin by examining a more complete list of 
undermining factors, and pursue a promising hypothesis that understanding why 














3.1.  Introduction 
IN THE LAST CHAPTER, I presented a challenge to Strawsonian accounts of responsibility.  
These accounts are unified by explaining what it is to be responsible in terms of the 
appropriateness of holding responsible; that is, our practices of praising and blaming.  I 
argued that this is the wrong order of explanation.  Instead, I suggested, we need an 
independent notion of responsibility in order to explain the symmetrical undermining of 
blameworthiness and praiseworthiness by the same factors across a broad and diverse 
range of cases.  The purpose of this chapter is to fill in what that notion of responsibility 
looks like, and to begin to show what the conditions necessary for being responsible are. 
 On my view, one is blameworthy just in case one is responsible for something 
bad.  One is praiseworthy just in case one is responsible for something good.  In each 
case, we have a responsibility component, together with an evaluative component (good 
or bad).  We can account for the various types of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness 
previously discussed by simply adjusting the norms involved in the evaluative 
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component.  So, moral blameworthiness is governed by moral norms, but those norms tell 
us whether or not the outcome was morally bad.  They lie outside of considerations about 
whether the agent is responsible for the outcome.  Similarly, artistic praiseworthiness is 
governed by artistic norms.  But they, again, simply tell us whether or not the outcome is 
artistically good.  The responsibility component in both cases is independently assessed. 
 This Simple Solution to the Symmetry Challenge is able (intuitively, I think) to 
capture the shared component between the various cases of symmetrical undermining 
canvassed in the last chapter.  Moreover, it is able to help explain how the symmetry is 
sustained across the wide range of diverse cases already discussed, because that diversity 
occurs with respect to the evaluative component only.  Thus, the same structure is present 
in every case; only the set of norms determining the appropriate evaluative status of the 
outcome in question changes.50 
 An account of this responsibility component should tell us just when an agent is 
responsible.  To do this, I will again look at the undermining factors.  If the undermining 
factors symmetrically diminish blameworthiness and praiseworthiness across a diverse 
range of cases, and do so in the same way, and if they do so by affecting this independent 
notion of responsibility (as the Simple Solution suggests), then a plausible hypothesis is 
that each undermining factor suggests the lack of a condition necessary for responsibility.  
This hypothesis is initially further supported by the observation that many undermining 
factors seem to present negative features.  They show the outcome was inadvertent, or 
involuntary, or unintentional, or by mistake.  It seems promising to suppose that perhaps 
if we remove the negations, we’ll be left with conditions an agent must satisfy to be 
responsible.  This is just an instantiation of a general strategy of explanation.  If you want 
                                               
50 This is to say that moral norms wouldn’t be correct for artistic evaluation, and vice versa. 
 
 54
to figure out what makes a rhombus a rhombus, a promising strategy is to look at shapes 
that are almost rhombuses.  Contrasting rhombuses with these figures will tell you 
something important about what makes a rhombus such.  The strategy here is to look at 
cases of undermined responsibility to tell us something important about what makes an 
individual responsible for what she does.  In short, the idea is that by investigating the 
undermining factors, we will thereby be able to distill from their negative features the 
requirements on being responsible.  The natural thought is that these negative features 
help demarcate the line at which responsibility is undermined; so, if no negative feature is 
present, the agent is responsible.51 
 My strategy is as follows.  The first step is to determine the list of undermining 
factors, and to characterize the negative features they exhibit.  The aim is to achieve a 
classification of the undermining factors grouping specific factors together into classes by 
virtue of the negative features they highlight.  I begin this characterization in Section 2, 
with what I take to be the most uncontroversial considerations, with a special emphasis 
on the ways mistakes operate.  In Section 3, I argue against the idea that instances of 
coercion undermine responsibility.  So, while they may initially seem to count as cases of 
undermining factors, I conclude we ought to exclude coercion from our set.  Section 4 
sums up what we learned from our characterizations in the previous three sections, and 
outlines what I take to be the set of necessary conditions on being responsible suggested 
by the undermining factors.  Section 5 concludes by highlighting the connections 
                                               
51 This is essentially the Second Prong of Strawson’s strategy.  Following a suggestion by Gary Watson, 
Michael McKenna interprets P.F. Strawson in “Freedom and Resentment” as also engaging in this strategy 
of distilling the conditions on responsibility from the undermining factors.  For Strawson’s original 
discussion, see Strawson [1962].  For McKenna’s discussion, see McKenna [1998].  The difference, as I 
see it, between Strawson’s approach and mine is that I explicitly pursue positive conditions distilled from 




between the conditions adduced here and the Simple Solution to the Symmetry Challenge 
from Chapter 2.   
 
 
3.2. Paradigm Cases 
WE NEED ONLY CONSIDER our everyday experiences to reveal a large variety of 
considerations offered to excuse blame or deny praise. The simplest expressions of 
undermining factors take the form of ‘I didn’t mean to’ or ‘She didn’t know’ or ‘He 
couldn’t help it’ or ‘It wasn’t my fault.’  Virtually everyone has made at least one of these 
claims (I admit to all four…) in an effort to mitigate blame from others.  Similarly, we 
often point to the same considerations when arguing that some praise is undeserved.  We 
tend to say things like ‘But he didn’t do anything’ or ‘She was just lucky’ or ‘It was just a 
happy coincidence.’ 
 These phrases all point to considerations that are meant to show that the agent 
isn’t blameworthy or praiseworthy because they aren’t responsible for the outcome for 
which the agent is being blamed or praised.  They are the language of the undermining 
factors with which we are most familiar.  It should be noted that both the enormous 
complexity of even ordinary events and the flexibility of ordinary language make it 
difficult at times to pinpoint what particular undermining factor was present or is being 
pointed to.  It is often the case that several factors are present at once, or sometimes it 
proves difficult to cite just what the factor was, even when we’re certain responsibility in 
such a case is undermined.  In the normal course of things it often does not matter 
whether we can cite the particular undermining factor.  But there are paradigm cases, and 
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it is to these that I shall devote most of my attention.  In addition, I think it often the case 
that we can pick out more precisely the undermining factor at play, even in complicated 
cases, and we should endeavor to do so even if it proves particularly challenging at times 
At any rate, I think it clear that when one consults the range of considerations we 
are likely to offer in our defense against various accusations, or as reasons that praise is 
inappropriate, a natural classification begins to emerge.  There is, of course, always a 
worry that such a list won’t be exhaustive.  But the goal at this point is to chart a 
categorization of the paradigm instances of factors that undermine responsibility.  I’m 
willing to sacrifice some exhaustiveness for greater progress towards that goal.  In any 
case, I do think the undermining factors can be grouped into a few main categories.  And 
while I don’t suppose to discuss every possible individual undermining factor, I will 
discuss these main categories of factors (and I do take the categories to be exhaustive) 
using illustrative example cases. 
 
3.2.1. The Involuntary 
ONE SET OF CASES that rather obviously undermine responsibility involves instances of 
involuntariness.52  If my wife rolls over in the night, knocking me out of bed, she is not 
responsible for my rude awakening.  Recall the example of Huckleberry, who painted a 
majestic landscape while sleepwalking.  He is not responsible for the gorgeous painting.53  
These are outcomes produced while the agent in question was unconscious.  Similarly, 
                                               
52 Throughout, my contrast case (to the moral) will be cases of undermined responsibility with respect to 
artistic outcomes.  My aim is to keep the discussion simple and centered.  Nevertheless, I think we could 
construct as many parallel examples as we wanted with other normative outcomes (e.g., athletic, scholastic, 
etc.) 
53 Recall that here, being responsible for the painting means that the painting would reflect on Huckleberry 
as an artist.  We still may marvel at his strange “ability,” but we wouldn’t consider the painting as an 
“accomplishment” of his as an artist. 
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suppose Barbie suffers a seizure and hits Ken.  Or suppose that Carter suffers a seizure, 
and in so doing draws a remarkable portrait.  These are instances of spasms, and in 
neither case, I think, is the agent responsible for the outcome.  We could also construct 
related cases where the outcome is produced via a reflex of the agent, such as knocking 
over a vase while swatting away swarming bees.  There are also, it seems, related cases 
where one fails to do something as the result of incapacitation (but not unconsciousness).  
Examples here would be where one fails to meet an associate for lunch because one has 
been bound and gagged, or where a musician’s performance suffers from an intermittent, 
but persisting paralysis in his hands. 
 In all these cases, it seems as if the agent’s responsibility is similarly undermined.  
And it seems as though what ties these cases together is that the outcome is produced 
involuntarily.  In each case (save incapacitation),54 the agent performs bodily movements 
that produce an outcome, but those bodily movements themselves are involuntarily 
produced.  And we can certainly contrast these cases with the ordinary actions of our 
colleagues and friends, when they hit others or fail to keep a lunch date.55 
 
3.2.2. The Unintentional 
ANOTHER SET OF CASES seem to highlight that the outcome was unintentional in one way 
or another.  For example, recall the example of Fred and Barney, in which Fred opened a 
bottle of champagne, and the cork popped, bounced off a wall and hit Barney in the eye.  
                                               
54 The case involving incapacitation is excluded only because it involves the lack of bodily movement, not 
because it isn’t involuntary produced. 
55 In this way, my project is compatible with the Strawsonian project of naturalizing responsibility.  Where 
I differ most strongly with the Strawsonian tradition is in my explanation of the notion of responsibility – 
what it is to be responsible.  It is this disagreement that was the focus of Chapter 1. 
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This is an incident in which the outcome is an accident.  Compare this example to the 
case of Augie, who merely circled answers on the test without thinking, and yet scored a 
perfect grade.  Here, again, the result is an accident.  And in neither case, I think, is the 
agent responsible for the accidental outcome.  Here, it seems that the fact that an outcome 
is an accident serves to undermine responsibility. 
 A related set of examples concerns inadvertence.  Suppose a bunch of friends 
have gathered in the living room and are watching a movie.  When Lenny gets up from 
the couch to get a soda, he’s distracted by the dialogue and so he steps on a friend’s hand.  
It seems as though Lenny’s responsibility is undermined because he only steps on the 
hand inadvertently.  Similarly, imagine that while Marta is putting the finishing touches 
on her painting, her friend enters the room and says “hi.”  When Marta turns to wave 
back, her brush sweeps across the canvass, creating a remarkable effect on the painting.  
Here, again, it seems as though Marta’s responsibility for the painting is undermined, 
because she only makes it remarkable inadvertently.56 
 Inadvertent outcomes are side-effects of intentional action, where the agent fails 
to foresee the possibility of the side-effect, but would foresee it if the agent considers his 
situation more carefully.  If Lenny is mindful about looking at the floor, taking care to 
where each step will land, etc., it is likely that he will avoid treading on any hands.  
Accidents are also side-effects of intentional actions, but whereas the inadvertent could 
have been foreseen with additional attention, accidents are unexpected or unforeseen, 
even had reasonable consideration of the possible consequences been given.  While it 
may not have been absolutely impossible for Fred to foresee that the cork could hit 
                                               
56 We can suppose that responsibility for the painting concerns the finished painting, especially with respect 
to those features of it that make it remarkable.  Obviously, Marta is likely responsible for all the aspects of 
the painting up until the inadvertent brushstroke (if anyone is ever responsible for outcomes in the world). 
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Barney in the eye (Fred may be able to imagine possible scenarios when considering 
opening the bottle), the resultant outcome is not among the list we might make of the 
possible outcomes within the realm of likelihood.  Accidents, therefore, seem to involve a 
notion of happenstance, whereas inadvertent outcomes are the result of a lack of 
attention.  This is a rough characterization, but we do seem to readily distinguish 
accidents as ‘unlikely outcomes,’ from inadvertent outcomes, which don’t exhibit the 
same degree of unexpectedness.  At the very least, we can easily note that Fred’s eye-
poking is an unexpected consequence of his bottle-opening in a way that Lenny’s hand-
stepping was not an unforeseen consequence of his getting up.  And this seems enough to 
outline the distinction.  We may, of course, call certain outcomes “accidents” that weren’t 
really unlikely.  Car accidents, for example, may be the result of dangerous driving that 
greatly increased the chance of a crash.  Despite this usage, it seems that cases like Fred’s 
are closer to “core” examples of accidents, outcomes that are actually unexpected or 
reasonably unforeseeable given the circumstances under which the agent acted.  Such 
core cases, it seems, are the ones to look to if we are to properly characterize what is 
central about such types of cases.  Core cases would seem to be most illuminating and 
reflective of what is different in cases of accident than in paradigmatic intentional action. 
 A further case seems to involve ignorance.  Ignorance can also undermine 
responsibility.  Suppose Martin walks to his room and opens the door, hitting his 
roommate Mark in face.  Mark had been admiring his new outfit in Martin’s full-length 
mirror, but Martin didn’t know that Mark was there.  So Martin didn’t know that his 
opening the door would harm Mark, and this ignorance seems to undermine his 
responsibility for the injury.  Now imagine that Luigi doesn’t know that his guitar has 
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been wired such that every time he plays the third string, 15th fret, his amplifier will 
produce a sympathetic tone.  Suppose that his otherwise respectable solo is rendered 
remarkable by this effect, which happens intermittently throughout the performance 
(indeed, just those times when Luigi plays the 3rd string, 15th fret).  Here, too, 
responsibility seems undermined (at least with respect to the solo’s remarkable aspect), 
and it seems to be Luigi’s ignorance that is doing the undermining work.  To make this 
point clear, remember that while we might grade the solo itself as remarkable, it would 
seem a mistake to attribute this quality to Luigi as a guitarist. 
 
 In all of these instances the outcome is unintentional or unforeseen.  While the 
agent performs some action intentionally (e.g., opening a bottle, marking an answer, 
walking to the kitchen, turning around, opening a door, playing a solo), the specific 
outcome in question, the one we’re interested in, was not part of the ‘intentional 
structure’ of that action.  It wasn’t an aim or end of the action, it wasn’t a necessary step 
towards an intended goal, nor was it a foreseen side-effect.57  We are all too familiar with 
cries of “But I didn’t mean to” when faced with a criticized outcome.  This general 
phrase seems to point us to considerations of accident and inadvertence, in order to show 
that the outcome in question was unforeseen, and that responsibility is therefore 
                                               
57 Inadvertent outcomes, we might think, are foreseeable even when they are not actually foreseen by the 
particular agent.  Accidental outcomes, on the other hand, might be distinguished by their ‘reasonable 
unforeseeability’; i.e., that it would be unreasonable to expect an agent similarly placed to foresee the 
actual outcome of the action.  Here I merely want to characterize how we seem to distinguish between these 
considerations.  It seems that claims of inadvertence serve to show the actual agent didn’t actually foresee 
the outcome, whether or not he could (or should) have. 
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undermined.  Similarly, “But I didn’t know” references the lack of relevant beliefs to the 
same effect.58 
 
3.2.3. The Mistaken 
THERE IS ANOTHER SET of factors that undermine responsibility through reference to an 
agent’s beliefs.59  Where ignorance picks out the lack of relevant beliefs, mistakes 
reference the agent’s false beliefs.  For example, recall the case of Jan taking a coat she 
believes to be hers as she’s leaving a party.  As it turns out, the coat she takes belongs to 
someone else, though it is the same type, size, and color as hers.  Here Jan is mistaken 
about whose coat it is she is taking.  She believes it to be hers, when in fact it is not.  But 
because intentions are sensitive to beliefs, and because Jan believes the coat is hers, she 
doesn’t intend to take someone else’s coat.  She intends to take her own coat, and simply 
fails to fulfill her intention, due to her false beliefs.  It also appears that Jan’s 
responsibility for stealing a coat is undermined due to the fact that she made a mistake.60  
Similarly, suppose Jimmy pulls out the wrong brush.  He thinks he’s chosen a fan brush, 
but it’s really a #3 pointed brush.  Despite his error, when he uses the brush it creates a 
remarkable effect on the painting.  As in Marta’s case, even if we grant that Jimmy is 
responsible for the rest of the painting, it seems his mistake undermines his responsibility 
for this particular remarkable effect. 
                                               
58 We sometimes use “But I didn’t know” to cite a mistake.  As will become clear in the following 
category, mistakes nonetheless deserve separate treatment.  This is just one example of why we must seek 
greater precision than our ordinary phrases provide. 
59 In some cases, the false belief may be attributed to another kind of “mistake”; for example, a 
‘misjudging’, ‘mishearing’, or ‘miscalculating’. 
60 One might like to qualify the statement here and say that Jan makes an “honest” mistake.  But such 
qualifications do not suggest a criterion on mistakes (i.e., that only mistakes that count as “honest” serve to 
undermine responsibility), but rather speak to our confidence that it was an actual mistake that was made. 
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 What distinguishes mistakes from accidents and inadvertence, or even ignorance 
(where one fails to have the relevant beliefs), is that mistakes do not show the outcome 
was unintentional, full stop.  Part of the reason is that in many cases of mistake, the 
outcome in question is not a side-effect of the intentional actions of the agent.  Unlike 
Martin’s case, where Mark’s getting hit in the face is a side-effect of Martin’s opening 
the door, Jan’s taking the coat is both the action and outcome in question.  As a result, 
Jan surely takes the very coat she takes intentionally.  She meant to pick up that particular 
coat, carry it with her outside, put it on, and drive home.  But when she appeals to her 
mistake, she makes reference to her belief, sustained throughout that series of actions, 
that the coat in question belonged to her.  As such, citing a mistake is an effort to specify 
the intention the agent acted on; mistakes highlight what the agent believed herself to be 
doing.  While Jan intentionally took that coat, she didn’t intentionally take someone 
else’s coat.  And we can explain the difference by referencing Jan’s mistaken belief that it 
was her coat, for this fact shows both why she intended to take that very coat and how 
she did not act from the intention to take someone else’s coat.61  In this sense, a claim of 
mistake seeks to show that Jan took someone else’s coat unintentionally. 
 As a class, then, the Mistaken is similar to the Unintentional, in that 
considerations in both categories can show that the outcome in question was 
unintentional (or unforeseen).  But it is important to treat mistakes separately, if only 
because the only way to show that the outcome was unintentional (or unforeseen) is by 
reference to the agent’s false beliefs.  In Jan’s case, the only way to show that she takes 
someone else’s coat unintentionally is to reference her false belief that in acting she was 
                                               
61 This is just a claim about the opacity of the content of our intentions and beliefs.  For example, Lois can 
intend to meet Clark Kent for lunch and fail to intend to meet Superman for lunch, despite the fact that 
Clark Kent is Superman.  Similarly, it would seem Lois does not intentionally have lunch with Superman. 
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taking her own coat.  As Jan’s case illustrates, mistakes are characterized by an agent’s 
false beliefs about facts that translate into false beliefs about the nature of what the agent 
is doing.  Jan doesn’t realize she’s taking someone else’s coat because she believes that 
the coat is hers. 
 
 I’ve set out what I take to be paradigm instances of the undermining factors (the 
Involuntary, Unintentional, and Mistaken).  From these we have gotten a picture of the 
ways in which responsibility for outcomes can be undermined.  It can be undermined 
when the agent’s action was involuntary.  It can be undermined when the outcome was 
unintentional, either as an unforeseen side-effect or as a result of false beliefs.  I take 
these categories to be exhaustive of the different types of undermining factors.  But 
before turning to distilling the necessary conditions on responsibility from these 
categories, I need to address a possible concern, namely that I have left important 
potential undermining factors out.  Chief among possible candidates are instances of 
coercion, which are often taken to undermine responsibility.62  In the following section I 
argue that this suggestion is wrong, and that instances of coercion do not undermine 
responsibility.  If I’m right, then coercion does not belong in our list of undermining 
factors, and we can proceed with isolating the necessary conditions on responsibility.63 
 
                                               
62 For just one such example, see Wallace [1994]. 
63 As noted earlier, one obvious drawback to my methodology is that we can’t be certain we’ve looked at 
every possible undermining factor.  While we may be barred from absolute certainty, I know of no place 
where a typology of undermining factors is discussed that includes a consideration that isn’t represented by 
my categories above, or else dismissed as an undermining factor (as I intend to show with respect to 
coercion).  I think we should be highly confident, therefore, that the account we’re led to by these 
categories will not be significantly lacking.  For examples of such typologies (or approximations thereof), 
see Wallace [1994]; Austin [1957].  One possible exception is the excuse “I couldn’t have done otherwise.”  




I CAN NOW TURN TO CONSIDERING cases of coercion as potential undermining factors.  It 
can seem natural that situations of coercion undermine responsibility.  Suppose Moira 
holds a gun to Manny’s head, demanding that he crack a safe.  Supposing that Manny 
complies, it appears Manny isn’t responsible for cracking the safe, and this is due to 
Moira’s coercion of Manny.  Or suppose that Malek threatens Micah’s family with harm, 
if Micah doesn’t lie about Malek’s whereabouts.  Here, too, it initially appears as though 
Micah isn’t responsible for lying.  In neither case, for example, are we liable to blame the 
coerced agent.  So, we might ask, what is it about coercion that undermines 
responsibility?  One observation to make about both cases is that the agent is presented 
with an especially powerful incentive for the choice they make.  In Manny’s case, Moira 
threatens him with death, a surefire incentive for most of us.  In Micah’s case, Malek 
threatens the welfare of his family, another forceful incentive.64 
 Of course, naturally, one often says in such situations, “I had no choice!”  But this 
is meant more as hyperbole than as fact.  It isn’t that Manny has no choice, only that he 
has no good choice.  If he refuses, he gets shot in the head.  If he accedes, he helps rob a 
bank.  Neither is a particularly attractive option.  Furthermore, making reference to a 
reduced capacity to choose is meant to indicate that the options from which one could 
choose are not endorsed by the agent.  If Manny were able, he’d refrain from either 
alternative (death or stealing).  Similarly, Micah has a choice.  He could refuse to lie, but 
                                               
64 Of course, Manny and Micah need not themselves feel the “pull” of these incentives.  Manny may be so 
principled so as to never do what he believes to be wrong, even when threatened with death; and Micah 
may be radically disconnected and feel nothing for the welfare of his family.  That such people may exist, 
to my mind, does little to discredit the observation that, in general, ordinary folks would feel the requisite 
pressure presented in the cases of Manny and Micah.  In any case, I doubt we’d consider cases without such 
pressures as instances of coercion. 
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only at the cost of his family’s welfare.  Or he can choose to lie.  Again, he has a choice, 
just not a particularly good one.  And similarly, his preference would be none of the 
alternatives on offer. 
 Cases such as these may suggest to some that the agent does not act voluntarily.  
But such a claim suffers from vagueness.  After all, there is a perfectly respectable sense 
of ‘voluntarily’ such that both Manny and Micah act voluntarily.  Each makes a choice, 
based on the available reasons, and carries out an action based on those reasons.  We act 
in this way all the time.  I can’t have both the pizza and the eggplant parmesan; so I pick 
one.  The difference for Manny and Micah seems to be that the choice in this instance is, 
in some sense, forced, and that neither choice is attractive.  One might object that little 
bars me from choosing both the pizza and the eggplant parmesan, and I could at least try 
to get both.  But Manny’s case is similar in this respect, since we can well imagine him 
rejecting the constraints of the forced choice, and instead trying to wrestle the gun away 
from Moira, or running away.  Micah may be in a more difficult spot, but he too, it 
seems, could have recourse to options “not on offer” as I’ve set things up.  These 
observations lead me to suspect that in acting under coercion we act far more voluntarily 
than is typically admitted. 
 Now for all I’ve said, coercion could still undermine responsibility.  Perhaps it 
really is necessary that the agent must find the options themselves to be appealing or 
endorse them in some way in order to be responsible for the outcome.  But I’m skeptical.  
And I think there’s good reason to doubt that coercion really undermines responsibility.  
My strategy in defense of this claim is to argue that cases of coercion are structurally 
similar to cases of necessity, and that both sets of cases should be treated similarly.  And 
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since I think we should be more confident that necessity does not undermine 
responsibility than that coercion does, we ought to exclude coercion from our 
classification of undermining factors. 
 
3.3.1. The Argument for Excluding Coercion 
MY ARGUMENT FOR EXCLUDING coercion begins by setting out a common distinction 
between two types of defenses to ascriptions of blameworthiness: excuses and 
justifications.  These defenses are standard practice in the criminal law, but they are 
readily adapted for use here.65  An excuse claims that what was done was in some way 
bad, but that the agent isn’t responsible for it.66  A justification, however, allows that the 
agent is responsible for the outcome, but suggests that the outcome itself was (in some 
sense) good or proper.  A justification claims it is proper to do as one did “under the 
circumstances” or “given his options.” 
 The next step in the argument is the observation that coercion is often thought to 
excuse agents, while cases of necessity are thought to be justifications.67  Now, a 
common example of necessity from legal thought is self-defense.68  So, consider Nora, 
who is being attacked by an axe-wielding Nick.  The only way she can defend herself is 
by incapacitating him, which she can accomplish by pulling a lever that drops a very 
                                               
65 Indeed, the criminal law is a valuable resource in thinking especially about blameworthiness.  Criminal 
liability is usually taken to be a stringent standard necessary for justifying punishment.  Since many believe 
blameworthiness necessary for justifying blame, it seems that criminal liability shares something in 
common with (moral) responsibility.  Both are taken to provide a grounds for evaluation based on the 
relevant standards; morality on the one hand, and the criminal code on the other. 
66 See Austin [1957]; Rodin [2002]; Wallace [1994].  ‘Excuse’ as I’m using it here, then,  is a somewhat 
technical notion, since we sometimes count as “excuses” considerations that don’t aim to remove 
responsibility, but seek only to mitigate others’ responses to our conduct, often to ameliorate potential 
sanctions.  I have more to say about this in the next section, and in Ch. 4, Secs. IV.2-IV.3. 
67 For an excellent discussion of the distinction and pointers to further reading, see Rodin [2002]. 
68 Model Penal Code, Article 3, §3.04. 
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heavy weight on him.  She pulls the lever, the weight is dropped, and Nick is 
incapacitated.  Here it is natural to think that Nora is responsible for injuring her attacker.  
Indeed, what she did was appropriate, given the circumstances, and we would expect 
Nora to pull the lever and think it the proper step to take to save her own life.69 
 But notice that Nora’s case is structurally similar to Manny’s.  Manny had to 
choose between cracking a safe and getting shot in the head, and neither of these is an 
attractive option.  Moreover, we supposed, Manny would prefer it if he could avoid 
making the choice altogether.  Similarly, Nora must choose between being chopped to 
death and crushing Nick, neither of which by itself is particularly attractive.70  And she, 
too, would likely prefer to avoid the choice entirely.  Given that these cases are 
structurally similar, I think there is pressure to treat them similarly.  So, it ought to be the 
case that coercion and necessity are to be treated either (1) both as excuses, undermining 
responsibility; or, (2) both as justifications, leaving responsibility intact.  Establishing this 
disjunction is step three. 
 Step 4 makes the case that option (2) is preferable.  Why should we prefer treating 
coercion and necessity as justifications?  My answer is that it is implausible to suppose 
that instances of necessity undermine responsibility.  To see this, we need only consider a 
few examples.  Nora’s case does not appear to be one in which she isn’t responsible.  On 
the contrary, she seems perfectly responsible – and for doing the proper thing.  We can 
                                               
69 It is certainly possible for some to react differently to the case, and claim that Nora doesn’t act 
appropriately.  But in such cases I suspect one would also concede that Nora is blameworthy for her act.  A 
related, but distinct, point concerns individuals who might think harming even in self-defense is 
inappropriate and refuse to do it (e.g., Quakers or pacifists).  Here, too, we can agree that refusing to harm 
in self-defense may as well be permissible.  Such a conclusion does not modify the claim that a Quaker 
would be responsible for his refusal. 
70 That is, there are significant reasons against each option.  Crushing Nick may be “attractive” to Nora in 
that she would take delight in it, say, or that it would save her life.  But that isn’t the sense I’m interested in.  
“Choiceworthy” reflects the sense of “attractive” at issue here. 
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also compare another standard case of necessity.  There is a wildfire heading straight for 
the center of town, and Otis notices that it will pass through his neighbor’s field on the 
way.71  So, Otis burns down his neighbor’s field, exhausting the fuel the wildfire would 
have otherwise consumed, and preventing the fire from ravaging the town.  Here, Otis 
surely is responsible for setting fire and burning down his neighbor’s field.  He does it 
deliberately, knowing all the relevant facts.  This is a paradigm case of responsibility.  
Now, of course he acts for good reasons.  He only burns down the field so as to save the 
town from much greater harm, but this reasoning is precisely what justifies his choice to 
us.  Far from undermining his responsibility, the necessity of the situation is his 
explanation for why he brought about what he’s responsible for. 
 Still, we need not engage in such serious scenarios to see the point.  We encounter 
similar situations all the time.  For instance, tonight I could clean out the garage, as I 
know that its current state is distressing my wife, or I could do something which I would 
enjoy more.  But I know that if I fail to clean the garage, it will continue to cause my wife 
distress, which would be worse than missing out on my enjoyment.72  In these situations 
it seems as though I am responsible for the outcome I choose.73 
 By parity of reasoning, coerced agents, like Manny, choose well, and are 
responsible for the outcomes they bring about.  Manny, too, has an explanation for why 
he cracked the safe.  He wanted to avoid a worse harm: his death.  This is his defense 
against our recrimination, but it doesn’t appeal to undermined responsibility.  Instead, it 
                                               
71 This standard case of necessity is perhaps best known as a “lesser of two evils” case.  When one chooses 
the lesser of two evils, it is thought, one chooses appropriately (provided one cannot avoid the choice). 
72 The distress she suffers need not itself be worse than the loss of enjoyment that I suffer.  It could be that 
causing my wife distress, or allowing her to be distressed when I could easily prevent it, is worse than the 
loss of enjoyment I suffer by missing the game. 
73 Similarly, Aristotle took coercion and necessity to be of a kind, and that they amounted to justifications 




points to those considerations that Manny thinks explains why he didn’t refrain from 
doing what he had good reason not to do.  Just as Otis has strong reasons not to burn 
down his neighbor’s field, reasons that are outweighed in his particular case, so too does 
Manny have good reasons that are simply outweighed in this instance.  Otis is justified so 
long as we take the reasons he gives to be strong enough to make his choice the 
appropriate one under the circumstances.  Manny is justified if the same condition is met. 
 So, I think we do better understanding both coercion and necessity as instances of 
justifications, which do not undermine the agent’s responsibility.  It is implausible to 
think that for all the various cases of necessity that we can construct the agent’s 
responsibility is undermined.  This concludes my argument for treating coercion in the 
same way as necessity, that is, as a justification. 
 
3.3.2. Objection 1: Coercion and Blameworthiness 
ONE MIGHT OBJECT to this conclusion in the following way.  If I am right about coercion, 
then this suggests coerced agents are responsible for the outcomes they bring about.  But 
cracking a safe isn’t a good thing; it is instead a bad thing.  And according to my 
conditions for blameworthiness, this would imply that Manny is blameworthy.  But 
coerced agents aren’t blameworthy.  Similarly, if Otis and Nora are responsible, then they 
are responsible for some bad outcomes, which means that they, too, are blameworthy.  




 Notice first that this objection does not affect my claim that coercion and 
necessity should be treated alike; it only states that neither constitutes a justification.74  I 
find this in general to be an implausible claim.  But what should we say about the claim 
that Manny is blameworthy for cracking the safe?  Or about the claim that Otis is 
blameworthy for burning the field? 
 Let’s evaluate these claims by examining some tougher cases of coercion.75  
Suppose that when Moira threatens Manny’s life, she doesn’t want him to crack a safe, 
but to kill 10 other people.  Here it is much harder to say that if Manny chooses to kill 
them he acts appropriately.  But now suppose that all Moira wants is for Manny to kill 2 
other people.  In this case it may still be difficult to say Manny chooses appropriately if 
he kills the 2 people, but it seems to be a more likely case of a justification than in the ‘10 
kills’ variation.  Suppose Manny does kill the 2 in order to save his life.  Is he justified?  
First, I want to dismiss a potential worry about such cases that has already been addressed 
above.  Conceding that Manny is justified here does not mean that killing the two is a 
good thing.  Justifications do not concern what “ought to be the case,” but rather what 
“ought to be done.”  Given this requirement, Manny is justified so long as killing the two 
is what he ought to do, given the circumstances.  Manny of course may not be justified in 
killing the 2 in order to save his life.  The answer to whether or not he is in fact justified 
lies with our substantive moral theories regarding cases like his.  I do not suppose to be 
able to weigh in on such a question here.  I will simply remind the reader that no matter 
the answer, it will not change Manny’s responsibility for the deaths, and that coercion is 
therefore not an undermining factor. 
                                               
74 Additionally, the objection might conclude simply that my explanation of blameworthiness requires 
revision.  In any case, my reply below answers both prongs of the objection. 
75 Everything I say here can be modified to apply to necessity simply by adjusting the examples a bit. 
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 Second, notice that the claim that Manny is responsible is compatible with either 
the existence or non-existence of moral dilemmas.  On at least one plausible 
interpretation, a moral dilemma is a situation in which no matter how an agent chooses, 
he chooses wrongly.  No matter how we settle on the question of whether or not there are 
scenarios in which there is nothing an agent can do permissibly, or, where every option is 
one that the agent ought not do, this will not affect the above formulation of 
justifications.  That is, the answer to dilemmas will not affect whether or not coercion can 
be a justification.  It will only show that in certain cases, Manny chooses poorly, and is 
blameworthy as a result, though no choice he could have made would have been 
appropriate.  Judgments regarding the plausibility of such a dilemmatic scenario regard 
the acceptability of dilemmas themselves, not about whether coercion is a justification or 
not. 
 Finally, I suspect that claims to the effect that Manny isn’t blameworthy for 
killing the two are driven by two important considerations: (1) that someone else is 
blameworthy in the situation, namely, Moira; and, (2) that we have decisive reason not to 
actually blame Manny.  On the first point, Moira is clearly blameworthy.  She is 
responsible for threatening Manny, and that’s morally bad.  Additionally, it seems as 
though she surely wants the two people dead, and her threatening Manny is an attempt to 
get him to fulfill that aim.  She’s using the probability that a convincing threat will 
motivate Manny to achieve her ends, and those ends are also morally bad.  Moreover, it 
seems that Moira, too, shares some responsibility for the two deaths.  After all, she is 
trying to bring something about in the world, these two deaths, and shapes her actions to 
influence Manny into helping her bring that about.  But this last fact does not absolve 
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Manny from responsibility.  Moira’s attempt to influence Manny could fail – if Manny 
refuses.  And then neither could be responsible for the deaths.  It takes Manny’s 
agreement (of a sort) to fulfill Moira’s aims, and to do so Manny must share that aim (at 
least to the extent that it saves his life).76 
 On the second point, just because an agent is blameworthy does not settle the 
question of whether or not we ought to blame him.  To deny this distinction is to accept 
what D’Arms and Jacobsen have called “The Moralistic Fallacy.”77  Something can be 
fearworthy even though you shouldn’t fear it (because doing so will make it more likely 
that you’ll fail some important aim, say).  And similarly, just because you ought to fear 
something, doesn’t mean it is fearworthy (perhaps if you genuinely fear something you 
will be rewarded with immense wealth).  I believe blameworthiness to work the same 
way.  So while the fact that an agent is blameworthy gives us good reason to blame him, 
it doesn’t settle the question of whether we ought to.78  And Manny’s case is a good 
application of this distinction.  I think it is a good application because at least some of the 
reasons one tends to offer in defense of the claim that Manny isn’t blameworthy are really 
considerations for why we shouldn’t blame him.  One natural consideration to note is that 
coercion of the kind Manny faces is very difficult to resist.  In fact, we might go so far as 
to claim it would be unreasonable to expect Manny to refuse Moira’s command.  We 
think things like we would have chosen as Manny did in similar circumstances.79  Neither 
                                               
76 I make similar claims about how our intuitions may be affected by claims regarding “shared” 
responsibility in Chapter 4, Section IV.3. 
77 See D’Arms and Jacobsen [2000].  I discussed this phenomenon in Chapter 1. 
78 Manuel Vargas distinguishes between an agent’s being responsible and it being the case that we ought to 
hold him responsible.  See Vargas [2004], p.225-226.  I take this to be the more general form of the point 
above, but since excusing only arises in the face of potential blame, I stick to the negative side of the things 
here. 
79 Both Watson [1987] and Graham [2005] point to similar reasoning, though they apply it to different 
phenomena.  Watson discusses our inclination to excuse (at least in part) vicious criminals with abused 
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of these thoughts, it seems to me, establishes that Manny isn’t blameworthy.  They seem 
to have the wrong emphasis.  The first thought regards the reasonableness of our 
expectations, while the second concerns predictions of our action in similar 
circumstances.  These thoughts seem to have more to do with the appropriateness of us 
actually blaming him, rather than the appropriateness of blaming, simpliciter.  So we may 
very well think it would be inappropriate for us to blame Manny.  It would be 
hypocritical to blame him for giving in to an incentive we ourselves could not resist.  But 
this does not support the view that blame is therefore inappropriate.  Nevertheless, such 
considerations can serve as decisive reasons for not actually blaming Manny.80  We can 
take these as reasons that show why we shouldn’t blame Manny, despite his 
blameworthiness.  Conflation of these two issues serves to confuse judgments about 
Manny’s blameworthiness, and the role of coercion in undermining responsibility. 
 I think, therefore, that we cannot rely merely on intuitions of Manny’s 
blameworthiness.  They are too much affected by irrelevant considerations.  And the 
tough cases, ones in which Manny must take more life than he saves, are tough 
independently of whether or not Manny is responsible for the deaths.  They are tough 
because our substantive moral theories lack clear answers in these cases, and because our 
tendency for shifting blame to the coercer and empathetic judgment clouds our 
assessments. 
  
                                                                                                                                            
childhoods; Graham discusses our inclination to excuse on the grounds of moral ignorance.  Graham 
explicitly rejects such reasoning, whereas Watson is more descriptive in his stance.  I discuss these claims 
again and in greater detail in in Ch. 4, Sec. 3. 
80 Similarly, I think, we can defend not punishing Manny in similar ways.  However, the issue of 




3.3.3. Objection 2: Coercion and Praiseworthiness 
A SIMILAR OBJECTION can be pushed if we consider cases of coerced good deeds.  The 
objection claims that if coerced agents were responsible for the good they bring about, 
then, on my view, this would mean that they are praiseworthy for such things.  But agents 
who are coerced into doing good are not praiseworthy, so there is something wrong with 
my account.  Notice again that this is not an objection to coerced agents being responsible 
so much as a critique of my explanation of praiseworthiness.  For even if agents weren’t 
praiseworthy for coerced outcomes, this alone wouldn’t show that they aren’t responsible 
for them.  Still, the objection does put pressure on my overall account, and so is worth 
addressing here. 
 First, let’s consider a case or two.  Suppose Moe holds a gun to Marlene’s head 
and demands that she donate $10 to Oxfam.  Supposing that Marlene donates the money, 
is she really praiseworthy for it?  To ensure this is a case of coercion, let us further 
suppose that Marlene doesn’t want to donate the money.  While she can afford it, she 
would prefer to spend the money elsewhere.  In fact, she would rather avoid either of the 
outcomes, just as in Manny and Micah’s cases.  She is also clearly presented with a 
powerful incentive for donating the money, since Moe will kill her if she doesn’t.  So, 
structurally, this seems to be a case of coercion.  Marlene also seems to make the 
appropriate choice.  And according to our characterization of coercion, it would seem that 
Marlene is responsible for the donation.  Given my account of praiseworthiness as being 
responsible for something good, and given the fact that donating money to Oxfam is 
good, Marlene is praiseworthy for it. 
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 But the objection claims this is the wrong result.  One who voluntarily donates 
money to Oxfam may be praiseworthy, but this has to do with the concern for others that 
he must have, and Marlene lacks that concern since she is primarily motivated by the 
concern for her own life.  That, the objection claims, is not the proper motivation for 
giving to charity.  A similar sentiment, I take it, lies behind our reticence to praise an 
analogous agent.  Consider the Calculating Benefactor.  He is embarking on a new 
business venture soon.  In order to garner positive publicity, he makes a substantial 
donation to a local charity.  This donation, he knows, will reflect well on him in the 
media, and the exposure will help his business venture prosper.  He does not, it turns out, 
care one whit about the people he’s helping; his sole motive is his business venture’s 
success.  I take it that many people think that the Calculating Benefactor is not 
praiseworthy.81  The thought is that he acts from the wrong sort of motive.  His aims are 
not noble, he lacks the requisite concern and respect for those the charity serves, and thus 
is not worthy of praise for his donation.  Call this the Right-Motive Account of 
praiseworthiness.  According to the Right-Motive Account, an agent is only praiseworthy 
for an outcome if it is good, she is responsible for it, and she acts from the right motives 
in bringing it about.  Such a view assumes that one’s motives play a role in one’s 
praiseworthiness for an action or outcome.  But while I understand the intuition, I don’t 
see why this should be the case.  Similarly, I don’t see why Marlene isn’t praiseworthy 
for donating to Oxfam.  After all, it is a good thing to donate money to charity, and she is 
responsible for her donation. 
                                               
81 Joshua Knobe has performed experiments in which an analogous case is described (although it concerns 
a side-effect of an action).  A significant majority of respondents agree that the agent doesn’t act 
intentionally (Knobe [2003], [2004].  In personal discussion, Knobe has said that similar experiments 
reveal the majority also think such agents aren’t praiseworthy either. 
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 I want to defend this claim by showing that its implications that naturally worry 
us (e.g., that Marlene is praiseworthy for donating to Oxfam) should not worry us.  
Motivating this defense is the observation that sometimes we speak of a person being 
praiseworthy for his character, and sometimes for a particular outcome.  I think it is this 
distinction that can help explain the worrying intuitions.  For example, the claim that 
Marlene and the Calculating Benefactor are both responsible for the outcomes they bring 
about does not entail that either one is a particularly good person.  That is, the outcomes 
need not reflect strongly anything about their characters.  In fact, we might think that 
since they do the right thing but not for the right reasons, this fact reflects poorly on their 
characters, in a way that overshadows whatever positive light being responsible for 
something good is able to shine on them.  On this account, the quality of one’s character 
is not determined solely by the outcomes one is responsible for.  Rather, the quality of 
one’s character may be a complicated weighing of the quality and strength of one’s 
motives, intentions, dispositions to act, beliefs, and attitudes towards others, whether 
these mental states are ever acted upon or not.   
 On this account, then, we get the right contrast between the Calculating 
Benefactor and the Benevolent Benefactor.  The latter donates the large sum to a charity 
because he is motivated by the desire to help others, he feels deeply the affected group’s 
suffering and wants to help alleviate it.  Surely he is a more praiseworthy individual.  But 
here we get an explanation for our reluctance to praise the Calculating Benefactor and 
Marlene.  They seem to lack praiseworthy characters.  They only donate because of 
egoistic incentives, whereas the Benevolent Benefactor acts out of his concern for others.  
We needn’t assume, however, that the connection between responsibility for outcomes 
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and quality of characters is so tight.  The fact that the Benevolent Benefactor has a more 
praiseworthy character, even that he is more praiseworthy overall, does not show that the 
Calculating Benefactor and Marlene are not each responsible for their donations.  It just 
shows that they aren’t particularly good people.  And this fact may well be enough reason 
to not actually praise them for their actions.  Just as in the case of coerced bad deeds, we 
can distinguish between the correctness of a praise attribution and whether or not we 
ought to actually praise someone.  In these cases, we seem to have decisive reason not to 
praise them, but it does not follow that it would be a mistake to do so, so long as we 
restricted our praise to the good outcome, and not their characters. 
 As a final consideration, allow me two more comparisons.  Compare the 
Calculating Benefactor to the Calculating Non-Benefactor.  The latter is also planning to 
donate money solely to improve his public image and garner positive press for his new 
business venture.  But after deliberation, he decides that the cost would not be worth the 
benefit, and so he refrains from donating any money to charity.  Here, he suffers from the 
same wrong motivations as the Calculating Benefactor.  But it seems right to suppose that 
the Calculating Benefactor is better than the Calculating Non-Benefactor with respect to 
what each did.  At least the former actually benefited other human beings.  He actually 
helped, whereas the Calculating Non-Benefactor had bad motives and failed to help 
anyone.  Again, we can explain this difference if we accept that the Calculating 
Benefactor is responsible and praiseworthy for his donation. 
 Similarly, compare Marlene to Maxine.  Maxine, too, is threatened with death if 
she doesn’t donate $10 to Oxfam.  She, too, would prefer to spend that money elsewhere, 
and just like Marlene, she would rather avoid either donating the money or getting shot.  
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But unlike Marlene, Maxine refuses to donate the money, and she is shot.  While perhaps 
there is something to be said for standing up to coercers, it seems as if Maxine does 
worse than Marlene.  At least Marlene ends up donating money to charity.  Maxine not 
only shares Marlene’s bad dispositions and motives, she still refuses to help others even 
when faced with death.82  Again, we can explain why Marlene is better if we accept that 
she is responsible and praiseworthy for her donation.  It might be suggested that 
Maxine’s actions are evidence of a severe character deficiency.  She is so bad that even 
under threat of death she refuses even to donate $10.  This action seems to display an 
utter disregard and perhaps an active contempt for those suffering.  We might then ask, 
couldn’t this character deficiency explain why Maxine is worse than Marlene?  And 
perhaps it can.  But I don’t need to eliminate all rival explanations in order to defeat the 
objection; I only need to show my account to be consistent with the phenomena.  This is 
accomplished so long as appeal to Marlene’s being praiseworthy for donating money can 
show her to have done better than Maxine, and to be, at least in that respect, better than 
Maxine. 
 In both cases, it may well be that the badness of the agent’s motives and 
dispositions far outweighs the positive contribution being responsible for the donation 
confers.  Moreover, being forced to do good may itself be a consideration that reflects 
poorly on an agent’s character.  Nevertheless, these considerations serve to show that the 
evaluation of an agent’s character is affected by more than the outcomes for which the 
agent is responsible.  And given these observations, we need not conclude that the agents 
                                               
82 We might question Maxine’s rationality.  Even on a modest cost/benefit analysis, surely one’s life is 
worth more than $10 dollars, especially to oneself.  If this poses a problem, then merely suppose that 
Maxine doesn’t value her life more than, say, $5.  While odd, this additional fact doesn’t seem to change 
her moral evaluation as a person. 
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are not responsible, indeed praiseworthy, for the outcomes they bring about, even though 
they are coerced.  Indeed, we can maintain that they are praiseworthy for these outcomes, 
and still explain the differences in the evaluation of their characters (i.e., their 
praiseworthiness ‘as people’) as a function of the multitude of considerations that weigh 
into such an evaluation.  Doing so preserves a natural view about responsibility and 
praiseworthiness, one that does not seem affected by coercion in cases of 
blameworthiness, and can account for the apparent unintuitive results such a natural view 
gives about the cases above.  It does so, I contend, because our intuitions in such cases 
can be explained primarily by facts about character not responsibility for outcomes. 
 
3.3.4. Objection 3: Non-Coerced Agents 
ANOTHER OBJECTION SEEKS to put pressure on my position by comparing coerced agents 
to non-coerced agents.  Compare Otis, for example, to Oscar.83  Oscar hates his neighbor, 
and one day, while his neighbor is away, Oscar burns down his field.  Oscar is surely 
blameworthy for burning down his neighbor’s field, and he is therefore responsible for it 
as well.  I am committed to the claim that Otis is responsible and blameworthy too.  I 
have argued that while we have decisive reasons for not actually blaming Otis, it 
wouldn’t be a mistake to do so.  But the objection notes that surely Otis is less 
blameworthy than Oscar.  After all, Otis burns the field down because he has to if he is to 
save the town.  It doesn’t reflect poorly on his character at all; he did the right thing.  
Oscar, on the other hand, burns down the field to harm his neighbor, and it does reflect 
poorly on his character.  He did something wrong.  But if both are responsible for burning 
                                               
83 Here I am using an example of necessity, since I think coercion and necessity are of a kind.  The same 
argument could be run with Manny, of course. 
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down a field, and I’ve claimed that burning down the field is bad, then they should be 
equally blameworthy. 
 In reply, let me again note that this objection again would not show that coercion 
isn’t a justification.  Indeed, it seems that it would have to be a justification in order for 
Otis to have done the right thing.  That is, it must be the case that something shows why 
burning down the field was the proper choice in the situation.  Still, we might think that 
Otis is surely less blameworthy than Oscar, though both are supposedly responsible for 
burning down a field. 
 I agree that Otis is less blameworthy, in general.  That is, I believe that if we are 
just comparing relative levels of blameworthiness between the two agents in their given 
scenarios, it is clear that Otis is less blameworthy than Oscar.  But, I maintain, this has 
relatively little to do with burning down a field.  Instead, I think what drives the judgment 
that Otis is less blameworthy is the fact that there is something Otis is praiseworthy for.  
After all, Otis saves the town from burning down.  And this is a very good outcome.  
Indeed, it is so good, that it outweighs the bad caused by burning down his neighbor’s 
field.  This is what a justification amounts to: an agent is justified in bringing about some 
bad outcome when greater good is achieved.  More may need to be added to this 
formulation, but it gets the core of justifications right.  For example, suppose Peter 
threatens to punch Paul if the latter doesn’t write a curse word on the side of the school.  
This seems to be a case in which Paul chooses well if he accedes to Peter’s demands.  
Creating a little graffiti is the better choice than suffering a broken nose.84  But suppose 
that instead of graffiti, Peter’s demand is that Paul murder the principal, Pam.  Here, I 
                                               




suspect, we think it would be improper for Paul to choose killing Pam over the threat of a 
broken nose.  Obviously, physical harm is to be avoided, but the threat of being punched 
just doesn’t carry enough weight to justifiably coerce when someone’s life is on the line.  
So, if Paul does kill Pam, I suspect we think him both responsible and blameworthy for it.  
The differences between these two cases seem to be with respect to the appropriateness of 
the choice made given the relative incentives involved. 
 Similarly, we can agree that Manny chooses properly in cracking a safe over 
sacrificing his life.  But suppose that he is threatened with a kick on the shin, or even a 
verbal insult, if he fails to crack the safe.  Here it is not at all obvious that in choosing to 
crack the safe he chooses the proper course.  So, even though both options are 
unattractive, coercion offers little defense if the agent chooses poorly, as Manny does if 
he opts for cracking the safe over being called a “scumbag.” 
 So it seems that coercion only justifies the agent’s choice when there is a 
significant enough threat to outweigh the reasons against doing the alternative in the first 
place.  It is clear that whether or not a given choice is justified will depend on the options 
available to the agent.  I’m not in a position to state what counts as an “available” option, 
but we can easily rule out the logically and physically impossible, and perhaps the 
psychologically impossible as well.  I trust that we needn’t worry over how to draw the 
appropriate line here, since it seems a rather straightforward matter for cases like 
Manny’s.  There, as I noted, he has the option of resisting Moira, of trying to get the gun 
from her, of running away, and many other possible choices.  Moira’s presentation of the 
options takes the form of a false dilemma.  Manny isn’t constrained by her dictates, but 
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can opt for an option that’s “not on the table.”85  But so long as he chooses appropriately, 
he is justified.  And presumably choosing appropriately involves something like choosing 
an option reasonably as good as any alternative. 
 Justifications, then, are all things considered notions.  They appeal to the 
conditions in which the action took place, especially the outcome that was avoided by 
taking the action, and that the action was the better option of those available.  
Blameworthiness perhaps can be an all things considered ascription.  We might take two 
agents and ask, “Which is more blameworthy?”  The question is unfortunately vague, but 
we might take it to mean, “Given all the things each is responsible for, which of the two 
is responsible for the worst stuff?”  Or, to put it another way, we might be asking who’s 
more blameworthy for their characters, and their attitudes, and their deeds, etc., 
aggregated over their lifetimes.  I’m not sure how to settle such questions.  Indeed, even 
limiting discussion to a much smaller portion of time, say, a particular sequence of events 
still leaves us with a difficult question if what we’re after is overall blameworthiness for 
everything relevant to that sequence.  I think it difficult to know how to handle 
ascriptions of overall blameworthiness precisely, since it isn’t clear how to aggregate 
blameworthiness over a vast array of objects of responsibility.86 
 That being said, I think coercion and necessity mitigate overall blameworthiness 
because they stand as testimonies to the agent’s motivation.  Coercion and necessity are 
relevant because they give an explanation for why the agent acted contrary to important 
reasons against doing bad things: it was because something even worse would have 
occurred otherwise.  Agents who act under such circumstances do not have bad motives 
                                               
85 Interestingly, Sartre makes a similar observation.  See Sartre [1943, 2003], pp.255-281. 
86 This is a very interesting question I hope to pursue in later work. 
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as a result.87  On the contrary, we might think they chose as they ought to have done.  
And yet the features that make the chosen option bad remain even when it is the proper 
choice.  After all, the trite phrasing of such scenarios is “the lesser of two evils,” not 
“what was once an evil but is no longer so given the possibility of greater evil.”  So I 
think there is some blameworthiness for doing bad things even when they are justified, 
and even though we shouldn’t actually blame the coerced. 
 
3.3.5. Objection 4: Responsibility and Character 
STILL ANOTHER OBJECTION goes as follows.  Responsibility is supposed to be the sort of 
notion that connects actions with an agent’s character.  An agent’s being blameworthy for 
x reflects negatively on his character because of the negative nature of x (i.e., that it is 
bad).  Being praiseworthy reflects positively.  But for Manny or Otis, this isn’t true.  So it 
is mistaken to think they are responsible.  Manny’s character isn’t negatively impacted by 
his cracking the safe, nor is Otis’ character for burning the field.  And yet these are bad 
things, and so if they were responsible for them, their characters would be negatively 
impacted as a result.  Therefore, they must not be responsible for these things. 
 I agree that when an agent is responsible for an outcome, this tells us something 
about the agent in light of the nature of that outcome.  And I agree that in cases of 
coercion and necessity, what the nature of the outcome tells us is different than in 
ordinary cases of action.  But the objection has the wrong view of how my account treats 
these cases.  Justifications are cases in which bad outcomes are relativized in a certain 
                                               
87 Or, at least, we cannot infer that they do from their “bad” action. 
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way due to the surrounding circumstances.  That’s why Otis’ being responsible for 
burning down the field isn’t quite the same as Oscar’s. 
 Part of the explanation for the difference concerns the sense in which Otis’ action 
isn’t divorceable from the particular circumstances in which it is performed.  It is these 
very circumstances which allow his burning the field to be justified.  The explanation of 
his action includes the beliefs featuring in Otis’ reasoning, at least some of which concern 
performing the act so as to avoid a substantially worse harm.  When Oscar acts, of 
course, he has no such beliefs.  When Otis is responsible for burning down the field, he is 
justified so long as he does it to thereby save the town,88 which means that he is also 
responsible for saving the town.  So, while in cases of justification we will be able to 
separate conceptually the agent’s responsibility for the bad outcome and his 
responsibility for the good outcome, the same action precipitates both.  We will not, 
therefore, be able to pry what his responsibility for burning the field tells us about him 
from what his responsibility for saving the town tells us.  For the responsibility relation 
seems to tie Otis to both outcomes simultaneously, since the same action precipitates 
both, and he intentionally brings about the one outcome in order to bring about the other.  
And this, I submit, is the unique feature of justifications.  His blameworthiness for 
burning the field down is clearly outweighed by his praiseworthiness for saving the town, 
and this will be true for all justifications, for they are justifications precisely because they 
are instances in which the agent does something bad that nevertheless averts something 
worse.  And averting the worse outcome will carry with it the relevant praiseworthiness 
outweighing the blameworthiness from the bad outcome in something like a proportional 
                                               
88 We might include a qualification that it has to be true that burning the field will save the town.  This 
would depend on whether an agent’s beliefs alone can justify, or whether the beliefs have to be true, as 
well, or something in the middle (e.g., the beliefs must meet some reasonability standard). 
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fashion.  The greater the harm avoided, the more praiseworthiness to outweigh 
blameworthiness, and thus, the more justified one is in performing a harm. 
 This account also nicely fits phenomena surrounding particularly difficult choices 
where it might not be clear which option is preferable.  In such scenarios, I take it, the 
relative badness of the options available will be much closer, and thus the 
praiseworthiness corresponding to the outcome averted will, perhaps, only slightly 
outweigh that accrued by the action performed.  Thus, in such scenarios, it will be easier 
to see how the agent might be blameworthy for the bad outcome he brought about, even 
if in the end we agree that he ought not be blamed for it.  What helps explain this feature 
of justifications generally is that the fact that his praiseworthiness for averting some 
terrible outcome outweighs his blameworthiness for the bad outcome he does bring about 
gives us good reason not to actually blame him.  If we did, we would be unfairly ignoring 
the praise he is due for averting the terrible outcome. 
 Now it may also be the case that he ought not actually be praised for averting the 
terrible outcome.  I take it in many (perhaps all) cases of coercion and at least some cases 
of necessity, this is the case.  I suspect that this is true in cases where the respective bad 
outcomes are closer in degree, so that praising the agent for adverting disaster would be 
to ignore the reality of the bad he brought about in order to do so.  Again, dilemmatic 
cases will be good examples, though I think this can be true even of cases in which there 
is a clear enough answer as to what the agent ought to do.  Moreover, in cases in which 
we would likely praise the agent, I think this most naturally reflects a commitment on our 
part to reinforce choosing correctly.  So, for example, in Otis’ case, while there seems to 
me something odd about praising him for saving the town, since this ignores the fact that 
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he burned down his neighbor’s field to do so, there may be good prudential reasons to 
praise him anyhow, if only to foster in others the tendency to overcome the strong 
reasons against bad actions necessary to prevent even more serious harms. 
 
3.3.6. Objection 5: Coercion and Freedom 
I CONSIDER NOW A FINAL objection that has a quite different source.  There is a general 
view, proposed by Gideon Yaffe, that claims coercion intuitively restricts an agent’s 
responsibility-relevant freedom, and thus undermines his responsibility.  The idea here is 
that responsibility requires a kind of freedom, and that freedom is impaired by coercion.  
Thus, responsibility is undermined as a result.89  Coercion could restrict freedom, it is 
claimed, by limiting the available options one can choose from.  If we imagine a range of 
scenarios in which a coerced agent could choose, coercion is characterized by the coercer 
adjusting tactics so as to guarantee (as much as possible) compliance with whatever he 
wants done.  Thus, no matter what sorts of reasons Manny might act on, Moira will 
attempt to insure that she provides the strongest reasons in favor of cracking the safe in 
all cases.  That is, if Manny’s choosing based on reasons of self-interest alone, she’ll 
threaten his welfare.  If he’s privileging other-interested reasons, then she’ll threaten his 
family, and so on.  The objection claims that coercion makes the array of reasons-
responsive mechanisms that Manny might act on “functionally equivalent”90 – that is, no 
matter which mechanism is engaged, the outcome Moira wants will result. 
 I have two replies.  The first is that this picture of coercion is overly restrictive.  It 
unnecessarily assumes a particular view about freedom, one that doesn’t seem to me to be 
                                               
89 For a presentation of such a view, see Yaffe [2003], esp. pp.350-355. 
90 Yaffe [2003], p.353. 
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plausible enough to assume. Second, even granting its conclusion, it fails to establish that 
responsibility is undermined.  I’ll take these replies up in turn. 
 First, the intuitive picture is that coercers restrict the available options open to the 
coerced.  Manny would prefer to do a range of other things, but Moira is poised to 
present him with incredibly strong incentives at every turn.  The picture suggests that 
Moira makes it such that given the various ways Manny might choose, the result will 
always be the same – he will crack the safe.  His freedom with respect to what he does is 
restricted by her manipulation of his reasons for choosing. 
 But this picture is infelicitous.  Suppose, for the moment, that the thesis of 
determinism is true.  Suppose it is true that every event e after some time t is entailed 
given the facts of the world at time t and the laws of nature.  If this is so, then there aren’t 
any options open to Manny.  Indeed, one way to state the thesis of determinism is that 
“there is at any instant exactly one possible future.”91  What Manny does is determined, 
just as what Moira does is.  His available “options” are already set; this is what 
determinism holds.  The picture of Moira’s interference sketched by the objection 
suggests that she is interfering with Manny’s choosing processes, such that the result will 
always be the same.  But given the truth of determinism, Manny and Moira are 
themselves parts of a deterministic process, which fixes what each will do.  So it is 
misleading to suggest that Manny’s freedom is limited by Moira anymore so than it is by 
determinism itself.  It follows, then, that the objection only establishes its conclusion if 
determinism is false.  But that seems to me an unreasonable and implausible assumption 
to make, and it is certainly one to be resisted by compatibilists, especially if there’s an 
                                               
91 Van Inwagen [1983], p.3. 
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alternative account of coercion on offer.92  Yaffe does suggest that determinism itself is 
different from a coercer’s actions, for the laws of nature will not change tacks to facilitate 
the compliance of the coerced, whereas Moira will presumably adjust tactics to ensure 
compliance.  But if determinism is true, we cannot, it would seem, divorce Moira’s 
actions from the total determined system, and her changing tacks would be no more or 
less determined than a ship’s captain being “coerced” by a storm to dump his cargo 
overboard (an example of necessity).93  So while this suggestion does seem to point to the 
coercer’s shared responsibility for actions, I do not see how it effectively contrasts 
coercion from necessity. 
 Second, even if we grant the conclusion, those pressing the freedom objection 
must still show that a restriction of freedom implies a reduction in responsibility.  In other 
words, proponents must show that maximal freedom is necessary for responsibility.  Even 
were it the case that Manny is less free in the face of Moira’s coercion than he would be 
otherwise, this is insufficient for demonstrating that his responsibility is similarly 
reduced.  Perhaps there is merely a threshold level of freedom required for responsibility, 
so that one could fail to be maximally free and still be maximally responsible.  I do not 
claim this is necessarily so, only that its possibility requires refutation.  At the very least 
one cannot simply assume that freedom and responsibility are directly proportional, as 
the objection seems to do.94 
 
                                               
92 It should be noted that Yaffe isn’t trying to give an independent account of coercion.  Rather, he’s 
assuming that coercion undermines freedom and trying to show how that could be the case.  In my mind, he 
does so only by eliminating compatibilist accounts of freedom, and by extension, compatibilist accounts of 
responsibility. 
93 A contrasting example Yaffe uses, borrowing from Aristotle. 
94 Yaffe certainly seems to make this assumption.  See Yaffe [2003], p.335, n.1. 
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 In light of the above, I conclude that coercion and necessity are of a kind, that 
neither undermine responsibility, and that therefore agents who act under coercion or 
necessity are responsible (ceteris paribus)95 for what they bring about.  Coercion and 
necessity are both justifications, and so, as long as the agent chooses properly, he ought 
not be blamed or praised for the outcome, even if he can still be blameworthy or 
praiseworthy for them.  I think this account explains the phenomena involved and 
maintains the natural view that blameworthiness and praiseworthiness are just 
responsibility for bad and good things, respectively. 
  
3.3.7. A Brief Note on Compulsion 
VERY BRIEFLY, THEN, I WANT to make a final observation.  If I am right in my 
characterization of coercion and necessity, that they are defined in part by the 
presentation of a powerful incentive for action, then it may very well be the case that 
compulsion ought to be treated similarly.  If klepto- and pyromaniacs can resist their 
psychological urges (i.e., if such individuals do not always act on such dispositions), then 
it would appear that such cases are structurally similar to cases of necessity.  The agents 
in compulsion cases are similarly presented with a powerful psychological incentive, this 
time from “within,” to bring about a particular outcome.96  But if coercion and necessity 
fail to undermine responsibility, then I conclude that compulsion will similarly fail.  
However, unlike coercion and necessity, compulsion does not seem to be a justification; 
                                               
95 The qualification is necessary since one might be coerced to do something and still bring about an 
outcome accidentally.  It would seem that responsibility for such a side-effect is still undermined in this 
case. 
96 The claim here is clearly conditional on psychology and neuroscience giving us the correct picture of 
such disorders.  If, say, kleptomania doesn’t work as I’ve described, then unfortunately my comments on 
coercion will not apply to kleptomaniacs. 
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it does not show that the outcome chosen was good or proper.  As a result, if compulsion 
does not undermine responsibility, than klepto- and pyromaniacs are responsible for the 
outcomes they bring about (ceteris paribus), and since those outcomes are usually bad, 
they are blameworthy for them. 
Similarly, and I think tellingly, we don’t think those compelled to do good things 
should be less responsible.  As Susan Wolf has shown,97 if someone is presented with a 
powerful psychological incentive to donate to charity, or help a drowning swimmer, we 
aren’t inclined to think their responsibility is undermined.  Indeed, they may be 
praiseworthy.  My account treats both types of cases identically, holding that 
responsibility is preserved in both.  To my mind, this is a welcome result for such cases. 
 
3.4. Conditions on Being Responsible 
IN THIS SECTION, I WANT to review what has been said so far and outline the conditions on 
being responsible suggested by the characterizations of the classes of undermining factors 
provided above.  So far, we have characterized three classes of undermining factors.98  
First, there are those considerations that show the outcome was the result of involuntary 
behavior.99  These are considerations like spasm, reflex, and incapacitation.  This class is 
The Involuntary.  Second, there are those considerations that show the outcome was an 
unforeseen side-effect of action.  These are considerations like accident, inadvertence, 
and ignorance.  This class is The Unintentional.  Finally, there are those considerations 
that show the agent acted from false beliefs about what she was doing.  These are 
                                               
97 See Wolf [1980].  I discuss her conclusions in Chapter 1 as well. 
98 Recall that considerations of ‘coercion’ have been excluded. 
99 The qualification is necessary as many wouldn’t want to count these sorts of bodily movements as 
actions.  I remain agnostic on how we ought to classify actions for the purposes of action theory. 
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considerations of mistake.  This class is The Mistaken.  Examination of this final class 
also sheds light on why mistaken beliefs are relevant.  They help specify the intentional 
structure of the agent and how mistaken beliefs can disrupt that structure. 
 My methodology was to presume that the undermining factors could operate by 
showing that a condition necessary for responsibility wasn’t present.  This presumption 
was supported, in part, by the observation that the undermining factors seem to be 
organized around presenting negative features of the outcome or agent; that the outcome 
was unintentional or involuntary, or a belief was mistaken.  The suggestion was that these 
negative features would themselves provide the conditions on being responsible. 
In light of the above discussion, I think there are 3 conditions on responsibility for 
outcomes.  In general, I’m concerned with the things that agents bring about.  These can 
be talked about roughly as actions, events, or states of affairs.  Agents sometimes aim to 
bring certain “ends” about, and these outcomes also sometimes have accompanying side-
effects (or the actions that bring them about do).  I intend to be neutral across possible 
questions regarding the individuation of actions, events, and the like. 
So, for an agent to be responsible for an outcome, that outcome must have been 
(1) brought about voluntarily, (2) brought about intentionally, and (3) brought about 
without mistake.  I need to say more about how these conditions relate to each other and 
what they rule out.  I shall take each one up in turn. 
 
3.4.1. Voluntariness Condition 
AN AGENT BRINGS SOMETHING about voluntarily if it is the product of some action of his.  
As I understand it, when we explain the actions of agents, it often suffices to do so by 
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reference to a belief-desire pair (or a set of beliefs and a set of desires).  Stan gets up and 
goes into the kitchen and gets a soda from the fridge.  Why did he do that?  Well, we 
might say, Stan wanted to drink a soda and he believed there was a soda in the fridge.  
So, he went to the fridge and got one.  I take it all actions for which one can be 
responsible can be explained in this way, whereas not all events can be so explained (e.g., 
those events that are not also actions, like the eruption of a volcano).100  An agent 
satisfies the voluntariness condition so long as the outcome was produced by an action 
that can be explained by reference to a belief-desire pair. 
 This construal of the condition rules out just those outcomes that gave rise to the 
condition in the first place.  For example, when Barbie suffers a seizure and hits Ken in 
her flailings, the outcome is explained solely in terms of her seizure.  She doesn’t “act” at 
all, in the sense made relevant by belief-desire pairs.  It is important to note here, 
however, that it is not the fact that we can explain the outcome in non-belief-desire terms 
that violates the condition.  This may be possible in even paradigmatic cases of 
intentional action.101  The relevant fact is that we cannot explain the outcome in belief-
desire pairs.  Similarly, if Adam breaks a window while sleepwalking, or Barry breaks a 
window while swatting at a swarm of bees, they too do not act from a belief-desire pair.  
As a result, none of these outcomes is voluntarily produced, and thus each fails the 
voluntariness condition.  Responsibility for each is undermined. 
 
                                               
100 Also, there may be some actions that cannot be explained this way.  On some views about action, 
distinguishing between actions and mere events can be done roughly by distinguishing between the “stuff 
people do” and the “stuff that happens to them”.  For an example, see Brand [1984], esp. pp. 3-6.  I remain 
neutral on whether the concept of action is best thought of in these terms or the ones outlined in the body of 
the chapter.  I do think, however, that belief-desire pairs are necessary for an action to be a proper object of 
responsibility, and I will call all such explainable objects as “actions” simpliciter.  I say more about this 
condition in Chapter 5. 
101 Indeed, I should think this necessary if physicalism about the mind is true. 
 
 93
3.4.2. Intentionality Condition 
THE INTENTIONALITY CONDITION constrains what must be true about the belief figuring in 
an explanation of the agent’s action.  An agent satisfies the Intentionality Condition so 
long as he believed that the outcome in question might occur as a result of his action.  
What you intend to do is generally susceptible to what you believe you can do.  But for 
the purposes of responsibility, it isn’t necessary that the outcome be intended.  Instead, 
one need only foresee that the outcome may occur.  Moreover, the agent need not know 
that the outcome will occur, or even that it will likely occur.  Rather, it is sufficient for 
intentionality (as responsibility requires it) that the agent foresees the sheer possibility of 
the outcome in question.102 
 Again, the construal of this condition rules out just those outcomes that initially 
gave rise to the condition.  When Fred shoots Barney in the eye, he doesn’t believe that 
the injury is a possible result of his opening the bottle of champagne.103  And when 
Lenny steps on his friend’s hand inadvertently, he also doesn’t believe that the result is a 
potential consequence of his stepping.  Indeed, if he did, he likely wouldn’t step.  And 
when Martin opens the door and hits Mark in the face, he also doesn’t believe that 
opening the door will cause injury.104  Again, if he had such knowledge, he would likely 
act differently.105 
                                               
102 The condition thus adopts a wider scope than might be suggested by certain uses of the term 
‘intentional.’ 
103 By stipulation.  Indeed, it doesn’t even seem to be a “foreseeable” result.  Rarely, if ever, do champagne 
corks injure people. 
104 Here I seem to join those like Galen Strawson and Fischer & Ravizza who claim there are subjective 
conditions on responsibility.  What the agent himself believes is relevant. 
105 This counterfactual tests are meant to illustrate the point, not as elucidations of how the condition must 
be satisfied.  One could satisfy the condition, and bring something about unintentionally, even if 
counterfactually he still would have acted as he did.  In the counterfactual scenario, however, he would no 
longer bring the thing about unintentionally. 
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 One might accept the foreseeing aspect of the condition, and yet be skeptical 
about the possibility aspect.  One might object that it surely matters how likely it is that a 
particular outcome will result from a particular course of action.  Allow me to comment 
briefly on why this isn’t the case. 
 First, notice that in cases of direct intention, the chance of success seems 
immaterial to ascriptions of responsibility (and, indeed, intentionality).106  For example, 
suppose Leona is trying to shoot Lionel.  But she’s never shot a gun before.  She’s quite a 
distance away, in the wind and rain, and has trouble aiming the gun.  Let’s assume that 
the chances that she successfully hits Lionel are incredibly low.  Indeed, we can set her 
probability of success arbitrarily low; say, she has a one in a million chance, literally.107  
Nevertheless, if Leona successfully shoots Lionel, she does so intentionally and she is 
responsible for shooting him.  Success, no matter how improbable, is all that’s required 
for meeting the intentionality requirement in cases of direct intention.108 
 But the objector likely has in mind cases of indirect intention.  That is, the 
objector is claiming that in cases where harm is merely foreseen as a possible side-effect 
of some course of action, then the likelihood of that harm actually occurring does become 
relevant to ascriptions of responsibility.  For example, suppose Harry wants to put down 
some pesticide at the edge of his property.  He wants to do it today, on Sunday, because 
it’s his day off.  He knows, however, that if it were to rain within 4 hours of putting the 
pesticide down, the rain will wash some of the pesticide into his neighbor’s prized 
                                               
106 Remember that, when I speak of intentionality (and intentionally x-ing, say), it is always qualified with 
“as responsibility is interested in the notion”.  Some may want to refine the notion of intentionality for 
technical reasons involved in other debates.  I’m only interested in specifying the sort of mental states 
required in order to be responsible for outcomes. 
107 If this probability seems too high, the reader is invited to take me seriously, and indeed set the 
probability as low as he or she likes.  I trust judgments about the case will remain unchanged. 
108 In cases of direct intention there is necessarily an explanatory belief about the potential outcome: it is 
the very aim of the action. 
 
 95
petunia patch, killing them.  Now suppose that Harry knows there is an 80% chance of 
rain for the next 4 hours.  If he puts down the pesticide, and it rains, and his neighbor’s 
petunias are killed as a result, it sure seems as though he kills the petunias knowingly 
(which suffices for meeting the intentionality condition).  That is, he believes that killing 
the petunias is a potential result of his action.  And it surely seems as though Harry is 
responsible for killing them. 
 The objector will try to put pressure on this claim by reducing the probability of 
rain.  So, suppose that everything is as before, only now Harry knows that there is only a 
5% chance of rain for the next four hours.  If he puts down the pesticide, and it rains, and 
the petunias are killed, I still think he kills them knowingly and is responsible.  Indeed, so 
long as Harry believes that his putting down the pesticide may lead to killing the 
petunias, and his putting down the pesticide does lead to killing the petunias, he does so 
knowingly and is responsible for killing them. 
 To make the above claim more plausible, notice what happens if we ratchet up the 
seriousness of the harm risked.  Killing petunias may be a bad thing, but it isn’t that bad.  
So suppose that Vincent loves watching his favorite movie, “Field of Dreams.”  But he 
also knows that there is a 1 in a billion chance that if he puts the DVD in his player and 
pushes “play” everyone else on the planet will die.  This is a miniscule risk (and we can 
reduce it further to any arbitrary amount).  Nevertheless, should Vincent play his movie, 
and everyone else dies as a result, I think it clear that Vincent kills them knowingly and is 
responsible.109 
                                               
109 To keep things simple, let’s assume the explanation for why pressing the button will kill so many people 
has nothing to do with any third-party’s nefarious schemes or intervention. 
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 There is a certain sort of strictness involved here.  To put it one way, I’m claiming 
that knowledge of the possibility of an outcome can make one responsible for it.  Acting 
in the knowledge that your action risks an outcome means that you “accept”110 that 
outcome’s obtaining.  And the condition would seem to expand the realm of the things 
we can be responsible for.  It is this expansion, I think, that lies at the heart of the 
objector’s worry.  I can believe a good many things are possible consequences of my 
action, but surely it is too much to demand that I am responsible for all of them that may 
occur.  Indeed, the worry may be simply that “possibility” opens up too much; if the 
probability is allowed to be arbitrarily low, then certainly there are a great many things 
that are only barely possible, even restricting ourselves to physical possibility.  We are all 
familiar with the image of a butterfly’s flapping causing a hurricane on the other side of 
the world.  Taking a liberty or two, if I am that butterfly, the objector asks, am I 
responsible for the hurricane? 
 This worry is unfounded.  Remember, the Intentionality Condition is only strict 
when it comes to outcomes the agent believed were possible consequences.  So to answer 
the objector, you the butterfly are responsible only if you knew the hurricane was a 
possible result.  After all, it is surely possible that opening a champagne bottle can lead to 
the cork hitting someone in the eye.  It is likely a rare occurrence, but not impossible.   
But Fred isn’t responsible for hitting Barney in the eye.  Why not?  Because Fred doesn’t 
believe that Barney’s injury is a potential side-effect.  And it is this consideration that 
undermines Fred’s responsibility for hitting Barney in the eye.  We’re concerned with the 
beliefs Fred actually holds at the time of his action, not the facts about possible 
                                               




outcomes.111  Contrast this with a counterfactual case, where Fred thinks to himself, 
“Opening the bottle in this fashion might hit someone in the eye.”  When he hits Barney 
in the eye with the cork, it is far less plausible to suppose he’s still not responsible for 
doing so. 
 
3.4.3. No-Mistake Condition112 
SO FAR, WE’VE SEEN THAT the Voluntariness Condition and the Intentionality Condition 
are satisfied when (1) an agent brings something about through an action that can be 
explained by a belief-desire set, and (2) that set includes a belief that the outcome in 
question was at least a possible result of the action.  There is only one more condition 
necessary for responsibility.  An agent brings something about without mistake so long as 
he has only correct beliefs about the nature of what he is bringing about. 
Once again, this condition rules out mistakes.  Recall our prime example.  Jan 
takes what she believes to be her coat from a pile of coats at a party.  She wants to leave 
and it is cold outside, so she wants her coat, and she believes her coat to be the red one 
now in her hands.  But she’s wrong.  The coat she holds is someone else’s, though it is 
the same type, color, and size.  In other words, she has a false explanatory belief (it is 
doubly explanatory since it helps explains both why Jan took someone else’s coat and 
why she didn’t take her own).  This false belief constitutes Jan’s mistake; she was wrong 
                                               
111 There is a related objection that claims this condition may rule too much out at times.  For instance, 
what if someone’s actual beliefs are unreasonable?  Suppose someone claims he didn’t believe that 
shooting his gun haphazardly could lead to serious injury?  I think this worry, too, is unfounded, but 
discussion of the relevant points is taken up in Chapter 3. 
112 I’ve previously claimed that one arrives at these conditions be negating the negations suggested by the 
undermining factors (the involuntary; the unintentional; and the mistaken).  For the other two conditions, 
the double negation invites a return to the simpler positive formulation (e.g., the voluntary; the intentional).  
Dropping the “mis-” from “mistake” does not invite such a return, as we don’t have the appropriate 




about the nature of what she was doing.  She thought she was taking her own coat and not 
someone else’s.  Jan has a false belief about what she was bringing about, and this false 
belief seems to undermine her responsibility. 
As stated, however, this condition clearly rules out too much.  Not just any false 
belief about what one is doing can undermine responsibility.  To use a modified version 
of an example from Pete Graham,113 suppose Ben hates the Amish.  He’s a technophile 
and resentful of what he perceives to be an Amish disdain for technology and those who 
use it.  While out walking one day he sees Jeb, who Ben takes to be an Amish person and 
proceeds to beat mercilessly.  Now, Ben believes that he is beating a man and that the 
man is Amish.  But Ben is wrong.  Jeb isn’t Amish at all; he’s a Mennonite.  So Ben has a 
false belief about what he is doing.  He’s mistaken about Jeb’s religion.  So he thinks he’s 
beating up an Amish man, when really he’s beating up a Mennonite.  But surely this 
doesn’t excuse Ben.  He must be fully responsible for Jeb’s injuries, if anyone is 
responsible for anything.  So we must somehow restrict the sort of beliefs relevant to 
undermining responsibility, or else we risk excusing too much. 
I think we do better to state the condition as follows: an agent brings something 
about without mistake so long as he has only correct beliefs about the nature of what he is 
bringing about necessary to generate an evaluation according to the appropriate 
normative standards.  Allow me to explain. 
Recall that, on my view, an agent is morally blameworthy114 just in case he is 
responsible for something that is morally bad.  He is responsible just in case he meets my 
three conditions.  The “something” is morally bad just in case our correct moral theory 
                                               
113 Graham [ms 1], p.20. 
114 All that I say here can be said mutatis mutandi for praiseworthiness and all non-moral types of each. 
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says so.  We care about responsibility principally because of the important role it plays in 
ascriptions of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness (across normative standards).  As a 
result, the conditions on responsibility are sensitive to that role it plays.  So, I think the 
relevant set of beliefs here is the one concerning those facts necessary for generating an 
evaluation in the circumstances according to our correct moral theory.115  Let’s take this 
version of the condition back to Ben’s case. 
To answer the question of whether Ben’s beliefs about Jeb’s religious affiliation 
are relevant to responsibility, I suggest we need only answer whether or not Jeb’s 
religious affiliation would be relevant to the moral evaluation of the act, given a plausible 
moral theory.  While surely some moral theories might take such a fact into 
consideration, I think we would have especially strong independent reasons to reject such 
theories.  Instead, it seems to me, our most plausible moral theories, whatever they say, 
will treat religious affiliation as irrelevant for evaluating instances of physical assault.  If 
the fact of Jeb’s religious affiliation is irrelevant according to the normative standards, 
then I think Ben’s belief regarding Jeb’s religious affiliation is similarly irrelevant for 
responsibility. 
Turning back to Jan, we can see that this version of the condition preserves our 
judgments in her case.  For it seems obvious that facts concerning whose coat a particular 
coat is will be relevant for evaluating instances of coat-taking.  And if that is the case, 
then I think beliefs about such facts are of supreme importance for responsibility.  Thus, 
the restricted revision of the condition serves to segregate just those cases in which false 
                                               




beliefs undermine responsibility, and those in which they don’t.  Jan’s responsibility is 
therefore undermined, but Ben’s is not.  And this is how it should be. 
A final word on this last condition.  In Chapter 2, I argued for a notion of 
responsibility that is significantly independent of our practices.  And here, it may seem as 
though I am smuggling our evaluative practices back into that notion.  But I’m not.  I 
don’t think the practices are constitutive of the notion of responsibility, nor do they 
explain what it is to be responsible.  That was the heart of my critique in Chapter 2.  
Moreover, even here, I do not think that the evaluative practices play a crucial role.  What 
we care about is that the agent’s beliefs about the features of the case are correct.  Some 
such features will be irrelevant in assigning blame (e.g., Ben’s false beliefs about Jeb’s 
religious affiliation), while others will not (e.g., Jan’s false beliefs about the coat she’s 
taking).  And these are important for the purposes of responsibility, only because they 
indicate the level at which the agent is aware of what he is doing.  A certain level of 
awareness is necessary (e.g., that one is hitting a human being and not a tree stump), 
while further awareness is not necessary (e.g., that one is hitting an Amish person rather 
than a Mennonite).  The agent must be aware of those facts that help explain the moral 
verdicts, but he need not be aware of the moral verdicts themselves.  He needs to know 
he’s causing harm, not that causing harm is wrong.  So the evaluative practices 
themselves are not important, only awareness of the facts relevant to those practices. 
This level of awareness, I think, is not restricted to the moral cases either.  I think 
in general the same level of awareness, or awareness of the same sort of features, will be 
relevant across normative domains.  That one is using blue paint and not green paint is an 
analogous example from the aesthetic domain.  Obviously, the color of paint is 
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aesthetically relevant, and not morally relevant.  So it isn’t the case that the very same 
facts will be relevant across domains.  But neither should we expect them to be.  Just as 
the color of paint is morally irrelevant, so is the causing of harm aesthetically irrelevant.  
Different norms care about different facts.  We might worry, therefore, that an agent 
could be responsible for the very same action under one set of norms and not another. 
But far from being worried by such a conclusion, I think it the right result.  It 
amounts to the claim that one could be morally mistaken while being aesthetically 
unmistaken.  And I think this is correct.  Imagine that some musician wants a particular 
sound on a given track.  The sound he’s looking for is a scream of pain.  To get it, he 
plugs in his keyboard, sets the sound bank to “screams” and plays.  Let us assume that the 
effect truly is aesthetically remarkable.  It seems the musician is surely responsible for 
that quality, if anyone ever is.  Now let us suppose that, unbeknownst to our musician, the 
keyboard works in the following way.  Whenever he sets it to “screams” and plays a key, 
someone is tortured in order to elicit the proper tone.  The technology is such that there is 
no lag time, and there was nothing in the materials that came with the keyboard 
suggesting this is how the sounds get created.  I think our musician is not morally 
blameworthy for creating the effect.  He doesn’t know (and has no reason to believe) that 
he is causing pain.  He believes sincerely that the screams are digitally created and no one 
was ever harmed in their creation.  His mistake, I think, undermines his responsibility for 
causing the pain.  And yet, despite his false beliefs, I think he is responsible for the 
remarkable effect he brings about in the song, and so he is aesthetically (or, musically) 
praiseworthy for it.  For the aesthetic norms are not sensitive to the sources of the sounds, 
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they care primarily about the quality of the sounds and their relation to the rest of the 
piece.116 
So, one can be both responsible and not responsible for particular things in a 
given bit of behavior.  In recording the screams he is both responsible for their aesthetic 
effect on the song and not responsible for the pain he causes in eliciting those sounds.  I 
see nothing problematic with such a result. 
 
It should be apparent from the preceding discussion that these three conditions fall 
into a hierarchy.  Or, if one prefers, they increasingly limit what counts as a potential 
object of responsibility.  The Voluntariness Condition limits us to actions (or the results 
of such actions) that can be explained by a belief-desire set.  The Intentionality Condition 
limits us to those outcomes the agent believed (at least) might result from his action.  And 
the No-Mistake Condition limits us to those outcomes in which the agent had all correct 
beliefs concerning those features of what he was doing necessary for generating an 
evaluation according the appropriate standards given the circumstances.  The restricted 
set for each condition is an obvious subset of the previous condition’s restricted set.  
Thus, all outcomes that satisfy the Intentionality Condition satisfy the Voluntariness 
Condition, but only some of them satisfy the No-Mistake Condition. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
I CONCLUDE THIS CHAPTER by outlining the structure of blameworthiness and 
praiseworthiness, especially as it relates to the discussions of mistake and coercion.  
Recall that on my view one is blameworthy just in case one is responsible for something 
                                               
116 This is a claim that risks attack by seasoned aestheticians.  I run the risk knowingly. 
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bad.  And in many of the cases in question, we’re interested in moral blameworthiness.  
For one to be morally blameworthy for something, she must be responsible for something 
morally bad.  The ‘for something’ refers to an outcome, the principle object of 
responsibility with which I’m interested.  Take Jan’s case for instance.  Now, it seems Jan 
is not blameworthy for taking the coat.  And it also seems it is her mistaken belief that the 
coat belongs to her that excuses her from blame.  Since such excuses show that the agent 
isn’t responsible, my characterization of mistake suggests that responsibility for 
outcomes is concerned with outcomes under descriptions.  This is because the outcome in 
question must be bad in order for us to be interested in an ascription of blameworthiness 
to Jan, so this means the outcome in question must be treated as ‘the taking of someone 
else’s coat’.  For this outcome, Jan is not responsible, and her mistake shows us why.  
She took herself to be doing something else, namely, taking her own coat.117 
 But we also saw that coercion doesn’t undermine responsibility, and that Manny 
is responsible for cracking the safe.  Now, it seems that Manny also is not morally 
blameworthy for cracking the safe (even though I’ve argued that he is in fact).  The 
defense of this claim was that Manny has a justification, namely, the coercion he acted 
under.  Manny chose appropriately given the situation, so while he was responsible for 
cracking the safe, under the circumstances cracking the safe was the appropriate thing to 
do.  Its appropriateness doesn’t make cracking the safe itself a good thing to do.  Rather, 
a justification notes that there was another outcome the agent is responsible for, an 
outcome that is good enough to outweigh the badness of the action coerced.  In Manny’s 
case, avoiding death was a significant enough good outcome such that it justifies bringing 
                                               
117 This is not to suggest that her taking of ‘this’ coat and her taking of someone else’s coat weren’t the 
same event, only that her beliefs regarding the second description are relevant because they were false. 
 
 104 
about a certain amount of bad, namely, cracking the safe.  Similarly, Otis, who burns his 
neighbor’s field to save the town, also does something bad (burn his neighbors field), but 
this action is outweighed by the goodness of saving the town.  In both case, the agent has 
a justification only if the goodness achieved is better than the badness brought about.  
Moreover, we saw that the justifications are such that we cannot divorce the agent’s 
performance of the bad action from the good outcome.  In cracking the safe Manny saves 
his life.  In burning the field, Otis saves the town.  Thus, overall, justified agents do not 
appear blameworthy because they are responsible for both outcomes, and because it is a 
case of justification, the goodness outweighs the badness, so we are apt to disregard in 
large measure the blameworthiness. 
 These two ways of mitigating blameworthiness fall out of the structure of 
blameworthiness.  One is blameworthy just in case one is responsible for something bad.  
One can undermine blameworthiness by showing either (1) that one isn’t responsible for 
the outcome; or, (2) that the sum-outcome in question isn’t bad.  The first disjunct 
corresponds to excuses (as undermining factors);118 the second corresponds to 
justifications.  Since ascriptions of blameworthiness involve both a responsibility 
component and an evaluative component, undermining either of these components 
undermines the overall ascription.  Justifications are then special cases, for strictly 
speaking, the agent is responsible for all that he did, but the nature of justifications are 
such that we don’t make an ascription of blameworthiness because the overall quality of 
the objects of responsibility is positive.  The responsibility component is a relation 
between the agent, her mental states, and the outcome.  The evaluative component is a 
                                               
118 This is again my technical use of ‘excuse’; recall that sometimes we call considerations ‘excuses’ that 
just point to reasons one shouldn’t blame. 
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measure of the outcome according to the relevant norms.  Blameworthiness depends on 
the combination of these two components; an agent is blameworthy only when the 
responsibility relation is present (i.e., the conditions on being responsible are met) and the 
evaluative component is negative.  Praiseworthiness has the same responsibility 
component, and the evaluative component is positive.119  And when the evaluative 
component registers a null value, we have “neutral” responsibility.  This is the sense, 
agreed on by many, that an agent can be responsible for morally neutral outcomes.120 
 
 On my view, responsibility for outcomes is a relation between an agent and an 
outcome characterized under the proper description, one that depends on the agent’s 
mental states.  Blameworthiness and praiseworthiness are functions of responsibility 
relations, such that when the outcome is bad one is blameworthy, and when the outcome 
is good one is praiseworthy.  Given this two-component structure, blameworthiness and 
praiseworthiness can themselves be undermined even when the responsibility relation is 
left unfazed.  This, I argued in Section 3, is why we ought to exclude considerations of 
coercion from our list of undermining factors.  Coercion, like considerations of necessity, 
mitigated blameworthiness by showing that the outcome one is responsible for is good 
under the circumstances (all things considered), and thus we ought not blame the 
                                               
119 Similarly, one can undermine ascriptions of praiseworthiness by showing either (1) that one isn’t 
responsible for the outcome; or, (2) that the sum-outcome isn’t good.  The considerations relevant here are 
not as popularly discussed as excuses and justifications, but as Chapter 1 demonstrated, the considerations 
that show (1) are the same in both cases.  I also think that moral theory should be concerned with (2), 
though historically it has been in the business of moral principles and obligations, and their violations. 
120 In most discussions the claim is that agents can be morally responsible for (morally) neutral actions.  
The mistake in such discussions is supposing that there is a special sort of responsibility that is moral in 
nature.  Recall my critique of such a view from Chapter 1.  On my account, it makes all the more sense how 
one can be responsible for evaluatively neutral objects.  In fact, it is compatible with neutrality across 
evaluative domains (e.g., an outcome’s being artistically neutral, or athletically neutral).  Thus, moral 
neutrality is put on a par with similar notions in the other normative domains. 
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agent.121  Moreover, the two-component model is a direct result of the Simple Solution to 
the Symmetry Challenge from Chapter 2.  The symmetrical operation of undermining 
factors suggests an independent and explanatorily prior notion of responsibility.  This 
notion requires that the outcome be voluntary and intentional and unmistaken.  I think 
these are the necessary conditions on being responsible, and I take up the task of 
defending this claim in the next chapter. 
                                               
121 Though, on my view, it wouldn’t be incorrect to blame Manny for cracking the safe, or Otis for burning 
the field.  We just take there to be decisive reasons against doing so.  More discussion of this feature of our 
blaming practices will occur in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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AT THE END OF CHAPTER 3, I stated the necessary conditions on responsibility for 
outcomes.  I claimed that to be responsible for an outcome, the outcome must (1) be 
brought about voluntarily, (2) brought about intentionally, and (3) brought about without 
mistake.122  The Voluntariness Condition is met so long as the outcome is brought about 
by an action explainable by a belief-desire set.  The Intentionality Condition is met so 
long as the outcome in question is believed by the agent to be a possible result of that 
action.  And the No-Mistake Condition is met so long as all relevant beliefs about facts 
necessary for generating an evaluation by the relevant standards are true. 
 In this chapter, I defend the claim that all three conditions are necessary.  In 
particular, I want to rebut a suggestive objection that claims that one can be responsible 
for an outcome even in the absence of one of my conditions.  The Negligence Objection, 
as I’ll call it, claims that agents who cause harm due to their negligence fail to meet one 
                                               
122 These are the abbreviated statements of the conditions that I will refer to most often. 
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of my conditions on responsibility, and yet they are nonetheless responsible for the harm.  
Thus, my conditions are not necessary after all. 
 The objection rests much of its claim on the fact that when someone is negligent 
and, say, injures someone, we hold the agent responsible for those injuries and tend to 
judge him blameworthy.  Indeed, blaming people for their negligence, or thoughtlessness, 
or carelessness, is an all too common occurrence.  It is all the more surprising, then, that 
very little has been said about responsibility for negligently produced harms outside of 
discussions in legal theory.  In fact, the moral responsibility literature has been virtually 
silent on the matter.123  Such a pervasive feature of our blaming practices calls out for an 
explanation, especially if it’s to serve as support for an objection to a theory of 
responsibility.124 
In this chapter, I’ll outline what’s distinctive about negligence, and how one can 
mount an objection to my account by examining negligent agents (Section 2).  
Negligence is characterized by the lack of certain conscious mental states, so if negligent 
agents are responsible for what they do while lacking these mental states, then no account 
of responsibility could require those mental states without modification.  In this way, the 
Negligence Objection actually poses a general problem for any theory of responsibility.  
Next, I’ll argue that the standard way of explaining responsibility in cases missing 
requisite mental elements, what has come to be known in the literature as “tracing,” fails 
to explain responsibility in cases of negligence (Section 3).  It follows that either we’ll 
                                               
123 One especially notable exception is Zimmerman [1986].  But Zimmerman’s treatment begins by 
creating a special instance of negligence, one in which the agent previously thought about the possibility of 
harm, and then arguing that we can explain responsibility in such cases.  Given his limiter, he misses most 
cases of simple negligence, where the agent never before consciously considered the risk of harm such 
conduct might pose. 
124 Manuel Vargas calls similar attention to negligence in Vargas [2005]. 
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need a different explanatory story, or we should reject the claim that negligent agents are 
responsible for the outcomes they bring about.  Next, I’ll give some considerations for 
rejecting the first disjunct (Section 4), and then propose a model for handling negligence 
intended to reduce worries associated with the latter option (Section 5).  Finally, I’ll 
compare cases of negligence to cases of simple inadvertence to lend some support to this 
alternative view of negligence (Section 6), and offer a brief conclusion (Section 7). 
 
4.2. The Nature of Negligence 
NEGLIGENCE CONSTITUTES a special class of cases.  Unlike harms that agents bring about 
on purpose, or knowingly, or even recklessly, negligently produced harms are brought 
about because of an absence of care.  To highlight what’s special about negligence, I’ll 
contrast it here with recklessness.  When an agent acts recklessly he consciously 
disregards the risk of harm his conduct poses.  Though he recognizes that his action will 
create a “substantial and unjustified risk of harm,”125 he acts anyway.  Should he in fact 
cause harm as a result, it seems as though he is responsible for doing so.  For example, 
suppose Spencer is late for an important appointment, and so he is speeding down the 
highway, swerving in and out of traffic, trying to make up time.  He realizes that this is 
dangerous behavior, driving in such a way greatly increases the risk of harm, but he 
continues nevertheless.  Sure enough, he causes an accident, and injures another driver.  
Speeding Spencer is reckless; for he has considered the risk his conduct involves and 
consciously disregarded it in favor of acting anyhow.  Reckless agents satisfy my 
Intentionality Condition, since they at least foresee the possible occurrence of the 
outcome in question. 
                                               
125 This is how the Model Penal Code characterizes recklessness, but it accords well with common usage. 
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 Negligent agents, in contrast, risk harm by not taking sufficient care in acting.  
They unreasonably fail to pay to attention to the possible consequences of their conduct, 
and thus substantially increase the risk of harm such conduct poses.  But they don’t do 
this consciously.  That is, they fail to exercise due care; they should be paying attention 
but don’t.  For example, suppose that Nate, tired from waking up early, is backing out of 
his driveway.  His thoughts turn to his meetings that day, and his attention is partially 
focused on a radio commercial.  Due to his inattention, Nate doesn’t see a child walking 
to school and so hits him, breaking the child’s leg.  Nate is negligent: he fails to pay 
proper attention to what he is doing and thereby risks harm to others.  It seems Negligent 
Nate126 fails my Intentionality Condition, since he does not actually foresee the possible 
occurrence of the outcome in question when he acts.  And if he’s responsible, then he 
stands as a counterexample to my three conditions being necessary for responsibility. 
 The requirement of consciously disregarding the risk of harm is crucially 
important, for it serves as a dividing line between recklessness and negligence.  
Negligence, like recklessness, involves engaging in conduct that risks harm.  But 
negligence no longer requires consciously entertaining the risk one’s conduct poses.  It 
only has to be the case that one’s conduct is unreasonably risky, not that one acted in the 
recognition that it was so.  Thus, negligence abandons the element of conscious 
consideration involved in reckless behavior (and intentional conduct, for that matter).  To 
do x recklessly requires consciously entertaining that x might result from your directly 
intended action.  But to do x negligently is to do x as a result of not consciously 
entertaining the risk of x given one’s directly intended conduct and refraining from that 
                                               
126 Negligent Nate’s name here is not meant to suggest a general character trait, but merely to help remind 
the reader of the specifics of the case when it is later brought up. 
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conduct.  Thus, we should consider negligence as being importantly different from 
recklessness (and directly intended action) in that it does not require a conscious 
entertaining of the harm or the risk of harm.  Indeed, it is characterized by the failure to 
consider the risk.  The hallmark of negligence is the lack of a conscious element.127 
 But my account (and, indeed, most accounts) of responsibility require at least 
some conscious mental element tying the agent to the outcome in question.  In my case, it 
would appear that Negligent Nate fails the Intentionality Condition, thus it follows that 
on my account Nate isn’t responsible for the child’s injuries.  The Negligence Objection 
argues that since negligent agents are responsible for the harms they negligently produce, 
Nate is responsible for the child’s injuries, and my account gets the wrong result.  More 
than this, the Negligence Objection becomes a general objection to most extant accounts 
of responsibility,128 since they require some conscious mental element be present, and 
negligence is characterized precisely by the lack of such an element.  The Negligence 
Objection is thus not a unique objection to my particular account, but a general problem 
facing all theories of responsibility. 
 
4.3. Tracing and Negligence 
IF WE ARE TO BE responsible for the products of our negligence, as the Negligence 
Objection suggests, then it must be the case that responsibility doesn’t always require a 
connection between harms and some conscious mental state.  This is no special problem, 
                                               
127 It is worth noting that I’m using “negligence” semi-stipulatively.  There is no doubt, I think, that we do 
blame people for harms they bring about due to their unconscious inattention.  I’m calling such agents 
“negligent.”  Of course, there may be other linguistically legitimate uses of “negligence” than mine here; 
naturally, my arguments won’t necessarily extend to such cases. 
128 This qualifier will be discharged below, where I again discuss Quality of Will approaches, which try to 
avoid reliance on conscious mental states in their explanations of responsibility. 
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one might think, because we already have a strategy for explaining responsibility in the 
absence of a conscious mental element.  We call it tracing, because responsibility for 
some conduct without the conscious mental element can be “traced back” to some 
previous decision or action that does have the conscious mental element.  For example, 
Sven is drinking at a bar, and has one (or maybe more) too many.  Sven is sloshed.  
Nevertheless, he drives toward home.  En route, and due to his drunkenness, he hits a 
family sedan, seriously injuring all four passengers.  Suppose that Sven is sufficiently 
intoxicated that he lacks the relevant conscious mental states for responsibility at the time 
of the crash.  If we want to maintain that Sven is still responsible for hitting the sedan, 
then his responsibility for that action must be located elsewhere.  This is where tracing 
comes in.  We can “trace” his responsibility for the crash to his responsibility for a prior 
act that contributed to the crash.  Sloshed Sven elects to drink to excess, and as a result of 
this choice, he hits and injures a number of people.  His choice left him drunk, and 
therefore severely impaired with respect to his ability to control his conduct, to recognize 
its relevant features.  In this case we can say that the initial choice creates a condition of 
impairment that later clearly contributes to some harm.  The above is, roughly, the 
structure of tracing.129 
 It is worth noting that this is a general way of explaining cases like Sven’s.  It is a 
strategy that can be adopted by all theories of responsibility to handle cases in which the 
usually requisite mental states are not present.  We can preserve responsibility for the 
harm so long as we can trace the harm back to some prior action which did include the 
                                               
129 Tracing has been an explicit interest of theories at least since Dennett [1984], and especially in 
responses to that work in Ekstrom [2000], Fischer & Ravizza [1998], and Kane [1996].  The core notion is 
also discussed by van Inwagen [1994] and, in response, by Petit [2002] and Vander Laan [2001].  For more 




relevant conscious mental element.  Then all that’s required is that the agent satisfy the 
conditions on responsibility for that prior choice or action, and responsibility can be 
transmitted to the later outcome. 
 Tracing plainly will not work, however, in cases of negligence, for in such cases it 
is difficult to demonstrate what the initial choice is.  Sloshed Sven’s accident is largely 
due to his drunkenness, for which, by hypothesis, he was responsible.130  Tracing claims 
that in such circumstances responsibility is preserved to (at least some of) the outcomes 
produced by his drunkenness, even if at the time of those later actions Sven lacks the 
conditions normally required for responsibility.  This is because Sven, roughly, chooses 
to get drunk.  Contrast this case with Negligent Nate.  He doesn’t choose to be 
inattentive, nor does he do anything for which he is responsible that also obviously 
creates the condition of his inattentiveness.  First, recall that the inadvertence associated 
with negligence is a failure, and as such is characterized by the lack of conscious mental 
awareness of potential harm.  It is not the disregarding of any consideration nor does it 
involve the realization of risk.  That is how we distinguish it from recklessness.  
Negligence is crucially defined by the absence of consideration, not its conscious 
dismissal.  Second, we need to consider the potential contributing factors to his 
inadvertence.  In the example as stated, Nate is groggy, part of his attention is focused on 
his meetings that day, and he is partially distracted by the radio.  These do not seem to 
resemble choices in the way that Sven’s continued drinking is a choice.  At the very least, 
one needs to show how these three factors would create a condition of inadvertence (as 
Sven’s drinking creates his drunkenness), one characterized by its non-conscious nature. 
                                               
130 If one doubts his responsibility, we’ll just have to come up with another case, since his will no longer 
illustrate how tracing is supposed to work. 
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 Nate plausibly does not choose to think about his meetings that day, nor is it 
obvious that such thinking would lead one to be inattentive.  Often thoughts simply occur 
to us, and it is certainly common to have thoughts about one’s upcoming day just “rise to 
the surface” of conscious thought.  It also doesn’t seem as though Nate chooses to be 
groggy.  He may choose to go to bed at a given time, and also to wake up, but we need 
not suppose that this entails he chooses to be groggy.  Perhaps he got plenty of sleep and 
allotted plenty of time to “wake up” before leaving.  It could nevertheless be the case that 
despite his precautions he is still groggy when he leaves the house.  It also isn’t clear that 
he chooses to drive while groggy; that is, he may not realize that he is groggy.  And if he 
doesn’t realize it, and he took the aforementioned reasonable steps to avoid grogginess, 
this would seem sufficient for undermining his responsibility for his grogginess.  Lastly, 
though he may choose to turn on the radio, he doesn’t choose to be distracted by it.  Often 
background music or commercials can simply grab a hold of our attention, even when we 
wish it not to, and it can be a hard matter to predict when this will be the case. 
 Even should we think that Nate should have done more to guard against 
distraction, we could simply modify the case to remove the worries.  Perhaps he is 
distracted by the sunrise, or a bird nearby, instead of the radio.  Perhaps he isn’t even 
groggy; he just gets distracted or otherwise fails to pay attention and so hits the child.  
The point is that simply failing to look behind him and hitting the child will be sufficient 
for demonstrating negligence, but nevertheless there will be no conscious choice to trace 
responsibility back to.  Thus, it seems that tracing is an insufficient explanation for the 





4.4. A Different Explanation for Negligent Responsibility 
IF I’M RIGHT, THEN we can’t appeal to tracing, the standard explanation for aberrant cases, 
to explain responsibility in instances of negligence.  It follows that either negligence 
requires an exceptional explanation, or else we ought to reject the claim that negligent 
agents are responsible for the harms they bring about.  In this section, I’ll first argue 
generally that an exceptional explanation ought to be rejected (4.1).  Then I’ll rebut a 
specific suggestion that there is a general account of responsibility that can handle 
negligence cases in the same way as other cases (4.2).  If such a view succeeded, then the 
Negligence Objection could be repurposed as an argument in favor of this general view. 
 
4.4.1. Explaining Responsibility 
MY ARGUMENT ADOPTS a simple constraint on explanations.  If two cases share a 
common feature, then the explanation of that common feature for the two cases ought to 
be unified in some way.  This can be applied to the issue before us here.  All actions for 
which an agent is responsible share a common feature, namely, responsibility.  If both 
Sloshed Sven and Negligent Nate are responsible for the harms they bring about, then we 
should expect the explanations of why they are responsible to be unified in an interesting 
way.  Furthermore, given that one who performs an action on purpose, with a given 
outcome as his intended aim, is undoubtedly responsible, then the explanation for why 
this agent is responsible should be unified with the previous two cases.  In short, if there’s 
something it is to be responsible for things, then the only satisfactory explanation of this 
fact will be unified across cases of responsibility. 
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 Explanation by tracing is an attempt to give such a unified account.  Tracing tries 
to explain all cases where the relevant conscious states were absent by reference to those 
same conscious states in some prior action.  Tracing may succeed in doing this between 
paradigmatic cases of responsible action and cases like Sloshed Sven’s.  Tracing bridges 
the gap between the two types of cases by showing where in Sloshed Sven’s case the 
relevant conscious mental element is.  Tracing purports to show how the cases are alike, 
and how this similarity explains responsibility in both cases.  But tracing cannot bridge 
the gap between Sloshed Sven and Negligent Nate.  Nate lacks the conscious mental 
element and there is nothing to trace back to.  So the problem isn’t just that tracing fails 
to explain responsibility in cases of negligence, it is that whatever the explanation is for 
negligence, if negligent agents are responsible, then the explanation should be unified 
with the explanation of responsibility both in cases like Sven’s and in cases of 
paradigmatic responsible action.  But this looks like a very unpromising project, for it 
seems that responsibility in paradigmatic cases is due to the presence of certain conscious 
mental states, just those sorts of states the absence of which characterize negligence. 
 
4.4.2. Quality of Will Approaches 
TRACING FAILS TO GIVE a unified explanation.  But perhaps the Negligence Objection 
merely highlights a consideration in favor of an alternative general explanation of 
responsibility across cases.  There is a family of views for explaining responsibility that 
gives priority not to the notion of control or conscious mental states, but rather to the 
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quality of will an agent’s conduct “manifests.”131  On this view, that an agent’s conduct 
manifests an ill quality of will is sufficient for demonstrating responsibility.  If Mad Max 
punches out the bartender, then this conduct manifests a quality of ill will on Max’s part 
towards the bartender.  The idea here is that conduct that isn’t chosen can still plausibly 
manifest qualities of will.  For instance,132 a husband who routinely fails to consider his 
wife’s interests and to at least occasionally place them above his own seems to express 
some quality of ill will towards her.  In another example, repeatedly forgetting a close 
friend’s birthday seems to manifest a lack of consideration towards him, and this ill 
quality of will seems sufficient for generating responsibility.  When we do things that 
manifest ill qualities of will, so the view goes, we are the legitimate targets of certain 
kinds of criticism on the basis of that conduct (the kinds of criticism intimately associated 
with responsibility).133 
 One might think that such views have an easier time explaining negligence.  It 
doesn’t matter that Negligent Nate doesn’t choose to run the child over, his failure to pay 
adequate attention nevertheless evinces a quality of ill will.  Naturally, it’s not as bad a 
quality of will as if he had harmed the child intentionally, or knowingly, say.  
Nevertheless, failure to pay attention when one is engaged in activities that pose a risk of 
serious harm displays a lack of consideration for those who you risk harm to.  So, 
                                               
131 This is a major component of the Strawsonian Approach I argued against in Chapter 1.  Here, I am 
considering the Negligence Objection as a possible response to my conclusions from that chapter.  If 
negligent agents are responsible and Strawsonian accounts can explain this fact, then this claim would 
weaken my criticisms against the view there.  The classic statement is Strawson [1962], who speaks in 
terms of actions “reflecting” and “expressing” qualities of will (p.63).  For a more recent and developed 
presentation of such a view see Wallace [1994], who adopts the terminology used above.  For a different 
application of a quality of will approach, applied to responsibility for attitudes, see Smith [2005]. 
132 The following examples are from Smith [2005]. 
133 Smith, A. [2005], p.243. 
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Negligent Nate displays ill will towards the child, and is thus responsible for harming 
him. 
 I think this approach fares no better than tracing in explaining responsibility in 
negligence cases.  To see this, we first need an account of what it means for an action to 
“manifest” a quality of will.  Unfortunately, the main proponents of these views say very 
little about what the “manifesting” relation is.  As I see it, then, there are two main 
options: “manifest” could be a causal relation or an evidential relation.  There is some 
evidence for either gloss.  Some authors use “manifest” simultaneously with “express,” 
which often looks causal, but the use of the relation on these views is often to draw 
inferences from actions to qualities of will.  No matter our gloss, however, on neither 
understanding will quality of will approaches be able to explain negligence responsibility.  
Indeed, they both fail for the same reason. 
 My preferred reading of “manifest” is as an evidential reading because the role it 
plays in the theory is to support inferences from actions to qualities of ill will.  
Unfortunately, on this reading quality of will theories will fail to explain negligence 
responsibility.  On the evidential reading, we are supposed to think that Negligent Nate’s 
conduct evinces an ill quality of will.  He should have paid more attention to what he was 
doing, and the fact that he didn’t is evidence that he doesn’t give the appropriate 
consideration to those who he risks harm to in operating a vehicle carelessly.  But this 
conclusion is too strong.  The power of the evidential relation surely rests on the 
reliability of the inference from conduct to ill qualities of will.  The reliability of such an 
inference requires, it seems, some regularity in its connections.  Notice that in sketching 
the examples above I used words like “repeatedly” and “routinely.”  Of course, any 
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conduct can count as some evidence for the underlying quality of will, but we generally 
require more before we’re justified in actually drawing the inference.  In order to 
justifiably draw the inference we need something like a pattern of response.  But 
ascriptions of responsibility in cases of negligence do not rest on regularities.  Negligent 
Nate could have at all times previously been the paragon of careful driving.  This is 
counterevidence, it would seem, for thinking that in the particular case in question, Nate 
manifests ill will towards anyone, even the child.  Nevertheless, one transgression is 
sufficient for negligence, and if negligence itself is to be sufficient for responsibility, then 
it seems that quality of will views fare no better in explaining it. 
 Quality of will views will fail on the causal reading for much the same reason.  
On this reading we are supposed to think that Nate’s negligence, his failure to pay 
attention, is caused by some ill quality of will, either towards the child or in general.  It 
seems to me we should be initially skeptical of such a claim, for Nate doesn’t even know 
that the child, or anyone else, is there.  Nor is he even consciously thinking about backing 
up, so we might seriously doubt that his current frame of mind is such that his attitudes 
towards others, whatever they are, would be engaged to cause his lack of attention.  More 
importantly, however, Nate could very well hold quite positive attitudes toward the child 
he injures.  Perhaps the child is a neighbor’s son, who mows Nate’s grass and shovels his 
sidewalk when it snows.  Nate is very grateful for the son’s work, thinks him a fine 
young man, etc.  If this were the case, it would be hard to claim that Nate holds any ill 
will toward the child, much less that that ill will caused his failure to pay attention.  
Indeed, it seems our causal judgments will be tied up again with the reliability of our 
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inferences from the conduct to the agent’s attitudes, and will therefore be subject to 
counter-evidence of the above sort. 
 No matter the gloss we give to “manifest,” quality of will approaches fare no 
better at explaining responsibility for negligently produced harms.  Quality of will 
accounts seem to require some regularity of conduct.  Repeatedly disregarding someone’s 
interests might count as sufficient evidence for an ill quality of will, but a one-time 
offense would be insufficient.  This is especially true anytime we have counterevidence 
involving positive qualities of will.  But once is enough for an ascription of responsibility 
in negligence cases.  Even someone who in all other respects is the acme of consideration 
and care can be responsible for negligent conduct, it seems, should he fail to pay proper 
attention in just one instance.  Quality of will accounts, therefore, cannot explain 
responsibility in cases of negligence. 
 
4.5. Rejecting the Claim that Negligent Agents are Responsible for Harms 
IF I’M RIGHT, THEN tracing fails as an explanation for responsibility for negligently 
produced outcomes.  It fails because it requires tracing responsibility back to some 
conscious mental element, usually a choice or action.  But negligence is defined by a lack 
of conscious mental states, by an unconscious inattention, and there need be no choices or 
decisions that contribute to that inattention.  Thus, tracing is unable to help us explain 
responsibility for negligently produced outcomes.  If I’m right, then, we are seemingly 
left with two options: either revise our accounts of responsibility in an effort to explain 
the outcomes of negligence,134 or drop the intuitive conclusion that negligent agents are 
                                               




responsible for the harms they produce.  I argued in the previous section that the first 
option is untenable. 
The other option one can take is to reject the claim that Negligent Nate is 
responsible for the child’s injuries.  If that were the case, then we should expect tracing to 
fail as an explanation.  Indeed, no satisfactory explanation could be given that would 
unify such cases with paradigmatic cases of responsible actions.  The burden on such a 
move is showing why it seems that negligent agents are responsible for the harm they do.  
Why does the Negligence Objection’s claim that Negligent Nate is responsible seem so 
plausible? 
 Part of the reason no doubt is that we do tend to hold negligent agents responsible 
for their conduct.  Most people would blame Negligent Nate for injuring the child; after 
all, it was his fault.  And to claim that he is at fault is to criticize Nate.  But we can find 
him at fault, I submit, without requiring that he is responsible or blameworthy for the 
harm. 
 Even though he is at fault, it doesn’t follow that he’s responsible or blameworthy 
for the harm.  To be at fault may well require less stringent standards than being 
responsible, in the sense necessary for blameworthiness, requires.  This distinction is 
well-mirrored in a legal distinction between criminal liability and civil liability.135  
Criminal liability seems to closely resemble moral responsibility.  If one is criminally 
liable for something, then they are “sanction-worthy,” subject to punishment or deserving 
of what would otherwise be objectionable treatment.  This connection is not preserved in 
the civil law.  To be civilly liable is merely to be designated as the appropriate individual 
for compensating injured or harmed parties.  The distinction is supported by the differing 
                                               
135 A similar point is discussed in “Notes” [1972], esp. pp. 976-979. 
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aims of the criminal law and of the civil law, respectively.  They seek answers to 
different questions.  The criminal law is concerned with determining who should be 
punished.  Since punishment often involves harms, it is the sort of treatment that requires 
justification.  Here, the criminal law surely shares something in common with our 
practices of blaming, which also seem to call for special justification.  Indeed, it seems 
proper to view the criminal law as a distinctive instantiation of our blaming practices.  
The special justification punishment requires involves a high standard for connecting the 
individual to the offense, something akin to moral responsibility. 
 The civil law, on the other hand, is concerned with determining who should pay.  
Civil trials (here I confine myself to torts) begin with the acknowledgement that the 
plaintiff has been injured or otherwise harmed, and his burden is to demonstrate that the 
defendant caused the harm by acting inappropriately.136  Here, the civil law does not need 
as stringent a justification for imposing the burdens of compensation on the defendant, as 
it would if it were punishing him.  But civil verdicts do not lead to punishments; they lead 
to penalties, usually financial, that serve to compensate the plaintiff for damages suffered.  
We need not require that a defendant be morally responsible for some harm in order to be 
the individual judged best placed to compensate the one harmed.  We only need to show 
that the defendant caused the harm and has no defense for why he shouldn’t pay for it.  
The presumption in civil cases, then, is that should the plaintiff show that the defendant 
acted inappropriately (e.g., unreasonably) and thereby caused the harm, this is sufficient 
for sticking the defendant with the bill.137 
                                               
136 This is a gross oversimplification, but the details do not matter for my point. 
137 Indeed, sometimes showing cause isn’t even necessary.  A number of civil cases have been decided by 
an appeal to fairness: that it would be unfair to impose the burdens on the injured party, and instead the 
defendant ought to pay, even though the plaintiff cannot prove that the defendant even caused the harm, 
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 If negligent agents are not really responsible for their conduct, then, perhaps we 
can retain and justify many of our attitudes and practices towards such agents by 
appealing to a less stringent connection, something more like civil liability.  It seems as 
though moral responsibility requires a conscious mental element, but negligence lacks 
any relevant conscious mental state.  But negligence also involves failing to appreciate 
the risk of one’s conduct, a failure that seems in many cases to be unreasonable.  We can 
rightly demand of Nate that he look behind him, and when he fails to, he must 
acknowledge his failure as being inappropriate, as violating our standards of care.  He 
doesn’t do what he’s supposed to do when driving.  Now, if my argument has been 
successful, it would be a mistake to blame Nate for injuring the child, as he is not 
responsible for it.  However, we can acknowledge that he is at fault, that his conduct was 
nonetheless criticizable, and that he is required to compensate the child for his injuries.  
Negligent Nate does something “wrong;” this is part of what it means to be negligent.  He 
fails to pay sufficient attention and acts unreasonably as a result.  But we can 
acknowledge his fault without an ascription of responsibility for the harm. 
 Allow me to elaborate briefly on this last point.  When we admonish Nate, we can 
do so merely by referencing his fault with respect to his failure to pay attention, for we 
are simply highlighting the fact that he has failed our expectations to avoid causing harm.  
We require individuals to look when they back out of driveways (in part because we 
expect them to recognize the dangers posed by operating vehicles).  When individuals fail 
this requirement, we can rightly criticize that failure.  We can even point to the child’s 
injury as a relevant component of that criticism.  But in doing so, I think, we are merely 
                                                                                                                                            




reemphasizing why we have such requirements in the first place.  You’re expected to 
look behind you when you back out of a driveway so as not to cause injury to others.  
And when one fails to pay sufficient attention and thus causes injury, this fact is a valid 
source of criticism.  But it need not involve any claims about responsibility for the harm 
or condemnation of the individual. 
 It may of course be the case, as I noted above, that consistent failures of these 
requirements to exercise care do point to certain attitudes and values that are proper 
objects of responsibility.138  Still, in isolated cases of negligence, we need not infer 
anything about, say, Nate’s attitudes towards the child, nor think that his lapse of 
attention evinces a lack of concern or an ill quality of will.  Indeed, Nate may be 
despondent over the harm he’s caused, and he may express regret.  There is nothing 
wrong with such attitudes.  We can regret not taking a chance that would have paid off 
big just as easily as regretting not hearing a cry for help because we were guiltlessly 
listening to our iPod.  My only caution is that either regret does not depend on being 
responsible for the object of regret, or that regret is technically misplaced in the latter 
case, just as it is in instances of negligence.  But there may be good reason to encourage a 
certain amount of negative attitudes towards instances of negligence, if only to reinforce 
the importance of our shared standards of care.  To the extent that we can emphasize 
dangerous lapses in attention as things to be avoided, so long as we can reaffirm the 
importance of taking due care in everything we do, we ought to do so.  Negligence often 
risks quite serious harm, which is to be avoided, and our criticism of negligent agents can 
be justified by appeals to education or simply reaffirming a commitment to the avoidance 
                                               
138 This thought is along the lines of the view defended by Smith [2005]. 
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of harm.  But we shouldn’t confuse such a justification with an ascription of 
responsibility for the products of negligent conduct. 
 Treating negligence in this way, as modeled on the civil law, preserves much of 
what I take is central to our reactions toward negligent agents.  Isolated transgressions are 
the proper object of admonishment, largely in an effort to educate or to deter future 
transgressions or even to reaffirm a shared commitment to our standards of care.  
Naturally, chronic transgressions may point to a defective character trait, or some other 
proper object of moral condemnation.  But in the more typical instances of local 
negligence, we can retain much of our disapproval and negative reactions by appeal to 
the negligent agent’s “fault,” and give up a more stringent requirement of responsibility. 
 
4.6. Support for the Alternative View 
IN SUPPORT OF TREATING cases of negligence on the proposed model of civil liability, I 
want to compare cases of negligence with a structurally similar set of cases, namely, 
simple inadvertence.  In cases of inadvertence, we don’t typically ascribe responsibility 
for outcomes; indeed, inadvertence is a factor that seems to undermine responsibility.  
Explaining these cases together, then, pressures us to treat negligence like inadvertence, 
and therefore reject the claim that negligent agents are responsible for the harms they 
produced.  Now it is likely the case that intuitions will still diverge about negligence 
cases and cases of inadvertence.  That is, many will still judge negligent agents 
responsible, but not their inadvertent counterparts.  We can explain this fact, however, by 
reference to what distinguishes negligent agents from their inadvertent counterparts.  It is 
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a difference which I think we’ll show why we tend to treat negligent agents more harshly, 
but it is not a difference that will actually demonstrate them to be responsible. 
  
4.6.1. Negligence as a Species of Inadvertence 
WE KNOW WHAT Negligent Nate did, but let’s compare him with a case from Chapter 3.  
Leadfoot Lenny139 is at a party where a group of friends are gathered watching a movie.  
There are more people than seats, and some have gotten comfortable lying on the floor.  
Lenny gets up to get a soda from the fridge, and in the course of stepping around and 
over people he inadvertently steps on his friend’s hand.  He didn’t mean to step on his 
friend’s hand, but he was distracted by the movie, and so he did.  Nevertheless, it seems 
Lenny’s responsibility in this case is undermined due to his inadvertence, which makes 
his stepping on the hand unintentional. 
 We seem to treat negligence as preserving responsibility, whereas inadvertence 
seems to undermine it.  But if this is the case, then there must be a way of distinguishing 
between Nate’s case and Lenny’s in a way that explains why Nate is responsible and 
Lenny is not.  Otherwise, we’re forced to conclude that inadvertence doesn’t undermine 
responsibility, and this is a conclusion I should think we want to reject. 
 An initial observation about cases of negligence is that they involve a failure to do 
something the agent should have done; negligent agents should have paid more attention.  
We say, “Nate should have looked where he was going.”  Unfortunately, such claims are 
ambiguous.  There are two possible interpretations for how to treat the “should have” 
clause in each, and each interpretation seems to fail to distinguish properly between 
                                               
139 Lenny’s name here, like Nate’s, is not intended to reveal a character trait, but only make clear the facts 
of the case when brought up later. 
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Negligent Nate and Leadfoot Lenny.  On the first interpretation, the “should have” means 
simply that it would have been better had Nate done what he failed to do.  It would have 
been better had Nate looked because then the child wouldn’t have been hit.  The problem 
with this first interpretation is that, while true of Nate’s case, it is equally true of Lenny’s 
case.  It would have been better if Lenny had been more careful, because then his friend 
wouldn’t have gotten his hand stepped on.  So the first interpretation fails to distinguish 
between the cases at all. 
 On the second interpretation, the “should have” refers to some sort of standard 
that was violated.  We require individuals to look when they back out of driveways (in 
part because we expect them to recognize the dangers posed by operating vehicles).  
Moreover, this seems to be an instance of a general duty to take extra care when engaging 
in activities that pose a risk of harm (or, perhaps, just a standing duty to take care in our 
conduct).  The problem on this second interpretation is that we can always ask why non-
responsible counterparts aren’t under a similar sort of standing duty.  Navigating around 
people lying on the floor poses a risk of harm.  If a standing duty is sufficient for securing 
responsibility, then Lenny would be responsible as well.  Granted, in this case, Lenny 
causes less harm than Nate, and is involved in an activity that poses a risk of less serious 
harm, but that shouldn’t count against Nate.  While our expectations are surely stronger 
in Nate’s case, this seems insufficient for setting negligence cases apart as a distinct class 
of cases with respect to responsibility.  After all, a standing duty governing a given 
activity applies to all those who engage in the relevant activity.  But the relevant 
requirement here isn’t driving carefully.  If it were, it wouldn’t apply to negligent agents 
whose negligence has nothing to do with driving, like a bricklayer who tosses defective 
 
 128 
bricks off a rooftop without looking.140  But the bricklayer seems negligent in the same 
way as Nate is: he should have paid more attention to the harm he risked.  And even if we 
have scores of standing duties finely individuated by activity, so that there’s one 
governing driving, and another governing bricklaying, and another governing firing a 
gun, etc., this is only because they fall out of a quite general standing duty to take care in 
everything we do. 
 It might be thought that satisfying the standard may require different thresholds of 
care depending on the specific activity.  So, when one is driving or bricklaying on a roof, 
one needs to take special care, but not when one is walking around prone people on the 
way to getting a soda.  But I’m not convinced that this is really a demand for more care 
than in Lenny’s hand-stepping case, and not just a different side of the same point about 
driving and bricklaying on a roof having the potential for more harm than stepping 
around prone people.141  Nevertheless, even if we think you do have to be more careful in 
certain situations, this wouldn’t distinguish between the cases on grounds that evince a 
difference in responsibility.  For the mere violation of a standing duty of care wouldn’t 
suffice to show an agent is responsible for the effects of such a violation.  And if it did, 
Leadfoot Lenny would be responsible too. 
  
                                               
140 This example is from Hart [1968], and is often reused in discussions of negligence in legal theory.  See 
also Zimmerman [1986]. 
141 Bénédicte Veillet has pointed out to me that we license people for driving (Nate), whereas we don’t 
license people for stepping around prone people (Lenny).  This is true, no doubt in large part because of the 
importance we place on driving.  It is obvious that such activities pose the risk of especially serious harm, 
more so than stepping around prone people.  But I don’t think this amounts to a claim about demanding 
more care in such instances, but rather a certification that those we license can demonstrate those skills that 
constitute taking care in the circumstances germane to the activity.  Plus, the costs of requiring and 
regulating licenses are worth it, given the seriousness of the potential harm.  This isn’t the case in the 
matter of prone-people-stepping.  I say more about these points below. 
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4.6.2. Negligence and Negative Expected Value 
BUT WHY DOES THE intuition that Negligent Nate is responsible seem so strong?  One 
important difference between Nate’s case and Lenny’s is that Nate causes much more 
harm.  A broken leg is much worse than a trod upon hand (we’re assuming the hand isn’t 
broken).  Additionally, there’s only so much harm you can cause by inattentively walking 
around prone people, whereas the risk of serious injury by inattentively operating a car is 
much greater.  It doesn’t seem to me that considerations such as these can support 
differing judgments of responsibility, but they may help explain our differing reactions to 
the cases. 
 I don’t think the severity of the harm caused can make a difference in 
responsibility.  Suppose you knew that an agent caused some harm entirely by mistake, 
by making an entirely reasonable choice, say.  If you were convinced that the agent 
wasn’t responsible, would learning that it was a serious harm make a difference?  To put 
the point generally, suppose we take a case in which it’s obvious an agent isn’t 
responsible and then ratchet up the seriousness of the harm brought about.  Is there a 
threshold in which responsibility “appears”?  I find the very suggestion to be implausible. 
 One reason to think it’s implausible surfaces if we compare paradigm cases of 
responsibility.  So, suppose Deirdre hates Emma and wants her to suffer.  So Deidre waits 
for Emma to get off work, sneaks up behind her in the parking lot and beats her with a 
baseball bat.  Emma suffers multiple contusions, a cracked skull, and a concussion.  
Deidre is responsible for Emma’s injuries if anyone ever is.  Now suppose that Fran hates 
Ginny and wants her to suffer.  So Fran waits for Ginny to get off work, sneaks up behind 
her in the parking lots and pulls down her pants, causing Ginny to trip and fall.  Ginny 
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skins her knees and is humiliated in front of a couple coworkers who observe the 
attack.142  Fran, too, seems responsible for Ginny’s injuries if anyone ever is.  Indeed, in 
comparison, Deidre and Fran seem equally responsible for their respective harms.  The 
paradigm of responsibility is cases of intentional action aimed at a particular outcome as 
the intended end, where the end in fact occurs as intended.  Deidre and Fran’s actions fit 
the bill.  Both are out solely to harm (in different ways) their targets, and this is precisely 
what they do.  In fact, I don’t see how one could be more responsible for an outcome then 
they are in their respective scenarios. 
 It should be apparent, however, that the harm done to Emma is much worse than 
the harm done to Ginny.  Indeed, Deidre is certainly more blameworthy than Fran for 
what she does precisely because the harm Deidre brings about is so much worse.143  But 
the amount of harm brought about isn’t pertinent to the ladies’ responsibility for bringing 
it about.  Both are equally responsible in their respective scenarios.  So, while the amount 
of harm brought about is certainly relevant for how blameworthy an agent is, it isn’t 
relevant to her responsibility for bringing it about.  Responsibility for outcomes is 
interested only with the relation between an agent’s mental states (a psychological set 
explaining action) and a given outcome.  That’s why Deidre and Fran are both equally 
responsible for their respective harms, even while Deidre is more blameworthy for her 
harm than Fran is for hers. 
 This result can be applied to Nate’s situation.  First, let’s change the case slightly, 
and let’s call the new Nate, Nate*.  Suppose everything is as before, but instead of not 
                                               
142 We can leave any evaluations of these coworkers aside. 
143 There maybe other relevant factors in play here.  We may judge Deidre more blameworthy overall 
because we also think it’s worse to intend to physically assault someone than to harass them a bit.  But I 
want to limit the discussion above to comparative judgments regarding blameworthiness for what they do, 
blameworthiness for particular mental states notwithstanding. 
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seeing the child, he doesn’t see a child’s bike that’s been left on the sidewalk.  So Nate* 
runs over a child’s bike.  This is a much less serious harm than what Nate brings about.  
Is Nate* less responsible for running over the child’s bike?  I don’t think so.  
Responsibility ascriptions seem importantly insulated from the amount of harm caused, 
as Deidre and Fran showed.  So I think the answer one gives should match whatever one 
thinks about Nate’s case, and the same goes if Nate* runs over a prized rosebush or three 
hundred nuns.  Since we should treat these cases alike, and I think Nate* isn’t 
responsible, Nate isn’t responsible either. 
 But this isn’t to let Nate off the hook in any of these cases.  We would reproach 
him more strongly than Leadfoot Lenny, and many people would still react to him as if 
he were blameworthy for the harm.  I agree that we tend to react this way.  Moreover, I 
think we’re justified to act this way.  We have all sorts of good reasons to admonish Nate.  
We have standing duties of care for a reason.  When people fulfill the duty they tend to 
cause less harm.  And we have very strong reasons to be in the business of seeking to 
limit harm in general.  So I think we are likely justified in censuring Nate, reprimanding 
him for his failure, and chastising his causing of the injury (which wouldn’t have 
occurred without his failure), but I don’t think he’s actually worthy of blame for the 
harm.  Our reactions to him for the harm may be justified because they reinforce the 
importance of the standing duty of care.  It’s the equivalent of us saying, “This is why we 
have such a standard, to avoid harm like this!  That’s why we demand you follow it!”  
But this response merely reinforces the fact that Nate is sensitive to our shared practices 
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of demands and expectations, that he can modify his behavior and is a reflective agent, 
and it helps justify the standing duty itself.144 
 Consider an analogous aesthetic example.  Suppose Julius is a recording engineer, 
recording the latest album for the heavy metal band Scooby Doom.  It is Julius’s job to 
manage the various inputs and outputs, the recording levels, etc.  Julius neglects to check 
a vocal amp that was used for the last song but isn’t in use on the song he’s currently 
recording.  As a result, there is a persistent hiss on the track.145  The band will yell at 
Julius and complain that his neglect led to a poor recording of the song.  They may even 
blame him.  No doubt, their reactions will center on his neglect, on the fact that he failed 
to do something he was supposed to do.  And in reacting in this fashion, they will no 
doubt draw heavily on the fact that the neglect caused a hiss, and the hiss ruined the take.  
But these facts do not establish Julius’ blameworthiness for the hiss, so much as figure in 
explanations for why Julius’ failure matters.  It matters because such failures tend to lead 
to bad things, like the hiss on the track.  And hisses on tracks are aesthetically bad 
outcomes.  But Julius need not be responsible for the hiss in order for him to be 
criticizable for his failure, nor in order for Scooby Doom’s admonishment of him, even 
for the hiss, to be justified. 
 Now we have an explanation for our differing reactions to Negligent Nate and 
Leadfoot Lenny, respectively.  We tend to treat Nate more harshly because his failure of 
the standing duty of care is worse than Lenny’s.  We can understand this comparison in 
terms of the amount of harm risked by the activity each is engaged in.  I am assuming 
                                               
144 And in some cases where an individual isn’t sensitive to our shared practices, like a child perhaps, 
admonishment can serve to educate her about these practices. 
145 This example requires some artificiality, since they could always rerecord the track.  If this is a 
bothersome detail, the reader is invited to create a similar example featuring the sound technician’s 
inadvertence during a live concert leading to an aesthetically disastrous feature of the performance. 
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here that the probability of harm is equivalent in these two cases.  The reader is invited to 
tweak the example suitably if the reader doubts that the probabilities are in fact the 
same.146  This assumption will be important below.  Now, Nate is operating a vehicle, 
which poses the risk for quite serious harm.  If done without care, driving a vehicle can 
kill multiple people.  And this is a quite serious harm.  Lenny’s activity, while it does risk 
harm, risks a much more minor amount of harm.  One could dislocate a finger or perhaps 
even break a bone by having one’s hand stepped on, but these are fairly minor harms.  
This comparison helps explain what the line separating Nate’s negligence from Lenny’s 
simple inadvertence is doing.  It is denoting a difference in ‘admonishability’ for failing 
the standard by reference to the expected negative value of the harms posed by engaging 
in such activities without due care.  In both cases, I think, the agent is reproachable for 
failing the standing duty of care.  Both Nate and Lenny are criticizable in this respect.  
Indeed, as experience will reveal, we would admonish both Lenny and Nate for their 
failures.  “Ouch, watch where you’re going!” we might snap at Lenny.  And in keeping 
with my story for our reactions to Nate, this response also has as its source the standing 
duty of care, and our providing it serves to reinforce that standard.  But driving vehicles 
poses a much more serious risk of harm, because the sorts of harms that could result if 
one doesn’t satisfy the standard are so much worse.  Thus, Nate’s violation is worse; it 
more flagrantly flouts the duty to avoid harm by engaging in a more dangerous activity 
without being sufficiently careful. 
 However, this isn’t the only way to be more admonishable for failing the standing 
duty of care.  The line between Nate and Lenny is drawn by the expected negative value 
                                               
146 We could do this artificially by example, but the examples would seem a bit contrived.  I prefer to 
assume the equivalence of probability and work with more ordinary examples. 
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of the harm risked without due care.  But there are two ways one can increase the 
expected negative value of the harm.  The first way, as demonstrated in the case between 
Nate and Lenny, is to increase the amount of harm risked by the activity.  Driving 
vehicles risks more harm than stepping around prone people.  The other way to increase 
the expected negative value of the harm is to increase the risk of harm; that is, to engage 
in riskier activities.  For example, shooting one’s firearm without care in the middle of 
Montana risks a certain amount of harm (e.g., a gunshot wound that could lead to death).  
Shooting one’s firearm without care in the middle of Manhattan risks the same amount of 
harm, but it poses a much higher risk of that harm actually occurring.  The chances that 
you will shoot someone in the middle of Montana are quite slim when compared to 
shooting someone in the middle of Manhattan.  So, failing the standard in Manhattan, in 




THIS VERDICT MATCHES our reactions to these cases, I think, and captures what is 
essential in distinguishing negligence from inadvertence. Negligence involves the failure 
to pay appropriate attention when the expected negative value of the risked harms meets 
or exceeds some threshold.  Inadvertence involves the same sort of inattentiveness, but 
the negative expected value of the harm risked is much lower.  When one’s carelessness 




 Moreover, my alternative model for negligence also gives us a unified 
explanation.  It unifies negligence and inadvertence by explaining them in terms of a 
shared inattentiveness and the expected negative value of the potential consequences of 
the conduct.  Of course, this means the alternative view rejects the claim that negligent 
agents are responsible for the harms they bring about.  But given the fact that negligence 
is defined by its absence of conscious mental states, and responsibility’s traditional 
dependence on conscious mental states, this seems a virtue of my proposal.  Furthermore, 
the alternative model captures a natural explanation of our reactions to cases of 
negligence, and helps show how we are justified in adopting admonishing attitudes 
towards negligent agents.  Given tracing’s failure to explain negligence, and the general 
worry that any unified explanation could be given for negligence, I’m forced to conclude 
that negligent agents are not responsible for the harms they bring about, but are properly 
admonishable according to our shared standards of care. 
 So I don’t think we lose much in rejecting the claim that Negligent Nate is 
responsible.  We can still claim that he is worse than Lenny, in the sense of warranting 
greater admonishment, because his violation of the standing duty was more egregious.  
We are forced to admit that Lenny, too, is reproachable for his failure to be careful.  After 
all, he’s under the same standing duty as Nate.  But this isn’t really a cost of the view; 
indeed, it actually fits with our general experience of similar cases.  Lenny fails just as 
Nate does, but since the expected negative value of the harm of his activity without due 
care (stepping around prone people) is relatively low, his carelessness in this case doesn’t 
arouse our intuitions as strongly as it does in Nate’s case. 
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 I don’t suppose to have convinced everyone here.  We tend to have strong 
reactions to cases of negligence, and I don’t have knockdown arguments against such 
intuitions.  But as we’ve seen, a proponent of the Negligence Objection will have 
difficulty applying a unified explanation to cases of negligence, and it seems generally 
difficult to distinguish between cases of negligence and inadvertence in terms of their 
responsibility for the harms.  On my model, however, I can show how the difference 
between Nate and Lenny, while not concerning responsibility, makes sense of our 
reactions in a way supported by the phenomena. 
 If I’m right, then inadvertence (i.e., unconscious inattention) does uniformly 
undermine responsibility for outcomes.  More generally, if I’m right, this strengthens my 
claim that my three conditions, Voluntariness, Intentionality and No-mistake, really are 
necessary conditions on responsibility.  I also think that cases of directly intended action 














I DEFENDED THE NECESSITY of my conditions on responsibility in Chapter 4.  In this 
chapter, I defend the view that they are jointly sufficient.  My strategy here is to consider 
four separate conditions, any one of which it could be argued is necessary for 
responsibility.  Lacking a necessary condition would mean that my conditions couldn’t be 
jointly sufficient.  My aim, therefore, is to show that each candidate condition is not 
necessary for responsibility.  Thus, if I succeed, in order to ascribe responsibility nothing 
else need be shown other than that the agent in question meets my three conditions: 1) the 
outcome was brought about voluntarily; 2) the outcome was brought about intentionally; 
and, 3) the outcome was brought about without mistake.147  I again run the risk of leaving 
something out.148  But I think I tackle four conditions most often proffered as necessary 
(beyond intentionality and voluntariness, at least).  I’m confident that if I have left 
                                               
147 As before, these are the abbreviated versions of these conditions.  Full discussion of them can be found 
in Chapter 3, Section 3.4. 
148 This was a risk in Chapter 3, where I tackled what I took to be the most paradigmatic (and oft-cited) 
examples of considerations that undermine responsibility. 
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something out, it is not a condition of central importance, and thus I assume it could also 
be dealt with.  At the very least, rejecting these four conditions suffices to defend my 
view against what I see as its four toughest candidate conditions. 
 What are the four candidate conditions?  The first is a condition of normative 
competence.  Roughly, some argue that if an agent doesn’t know that what he’s doing is 
morally wrong, he isn’t blameworthy for it because he isn’t responsible for it.  The 
second condition results from recent arguments concerning manipulation of various 
forms.  The result is a historical condition.  These arguments purport to show that an 
agent’s history leading up to an action matters for responsibility.  Roughly, an agent’s 
history must be free from certain manipulations or interferences in order for her to be 
responsible for the outcome.  The third condition figures usually as a premise in 
incompatibilist arguments.  The claim is that since what one does at a particular time 
depends on how one is mentally at that time, to be responsible for what one does requires 
being responsible for how one is.  Briefly stated, according to this view responsibility for 
outcomes requires responsibility for one’s mental states and traits.  I will refer to this as 
the ultimacy condition, as it is usually discussed in terms of ultimate responsibility for the 
things agents do.  Finally, the last condition is that an agent must have genuine alternate 
possibilities to be responsible.  It must be the case that the agent could have done 
otherwise.  This is perhaps the most (in)famous and controversial condition cited as 
necessary for responsibility. 
 This chapter proceeds quite simply.  In the next four sections I introduce a 
proposed candidate condition, and then argue against it.  I’ll proceed as indicated, arguing 
against normative competence (Section 2), a historical requirement (Section 3), the 
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ultimacy condition (Section 4), and the alternate possibilities condition (Section 5), in 
succession. 
 
5.2. Normative Competence 
SOME HAVE GIVEN an argument that for one to be responsible for some outcome, one 
must know that what one is bringing about is morally good or morally bad.149  We can 
extend the argument, I think, to include additional evaluative competence, such as artistic 
competence.  The claim then becomes that one must know the normative evaluation of 
one’s outcome to be responsible for it.  One must know that it is morally bad, or 
artistically good, or scholastically bad, etc., in order to be responsible for it.  In short, 
responsibility requires normative competence, knowledge of the evaluative status of the 
outcome in question according to the appropriate normative standards.150 
 I begin with a rough sketch of an argument, suggested by Gideon Rosen’s view, 
augmented to speak more directly to my own account (2.1).  Next, I present my rebuttal 
to this argument, borrowing on Pete Graham’s own response to a similar argument (2.2).  
Finally, I’ll conclude with some observations about what the argument does accomplish 
(2.3). 
 
                                               
149 For example, see Rosen [2002]. 
150 One might think that normative competence is too broad.  For example, there are norms of rationality.  I 
think rationality norms are likely excluded from normative competence arguments.  At least, including 
them would weaken any argument for a normative competence requirement, since mistakes of irrationality 
don’t seem to be the sort that would upset responsibility.  I think we do better, and stay truer to the intended 
scope of such arguments, to construe normative competence in a narrower way, as pertaining to norms of 
value, such as moral or artistic value. 
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5.2.1 The Argument From Moral Ignorance (AFMI) 
THE ARGUMENT, IN BRIEF, suggests that just as ignorance of the facts usually excuses one 
from blameworthiness, so too can ignorance of the moral quality of one’s act.  In short, 
one is not blameworthy for bringing about x provided one did not know that he ought not 
to have brought about x.151  This argument has some intuitive weight.  Most of us think 
there are moral facts of the matter.  What one ought to do in a given situation is a moral 
fact.  So why limit instances of ignorance of the facts of the case to only the non-moral 
ones?  The argument purports to show, by illustration, that there are at least some cases in 
which ignorance of what the agent ought to do excuses the agent from blameworthiness.  
If that’s the case, then it seems that responsibility requires moral competence – at least a 
belief that one ought not be doing what one is doing.152,153  If the argument succeeds, 
then, at the very least, my No-Mistake Condition requires revision to include normative 
facts along with the non-normative ones.  I turn now to the argument. 
 Let’s begin, as usual, with some cases.  Consider the following two cases:154 
 
                                               
151 Rosen, for example, limits his discussion to instances in which ignorance of what the agent ought to do 
must be itself non-culpable in order to excuse.  I argued against such restrictions in Chapter 3, but I’ll retain 
his caveat for the purposes of my argument here.  So nothing I argue for here should turn on my 
conclusions from Chapter 3. 
152 Obviously, the ‘ought’ in play here is a moral ought, since the argument doesn’t aim to show that 
blameworthiness requires acting against what one believes one ‘ought’ to do in any respect.  One may 
know that it is immoral to cheat but believe that he ought to, nonetheless, since it will increase his fame, 
say. 
153 It isn’t clear whether the argument seeks to show a requirement of moral knowledge or not.  That is, 
whether one must have something like a justified true belief about what one ought to do, and act contrary to 
it.  Such a reading would also seem to require, given my comments above, that the moral domain fixes a 
fact of the matter about what one ought (all things considered) to do.  I leave aside these various worries, 
and operate on the assumption that, at minimum, the Argument From Moral Ignorance seeks to show that 
ignorance of the moral nature of what one is doing excuses, and suggests some revision of my No-Mistake 
Condition. 
154 These are taken from Rosen [2002]. 
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Slave Owner: Consider an ordinary Hittite lord. He buys and sells human beings, 
forces labor without compensation, and separates families to suit 
his purposes. Needless to say, what he does is wrong. The landlord 
is not entitled to do these things. But of course he thinks he is.  
Moreover, we may imagine that if he had thought otherwise, he 
would have acted differently. In that case he acts from moral 
ignorance in our sense. That much seems clear.  It also seems clear 
that his ignorance is not straightforwardly grounded in factual 
ignorance. Unlike race slavery in the Americas, ancient Near 
Eastern slavery was not supported by myths about the biological or 
psychological inferiority of the slave. One became a slave through 
bad luck or imprudence; in principle the status could befall almost 
anyone. It is less clear to what extent this ignorance was grounded 
in false religion. The evidence suggests, however, that there was 
no perceived need for theological rationalization. The institution of 
chattel slavery was simply taken for granted. Questions about its 
administration were generally conceived as questions of civil law 





                                               
155 Rosen [2002], pp.64-65. 
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Sexist:  Smith is a run-of-the mill American sexist circa (say) 1952.  Like 
any decent middle class father he has encouraged his sons to go on 
to college, setting aside money for the purpose. But like any run-
of-the-mill sexist he has done nothing comparable for his 
daughters. This differential treatment is not malicious. But it is 
unfair and therefore wrong. But of course Smith doesn’t know this. 
He doesn’t know that his daughters deserve equal consideration in 
this respect. …. [Moreover,] [l]et’s suppose that if you had asked 
Smith at the time why he was treating his daughters differently, he 
would have said, ‘Because they’re girls,’ as if the sufficiency of 
the answer were self-evident. Smith is the sort of complacent sexist 
who takes it for granted that his sons have legitimate expectations 
to which his daughters are not entitled (and perhaps vice versa).  
Let’s suppose in addition that this commitment is not based on 
some sort of theory—some bit of bad religion or bad science. Let’s 
assume, in other words—and this is hardly unrealistic—that Smith 
believes what he believes because he finds it obvious, and that he 
finds it obvious because he was raised to find it obvious and 
because the people he takes seriously find it obvious. The idea that 
gender matters in this way thus functions for him as an undefended 
axiom of moral common sense.156 
 
                                               
156 Rosen [2202], pp.66-67. 
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Proponents of the Argument from Moral Ignorance claim that neither the slave owner nor 
the sexist are blameworthy for what they do.  The Hittite could not be expected to know 
that his treatment of his slaves was wrong.  As Rosen puts it, “Given the intellectual and 
cultural resources available to a second millennium Hittite lord, it would have taken a 
moral genius to see through to the wrongness of chattel slavery.”157  It would be 
unreasonable of us to hold him responsible.  So while we might decry a universe that 
would allow such an injustice to take place, “it makes no sense to hold this injustice 
against the [slave owner] when it would have taken a miracle of moral vision for him to 
have seen the moral case for acting differently.”158  Similarly, Rosen thinks that it would 
be unreasonable for us to blame the sexist for doing “what seemed reasonable given 
everything [he could] plausibly be expected to have known at the time.”159 
 The defense here seems to be that we would be unreasonable if we blamed those 
who acted out of a reasonable moral ignorance.160  At other times, Rosen suggests that it 
would be a “mistake” to blame those like the slave owner and sexist.161  Given these 
facts, it would be inappropriate to blame the agent in question.  If it would be 
inappropriate to blame the agent, then the agent isn’t responsible. 
 
                                               
157 Rosen [2002], p.66. 
158 Rosen [2002], p.68. 
159 Rosen [2002], p.68. 
160 It is worth stressing here that Rosen, for example, goes to great pains to show that both the Hittite and 
sexist acted reasonably given their times.  They were both as reflective as the common person of their day, 
and they didn’t engage in any reflective negligence or the like.  I assume with Rosen that these facts are 
established. 
161 For examples, see Rosen [2002], p.66,68. 
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5.2.2. Blaming as Something You Do and the Moralistic Fallacy (Again) 
AFMI IS AN ARGUMENT by illustration.  We are to consider the slave owner and the 
sexist, conclude that it would be inappropriate to blame either of them because they 
lacked important normative knowledge (or had specific false beliefs), and then reach the 
general conclusion that a knowledge condition on responsibility must include (at least) 
some moral knowledge (or correct beliefs). 
 Let’s examine Rosen’s defense of the claim that it would be inappropriate to 
blame the slave owner and the sexist.  At bottom, Rosen follows Wallace in thinking that 
the main norms that govern the appropriateness of blame are norms of fairness.  As he 
puts it,  
“It is unfair to blame someone for doing something if he blamelessly 
believes that there is no compelling moral reason not to do it.  This 
principle is in turn supported by two more basic principles.  It is 
unreasonable to expect people not to do what they blamelessly believe 
they are entitled to do, and it is unreasonable to subject people to sanctions 
when it would be unreasonable to expect them to have acted 
differently”.162 
 
So it would seem that blame is unfair when our expectations of their acting well are 
unreasonable.  Thus, on Rosen’s view, unreasonableness grounds unfairness. 
 As should be apparent, I don’t think fairness is the right way to think about the 
appropriateness of blame.  I argued as much in Chapter 2.163  In brief, I think that what 
make blame inappropriate are the same things as what make praise inappropriate, namely, 
the undermining factors.  I won’t rehash that argument here.  Instead, let’s focus on the 
                                               
162 Rosen [2002], pp.74-75.  I think it worth noting that it may just be false that we cannot reasonably 
sanction individuals for reasonable mistakes.  It certainly isn’t clear that no negative treatment of an 
individual for a reasonable mistake is warranted.  I won’t rely on this being the case, but it’s important to 
note that Rosen’s claim here isn’t at all obvious.  My thanks to Manuel Vargas for raising this point. 
163 See Chapter 1, Section 3. 
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two glaring mistakes I think Rosen’s making here; mistakes encouraged by his adopting a 
practice-based view (like Wallace).  First, notice that he confuses liability to blame with 
the unfairness of actually blaming.  This is a crucial misstep.  Second, this mistake leads 
him to conclude that considerations that would make blame unfair render one not liable to 
blame.  I’ll elaborate on these two mistakes in turn. 
 Liability to a response need not have the same conditions as the appropriateness 
of that response.  Rosen, of course, understands liability to blame in terms of the 
appropriateness of actual blaming, but this is exactly what gets him into trouble.  He 
succumbs to a version of the Moralistic Fallacy, as raised by D’Arms and Jacobsen and 
discussed in Chapter 2.164  In their work, D’Arms and Jacobsen show that responses can 
“fit” their object (what I’m here calling “liability”), even when it would, in some sense, 
be inappropriate to actually engage in the given response.  For a common example, 
something can be funny, even if it would be, say, morally wrong to laugh at it (perhaps 
because it’s offensive to a minority).  The distinction here is easily captured, I think, in 
terms of distinguishing between being worthy of a response and it’s being the case that a 
particular response ought to be given.165  Rosen confuses an agent’s blameworthiness 
with it’s being the case that one ought to blame him.  It should be evident that the 
conditions that support the first clause can be different from the second.  To blame 
someone is an action one engages in, and it is thus subject to a litany of reasons for 
action, even ones quite orthogonal to issues of responsibility.  Blameworthiness, on the 
other hand, is a property or condition of an agent.  For instance, if I will get a million 
dollars if I blame you for sneezing, then perhaps I ought to blame you, although there can 
                                               
164 See Chapter 1, Section 3.1. 
165 Recall the distinction found in both Chapter 2 (see also n.77), between ‘blameworthiness’ and ‘it being 
the case that one ought to be blamed’.  The same distinction is at work here, in its general form. 
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be no doubt you are not blameworthy for sneezing.  To take a livelier example, suppose I 
am a spy overseas working with my female partner.  My cover is as a married physicist; 
my partner playing my wife.  The success of my mission depends on my ability to 
convince those I meet of the truth of my cover, that I am in fact the physicist I’m 
claiming to be.  It would help my performance if I, too, believed the supposed facts of my 
cover.  I’ll be less likely to “slip up” and more likely to convince them.  Thus, it would be 
beneficial if I were to believe that I was actually married to my partner.  Indeed, I ought 
to believe this, as it is crucial to the success of my mission (which we can assume is of 
the utmost importance).  Nevertheless, it would be a mistake for me to believe this claim, 
for it isn’t true.  So even if I could revise my beliefs in such a fashion, and even if I did 
actually revise them, I would be making a mistake.  This is because the “fittingness” of 
belief tracks truth; beliefs “fit” when they match truths in the world.  Similarly, I think 
blame “fits” when it is correct, when the agent is actually worthy of the blame.  And this 
is the case so long as the agent is responsible and the outcome is bad.166  But this result 
doesn’t entail that we ought to actually blame him.  There may be all sorts of competing 
reasons, just as there can be competing reasons in favor of believing some untrue claim.  
But what counts for the “fittingness” of blame is when the agent is liable to the response, 
irrespective of whether we ought to engage in it all things considered. 
 Rosen instead thinks that blame fits just in case we ought to engage in it.  This is 
clear from his comments on what supports his cited norm of fairness.  There what 
grounds the unfairness of our actual blame in the given cases is the unreasonableness of 
our expectations.  But this is a comment on when we shouldn’t blame, not on when blame 
                                               
166 Even if one rejects my particular characterization of when blameworthiness is correct, the conceptual 
distinction should be acknowledged. 
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is unwarranted.  Pete Graham makes a similar point regarding the appropriateness of 
giving a response to an agent and the appropriateness of a particular person’s giving that 
same response.167  He gives the example of Ned, a notorious car thief, blaming Homer for 
stealing his car.  We might think in such cases that it is inappropriate for Ned to blame 
Homer because such blame is hypocritical.  Who is Ned to blame anyone for stealing 
cars?  But Graham notes that just because Ned shouldn’t blame Homer because it would 
be hypocritical, this doesn’t mean that Homer isn’t blameworthy for stealing the car.  
After all, Ned’s wife Maude, who isn’t a car thief, is certainly within her rights to blame 
Homer.  Indeed, it would seem that Homer’s liability to blame isn’t at all affected by who 
does the blaming, even if we may judge that in particular cases particular individuals 
should refrain from engaging in blame. 
 These reflections on Ned and Homer’s case are enlightening, for they expose part 
of what I think is going on in Rosen’s examples.168  Call the above the “hypocritical 
thought.”169  When combined with another thought, the “luck of the draw thought,” we 
get a convincing picture of what supports the intuitions that the slave owner and sexist 
are not blameworthy.  The “luck of the draw” thought expresses the belief that we could 
have been like the slave owner or sexist.  Had we been born into ancient Hittite culture, 
we too would have likely accepted slavery without reservation.  And had we grown up in 
the 1950’s, we too would have likely come to have sexist beliefs.  There is therefore 
something hypocritical in us blaming them since it is only due to the luck of the draw that 
                                               
167 This discussion can be found in Graham [2005], pp.173-183. 
168 Here I am in agreement with Graham, who makes similar points. 




we didn’t end up like them.170  We might be led by this reasoning, then, to suppose that it 
would be inappropriate or unfair for us to actually blame the slave owner and sexist. 
 But this reasoning is clearly inadequate for showing that the sexist or Hittite is not 
blameworthy.  The fact that we might think it inappropriate for us to blame them does not 
show that they aren’t liable to blame.  For we surely do not have the same intuitions 
about the slave owner’s fellow Hittites, or the sexist’s daughters.  It surely wouldn’t be 
inappropriate for those in the respective times and cultures to do the blaming.  Though it 
may have taken a “moral genius” to have seen the wrongness of slavery in Hittite culture, 
had such a genius existed, it seems entirely appropriate for him to criticize his fellow 
Hittite’s for their immoral practices.  To claim otherwise risks endorsing the view that 
until an immoral practice is acknowledged as such by a significant portion of the 
population it cannot be criticized, nor can its practitioners be appropriately blamed.  So I 
think it eminently plausible that a Hittite slave owner could be appropriately blamed by a 
fellow Hittite.171  And this observation helps support the claim that the inappropriateness 
of particular individuals blaming others doesn’t establish that it is inappropriate tout court 
to blame others.  This is precisely the result of considering Ned and Homer’s case.172 
 I think the slave owner and sexist are blameworthy.  Indeed, I think it is fitting for 
us to blame them.  But I need not establish this stronger claim.  All I need show is that 
they can be blameworthy even if it would be inappropriate for us to actually blame them.  
And this last fact may indeed be true.  The explanation for this fact is that there can be all 
manner of good reasons against actually engaging in a response like blame; perhaps it 
                                               
170 As Graham notes, Watson [1987] cites similar reasoning as part of the explanation for why we hesitate 
to blame criminals who themselves were victims of abusive childhoods.  See Graham [2005], p.181, n.96. 
171 Though not a fellow slave owner, naturally. 




would be hypocritical, or rude, or insensitive, or harmful, etc.  Nevertheless, that such 
good reasons exist, that they might show that we shouldn’t blame in a particular instance, 
does not show that the individual in question isn’t liable to blame.  In short, one can be 
blameworthy even if all things consider we shouldn’t actually blame him. 
 
5.2.3. Moral Knowledge 
IN SPECIFYING THE No-Mistake Condition, I stated that an agent must have correct beliefs 
only about those non-normative facts sufficient for generating the appropriate normative 
evaluation.  For instance, one need not believe that holding a slave is wrong, one need 
only believe one is holding a slave.173  Whether holding a slave is wrong is the result of 
theory.  Moral theory will tell us what things are permissible and impermissible, just as 
aesthetic theory will tell us what things are beautiful or ugly. 
 Nevertheless, I think that beliefs about the result of theory are unnecessary for 
evaluations of blameworthiness, and they certainly aren’t necessary for responsibility.  
Indeed, knowledge of the non-moral facts certainly seems sufficient.  Imagine someone 
responding to our censure of him with “Sure, I knew I was causing harm, but I didn’t 
know that causing harm was wrong!”  Even if he is genuinely ignorant of this fact, which 
seems improbable,174 if he knows what harm is and that he’s causing it, we need no other 
                                               
173 This is a bit simplistic.  I think one needs to know that a slave is a human being that is treated like 
property, or something like this.  Knowledge of a slave as the same species as the owner is part of why 
Rosen chooses the Hittite owner in the first place.  It is unclear how the arguments here apply to slave 
owners in, say, the colonial American south, where many may have operated under the false factual belief 
that slaves were not human beings, though their subsequent treatment of slaves would still have been wrong 
even if their biology had been correct. 
174 There may well be individuals who do not know (or genuinely do not believe) that causing pain is 
wrong.  My first comment is that such individuals certainly stand outside the norm and aren’t the core cases 
we should first test moral competence against.  Second, I suspect such individuals do not just believe that 
causing harm isn’t wrong, they evince a pathology, a failed capacity to see the world in moral terms.  To 
 
 150 
information to blame him.  This is surely an uncontroversial case of doing wrong; we’re 
likely to think that any moral theory worth having will treat causing harm as usually 
wrong.  There are no doubt more controversial cases.  Suppose Sharon has an abortion 
(she thinks it’s morally permissible).  An anti-abortion group blames her for it.  Is Sharon 
blameworthy?  I don’t know.  All I’m arguing here is that she doesn’t have an excuse 
simply because she thinks it morally permissible.  She isn’t blameworthy if it is 
permissible and she is blameworthy if abortion is wrong.  Her blameworthiness, then, 
will depend on whether abortion is morally permissible or not.  But we shouldn’t be 
surprised that blameworthiness and praiseworthiness will depend on the verdicts of our 
true normative verdicts. 
 To be responsible, on my view, one need not know the verdicts of these theories, 
which is a plus, I think.  If responsibility is dependent on moral theory, then we face two 
significant problems.  First, it makes many responsibility ascriptions conditional.  For 
instance, Sharon is responsible for getting her abortion, but only if abortion is 
permissible.  Otherwise, she will have been wrong about the verdict, and thus not 
responsible.  Now, one might argue that Sharon’s case is disanalogous to the Hittite slave 
owner, because the claim in the Hittite’s case is that it would have taken a moral genius 
to see the wrongness of slavery in his time.  In Sharon’s case, it doesn’t take a genius to 
see how abortion might be morally wrong.  But the problem is that for many intelligent 
moral philosophers, those who think very carefully about such problems, it isn’t at all 
                                                                                                                                            
my mind, this goes well beyond a moral competence; it suggests a cognitive deficiency of a sort.  Perhaps 
we should then require healthy cognition for responsibility?  My preferred response would be rather to hold 
that these sorts of individuals are responsible.  But this is an argument that actually stands outside the main 
discussion here, for it concerns how we ought to handle special cases, and would require extensive 
discussion of what the right verdict in cases of such psychopathy should be.  I have no settled position on 
this.  For some helpful discussions of these issues, see, e.g., Duff [1977]; Greenspan [2003]; Watson 
[1987]; Wolf [1987]. 
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clear what the right verdict is for abortion.  Just because there are some people who 
defend both sides of the issue, doesn’t mean that it won’t take a moral genius to figure 
out the right answer.175  But in any event, the existence of disagreement doesn’t imply, to 
my mind, that expecting people to have the correct beliefs would be significantly more 
reasonable.  And if we give up looking at moral competence in terms of reasonable 
expectations, then Sharon’s case seems much more analogous to the Hittite’s after all.  
So, if we tie responsibility to our moral theories then we’re effectively hindered in 
rendering responsibility verdicts without the correct moral verdict (in order to evaluate 
whether the agent had correct moral beliefs).  This is a serious problem for being able to 
make definitive ascriptions of responsibility; they are impossible without settled moral 
verdicts. 
 The second problem is simpler and more damaging.  Tying responsibility to moral 
theory in this way will render counter-intuitive results.  Suppose that Susan, too, has an 
abortion.  Susan, however, believes abortion to be morally impermissible.  She went 
through with it despite this belief (we may imagine that she had further compelling 
reasons).  Supposing that Sharon and Susan’s circumstances are sufficiently the same, 
and supposing that abortion in such a case is either permissible or impermissible, then 
either Sharon is responsible for her abortion or Susan is responsible for her abortion, but 
not both.  And this seems mistaken given that they are alike in every other respect except 
belief in the action’s permissibility.176 
 In light of these problems, I think it an advantage of any view that it rejects a 
normative competence condition.  To be responsible one need only know those non-
                                               
175 I happen to think abortion is this difficult an applied ethics issue. 
176 We may even suppose that Sharon has Susan’s additional reasons in favor of abortion and they happen 
to over-determine her choice, whereas in Susan’s case they outweigh the moral reason against. 
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normative facts sufficient for generating the relevant evaluation according to the right 
theory. 
 
 The Argument from Moral Ignorance fails to show that individuals must have 
correct beliefs about moral verdicts to be responsible. The slave owner and sexist are 
blameworthy, even if we have strong reasons not to blame them.  Therefore, my No-
Mistake Condition survives, and no amendments are necessary to my three conditions on 
responsibility.  Nevertheless, Rosen’s approach succeeds, I think, in defending grounds 
for a certain sort of caution about our blaming practices.  While I don’t think Rosen 
achieves the skepticism about blameworthiness that was his aim, he does show that facts 
about our moral knowledge invite skepticism about when we ought to go about the 
business of blaming.  The value of our practices can be independently assessed even if 
we’re confident, as I think we should be, that individuals are blameworthy for at least 
some of the things they do.  Indeed, I think this skepticism is rather mild, as I don’t think 
that there is widespread disagreement about the moral verdicts any worthwhile theory 
ought to produce.  Nevertheless, consideration of the issues discussed above does draw 
our attention to thinking carefully about whether we ought to blame someone in a given 
situation.  And increasing the amount of care and attention involved in our blaming of 




5.3. Historical Condition 
MANIPULATION ARGUMENTS have been particularly popular recently.177  They purport to 
show that how an agent comes to act makes a difference to his responsibility.  
Specifically, they indicate that the way an agent comes to have the beliefs, desires, and 
values on which he acts can make a difference to his responsibility for the outcome.  Here 
I will discuss two separate illustrations of supposed responsibility-threatening 
manipulation, and try to show how they may be taken to illustrate an objection to my 
view as stated (3.1).  Next, I’ll take each case in turn, diagnosing what could be its 
problematic aspects for responsibility, but arguing in each case that we shouldn’t think 
them worrisome after all (3.2 & 3.3).  Lastly, I’ll consider a different manipulation 
argument intended to support the view that responsibility is incompatible with 
determinism after all (3.4).  I discuss it last because the lessons learned in the preceding 
sections will allow us to better appreciate my response, and help draw out a general 
conclusion to take away from manipulation arguments. 
 
5.3.1. Manipulation Arguments 
I BEGIN WITH TWO pairs of cases:178 
 
                                               
177 Some recent examples can be found in Fischer, et al. [2007]; Mele [2006]. 
178 These cases are variations on ones given in Mele [1995, 2006].  Mele cites Kane [1985] as a source of 
similar sorts of manipulation examples.  Mele is most interested in the conditions needed for autonomy, 
which he thinks is sufficient for the sort of free will necessary for responsibility, but he remains an agnostic 
in the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists.  He uses cases like Overnight Opera Lover in 
support of historical conditions on responsibility; he cites cases like Zygote Zapper as explaining why he 
cannot flatly endorse compatibilism.  Kane uses manipulation arguments to argue directly for 
incompatibilism (of free will and responsibility with determinism). 
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Overnight Opera Lover: Donna loves the opera.  She finds it musically inspired, 
compellingly dramatic, and a pleasure to see and hear.  In addition 
to attending operas whenever possible, she also wants to promote 
her local opera company’s future.  As a result, she donates $1,000 
dollars on June 1st to the company. 
  Donny, on the other hand, can’t stand the opera.  He thinks 
it repetitive and boring, he can’t stand the timbre of operatic 
voices, and he hates the aesthetic of opera halls.  All in all, he 
ranks operas below visits to the DMV.  All his life he has 
petitioned for less public funding of opera companies, urging that 
money to go elsewhere.  When Donny goes to sleep on the night of 
May 31st, however, he is visited by an opera-loving neuroscientist, 
who reconfigures Donny’s brain as he sleeps.  The neuroscientist 
has studied Donna to find out what makes her tick, and configured 
Donny to be her psychological “match.”179  When Donny awakes, 
he is the biggest opera fan in the world.  Now he finds them to be 
musically inspired, compellingly dramatic, and a pleasure to see 
and hear – just like Donna.  As a result, Donny donates $1,000 on 
June 1st to his local opera company. 
 
Zygote Zapper:  Donna loves the opera just as before.  Additionally, an opera 
loving geneticist wants to ensure that his local opera company 
continues to prosper in the future, so he manipulates a particular 
                                               
179 Presumably the neuroscientist does this by manipulating neurons or other parts of the brain. 
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zygote such that on June 1st, 30 years from now, the individual the 
zygote becomes will donate $1,000 to the company.  The 
geneticist, too, has studied Donna to find out why she donates 
money to the opera.  So he arranges the zygotes genetic code so as 
to produce Donna’s psychological “match” 30 years from now.  
Sure enough, in 30 years, the zygote, now a man named Danny, 
donates $1,000 to his local opera company. 
 
To keep things straight, here is a table illustrating the cases: 
 
Donna Loves the opera and donates money to support it (non-manipulated) 
Donny Has always hated the opera – but has his beliefs, desires, and 
values reconfigured so as to “match” Donna’s psychological set – 
so he, too, donates money to the opera (neuronal manipulation) 
Danny Was configured as a zygote such that, in 30 years, he too is a 
psychological “match” of Donna – so he also donates money to the 
opera (genetic manipulation) 
 
 
In the cases above, we are meant to think that neither Donny nor Danny is responsible for 
donating the money.  Each has been manipulated and “made” to donate the money.  But 
in both cases the agent in question seems to meet my conditions on responsibility.  They 
each bring about the donation voluntarily, intentionally, and without mistake.  Each one’s 
action is certainly explainable by a belief-desire set.  Moreover, we can easily cite the 
beliefs and desires that explain the action.  Each wants the opera company success in the 
future and believes that donating money will help ensure some measure of financial 
stability.  And they are both correct about the relevant features of their donations; they 
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are, in fact, giving money to a local opera company that will use it to help fund future 
projects.  So, if Donny and Danny aren’t responsible for their donations, then I’m missing 
a condition on responsibility, and so my three aren’t sufficient by themselves. 
The above cases are typically used to motivate an argument for a historical 
condition on responsibility.  Not only must one act in a particular way in order to be 
responsible, one must come to act in a particular way.  Specifically, one must come to act 
in a manner free of problematic manipulation, as seen in Donny and Danny’s cases.  The 
problem in these cases is that the beliefs and desires and values doing the explanatory 
work are, in some significant sense, not really Donny’s and Danny’s.  At least, they 
haven’t come to have those beliefs, or endorse those values, in the appropriate way.  This 
deviant history lies behind the claim that neither Donny nor Danny is responsible.  
Whether or not we can clearly demarcate between deviant and non-deviant histories, it 
seems clear, according to manipulation arguments, that Donny and Danny are not 
examples of normal belief acquisition or normal value endorsement.  Something has gone 
wrong in the histories leading up to the donations, and this deviant history explains their 
undermined responsibility. 
According to my view, Donny and Danny are both responsible; they satisfy my 
three conditions on responsibility at the time of their donation.  And I think this is the 
right view to take about these cases.  I’ll argue as much, first tackling Donny’s case, and 
then Danny’s.  My view, then, is a non-historical one; it doesn’t require that one’s history 
leading up to an action satisfy some condition in order to be responsible for the outcomes.  
I’ll say more about the non-historical dimension and its relation to responsibility for how 




5.3.2. Overnight Opera Lover 
LET’S BEGIN WITH SOME simple observations about Donny’s situation.  Let’s take the 
perspective of one of his close friends.  In fact, the friend and Donny started P.A.P.F.O 
(People Against the Public Funding of Opera) together.  They’ve always shared a disdain 
for opera; and an interest in a great many other things, like fishing, video games, 
supermodels, and beer.  In fact, they had just gone fishing on the 31st of May, and had 
arranged to go to the P.A.P.F.O meeting together the next day.  When Donny’s friend 
arrives, however, Donny says that he’s not going to the meeting.  This strikes Donny’s 
friend as strange, and he asks why.  Donny says he now loves the opera.  It’s a fantastic 
art form.  In fact, he’s quitting P.A.P.F.O altogether.  Now Donny’s friend likely thinks 
Donny is just joking with him.  Maybe he laughs nervously.  But when he sees Donny is 
serious, he’s liable to say something like, “What’s come over you?  You’re not yourself 
today!”  Donny is unaware of how the change has taken place, though he is aware of a 
change.  So he’s likely to reply that he woke up this morning with a new (though 
inexplicable, to him) appreciation for opera and a strong desire to promote its 
continuation.  In fact, he says proudly, he’s headed right now to donate $1,000 dollars to 
the local opera company. 
 No doubt, Donny’ friend is flabbergasted.  He doesn’t know what to make of this 
abrupt and sudden change in Donny.  He’s known Donny for years, and his behavior this 
morning isn’t like him at all.  Indeed, when Donny’s friend goes to the P.A.P.F.O 
meeting and informs them of Donny’s change, the entire group is likely to be 
dumbfounded.  How strange for someone to undergo a complete reversal of such a 
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strongly held conviction.  To his closest associates, Donny will likely seem a different 
person. 
 At least one significant feature of the case, then, is the extreme suddenness of the 
change.  Compare Donny’s case as told to an elaborated version of Donna’s story.  
Suppose she didn’t always love the opera.  For many years she thought it stuffy and 
boring.  But then she dated someone who loved the opera, and so she actually went to 
one.  And, much to her surprise, she found it wasn’t nearly as bad.  She attributed her 
previous dislike to growing up in a smallish city and not being exposed to ‘good’ opera.  
She is interested in learning more and so begins to develop an appreciation for opera.  
Her appreciation grows; so much so that in a matter of months she finds herself donating 
$1,000 dollars to the local opera company.  Donna’s friends may also be surprised at the 
change (it is still a quick development), but it is gradual enough not to strike them as 
bizarre. 
 Moreover, unlike Donny, Donna can explain where this new love of opera 
originated.  She can recount for her friends the sources of her altered beliefs and, roughly, 
the process by which she came to change her outlook.  Donny’s change is inexplicable, 
even to himself (we, of course, know differently).  And this brings us to the second 
significant feature.  The neuroscientist is clearly “behind” Donny’s change.  It is his plan 
to “make” someone like the opera, and he carries out his plan using Donny.  This aspect 
of Donny’s case no doubt lies behind much of what concerns us about his actions.  He 
isn’t really responsible for the donation, because the neuroscientist is responsible for the 
way Donny is.  I will call agents like the neuroscientist in this case Intervening Immune 
Agents.  They’re intervening because they influence in significant ways what the other 
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agents in the scenario do, and they are immune because they are not subject to the same 
sort of influence.  In Donny’s case, the neuroscientist is the one who reconfigures his 
psychological set to look like Donna’s (at least with respect to opera), but the 
neuroscientist himself isn’t subject to such psychological tampering (by hypothesis). 
 The third significant feature is importantly related to the second.  I’ve already 
mentioned it in fact.  Part of why Donna can recount her change is that it came about 
through the usual process.  As agents, we have the capacity to reflect on our beliefs, 
desires, and values.  And while in most circumstances we cannot spontaneously revise 
them, we can take steps so as to revise them or to encourage the adoption of different 
values.  Donny’s change doesn’t come about through this usual route.  His change is 
engineered by another party, who bypasses his reflective capacities and simply puts a 
particular set of psychological states in his head.  So while we may be comfortable with 
the claim that Donna exerts some control over her psychological set, at least in coming to 
be a lover of opera, we cannot make such a claim of Donny.  He exercised the same sort 
of control in coming to be a hater of opera, but the neuroscientist’s intervention lies 
behind his newfound appreciation, and this process bypassed the usual routes. 
 I think these three features are significant in that they form the bulk of support for 
the judgment that Donna is responsible for her donation while Donny is not responsible 
for his.  First, the change is extremely sudden (the Suddenness feature).  Second, the 
change is primarily the result of an Intervening Immune Agent (the IIA feature).  And 
third, the change bypasses the agent’s reflective capacities (the Bypass feature).  I now 
take up these features in turn, arguing that they should not lead us to think that Donny is 






DONNY UNDERGOES HIS change in values extremely suddenly.  And this is a very 
important fact; for it immediately directs our attention to the way in which Donny’s case 
is aberrant.  In general, people don’t undergo such rapid and radical changes in their 
psychological sets.  In general, people tend to revise their core convictions through 
gradual processes.  They don’t embrace radically different conclusions overnight. 
 But sometimes they do.  Sometimes individuals experience an “awakening” or 
sudden realization that immediately shapes their lives in particular ways.  I’m thinking 
specifically of individuals who experience epiphanies.180  The change can be quite 
dramatic and quite sudden.  Indeed, when faced with such individuals we often confess 
that they seem to be an entirely different person.  Nevertheless, I take it we don’t think in 
such circumstances that the individual isn’t responsible for the things he does, even those 
things he does shortly after his change.  The born-again Christian who immediately 
begins donating to charities and being more considerate of others is surely praiseworthy 
for such deeds.  And, I would think, the same could be said about a born-again “Satanist,” 
who immediately begins doing ill work about town; he seems blameworthy for such acts. 
 Moreover, I should think that we want to be responsible for such acts.  We should 
allow for the possibility of quick changes to our psychological sets.  Imagine that Sasha 
has been operating under some false belief, say, that eating meat is morally permissible.  
Sasha has even reaffirmed her commitment to its permissibility over and over again, even 
in the face of good philosophical arguments to the contrary.  But then suppose that Sasha 
comes across a new argument for vegetarianism.  It is so new and so good that it 
                                               
180 For example, some religious converts who are “born again” or “see the light” quite suddenly. 
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convinces her that eating meat is really morally impermissible.  She immediately stops 
eating meat, and is glad that she can take credit for her new acts of compassion, even as 
she might regret her past meat-eating acts, committed as they were under an error.  
Nevertheless, I should think that once we’ve come to the new belief, we should want 
immediate credit for doing what’s right.181 
 So, I don’t think it can be the suddenness of the change that explains why Donny 
isn’t responsible for the donation.  There are plenty of examples, it would seem, where 
the change is just as radical, just as sudden, and yet we think responsibility remains 
intact.  Perhaps the suddenness feature attunes our attention; it raises our suspicions, as it 
were.  We begin to look more closely for explanations of the change.  But I don’t think 
that by itself it can show responsibility to be undermined. 
 
 
5.3.2.2. Intervening Immune Agents 
 
THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS WITH intervening immune agents are all too common in the 
responsibility literature.  In Donny’s case, there is a neuroscientist who reconfigures 
Donny’s psychological set.  When Donny makes his donation, the existence of the 
neuroscientist is extremely important.  It is easy to say that the neuroscientist is 
responsible for the donation.  After all, he altered Donny’s brain specifically with the 
purpose of getting him to support his opera company.  Donny seems to be an instrument 
of the neuroscientist’s purposes; a puppet whose strings the neuroscientist pulls. 
                                               
181 I am supposing here that eating meat is morally problematic, but we could alter the case to use a 
different moral claim. 
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 But I think we have the same reaction, though perhaps to a lesser degree, to 
similar cases that nonetheless do not seem to involve undermined responsibility.  Take a 
case of manipulation as found in Shakespeare’s Othello.  Iago manipulates Othello into 
believing that Desdemona has been unfaithful, and, in a grossly simplified summary, 
Othello kills Desdemona.  Many who have read the play no doubt revolt at Iago’s role in 
the affair.  He is the mastermind behind the plot, and many of the events transpire as they 
do due to his actions, shaping others’ beliefs through deception and stoking their desires.  
Still, it strains me to believe that Othello isn’t responsible for Desdemona’s death.  
Though he is in error about his reasons for killing her, he kills Desdemona intentionally, 
in full awareness.  It is his actions that lead most directly to her death, and while he’s 
been fed false information, he brings about her death by way of action that would in all 
other circumstances be the paradigm for responsible action. 
 Now, it seems to me there are two likely objections to my drawing this parallel.  
The first objection is that even if we grant Othello is responsible for Desdemona’s death, 
he is only partially responsible.  After all, he and Iago share the responsibility for her 
death.  The picture such a claim as this makes is that there is some amount of 
responsibility available for the outcome in question, to be apportioned out to those who 
took part in the plot. 
 But this doesn’t seem right.  After all, we might widen our gaze to include all 
those characters (such as Roderigo) that joined in Iago’s scheme and those who were 
unwitting accessories (perhaps like Emilia).182  But the more people we add to the story 
does not reduce the responsibility apportioned to any one of them.  Just as a bank robbery 
                                               
182 For those who aren’t familiar with the play, Roderigo enlists Iago’s help to win Desdemona’s heart, and 




could be committed by a team of seven or seventy people, but we don’t suppose that one 
of the seven is more responsible than one of the seventy, we shouldn’t think that 
Othello’s responsibility diminishes just because Iago is implicated.183  For one thing, 
neither the bank robbers nor Othello seem any less blameworthy, no matter the number of 
people added to the story.  Moreover, while Iago certainly contributes to the beliefs and 
desires Othello acts on in killing her, it would seem that her death is primarily Othello’s 
doing. 
 The second objection picks up on this line of thinking.  It suggests that while her 
death may be primarily Othello’s doing, Iago nonetheless plays a crucial role.  Without 
his interference, Othello would likely not have come to believe Desdemona was having 
an affair.  So, without Iago’s meddling, Othello would likely not have killed her.  So, 
Othello’s killing of Desdemona is less his doing than had he come to have the same 
beliefs of his own accord (whether these were true or not). 
 But again, this doesn’t seem right.  For suppose that Sasha came to her new 
vegetarian beliefs by way of argument by Sean.  He wanted her to “see the light” 
regarding respecting animals, and he persuaded her through meticulous and creative 
argumentation.  In fact, he wanted her to stop eating meat, and this why he said the things 
he said.184  Her selection of a vegetarian offering and her next meal is her doing, but we 
might plausibly insist that it is partially Sean’s doing as well.  We can, if necessary, 
further suppose that he went out of his way to convince her, providing her with 
documentation about food animal raising practices and the like.  Despite all his work, 
                                               
183 Frankfurt makes a similar claim about aggregation in Frankfurt [1971].  My thanks again to Manuel 
Vargas for bringing this to my attention. 
184 I actually think it is immaterial whether or not Sean’s argument is sound, and not just simply valid.  
Even so, we can proceed here under the assumption that his argument was both valid and sound. 
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however, and even if he is partly responsible for her vegetarian selection, I don’t think 
this in any way diminishes Sasha’s responsibility for the selection. 
 In fact, I think the better answer is that Sean is partly responsible for how Sasha 
is.  He is partly responsible for her beliefs about meat eating.  After all, he shone a new 
light on them through documentation and rational argument.  Similarly, Iago is partly 
responsible for how Othello is.  And, I think, this is clearest in Donny case.  The 
neuroscientist is largely responsible for how Donny is; probably entirely responsible for 
how he is regarding opera.  In all these cases, however, I still think that the agent in 
question is responsible for the relevant outcome, even if we can also implicate another.  
What seems to distinguish Donny’s case is not that there is another agent (the 
neuroscientist) implicated in his psychological change, but the way in which the 
neuroscientist brings about the change.  In other words, it is the deviance from our 





SASHA’S BELIEFS ARE CHANGED through rational argument and new evidence.  We change 
our beliefs often enough by such a process.  It is well within the norm for psychological 
revision.  But neuronal alteration stands far outside the norm.  This is what makes 
Donny’s case different.  He is psychologically altered, in ways similar to Sasha and 
Othello, but his manipulation seems much worse, I submit, because it bypasses the usual 
route to such changes.  Donny is unaware of how this change comes place, whereas both 
Sasha and Othello can explain at least what new evidence they were given and why it 
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changed their minds.  The picture we get in their cases is one in which the manipulating 
(or persuading)185 agent submits evidence for the other’s consideration.  So it’s up to 
Sasha and Othello whether to entertain the new evidence, and then it’s up to them 
whether or not to revise their beliefs accordingly.  The neuroscientist, on the other hand, 
directly alters Donny’s brain, and he doesn’t get to consider anything.  In Donny’s case 
we’re more likely to say he’s been used or violated, in large part because of this 
bypassing. 
 Still, I’m not sure that bypassing is sufficient for undermining his responsibility.  
Let’s assume that the neuroscientist is responsible for the way Donny is.  This I think is a 
common explanation to (at least virtually) all cases of manipulation of the sort we’re 
interested in here.  Granting that assumption, is the fact that this change resulted from 
bypassing the normal conscious routes to belief revision sufficient for undermining 
Donny’s responsibility for his donation?  I don’t think so.  I think bypassing of this sort is 
only worrisome if we retain an implausible notion of our conscious belief revision. 
 Sasha is supposed to be a case of non-bypassed belief revision.  She comes to 
rethink her position on eating meat, and changes her mind, believing now that it is 
immoral.  Similarly, Donna used to hate the opera, believing it to be stuffy and boring, 
but now she likes it very much.  She now believes that it is artistically inspiring and 
compellingly dramatic.  She too is an example of non-bypassed belief revision.  Now, in 
order for it to be the bypassing that undermines Donny’s responsibility, it isn’t enough to 
simply be able to draw a line between his case and theirs.  One also needs to show that 
the line distinguishes his case in an important and interesting respect from the standpoint 
                                               
185 I use persuasion to talk of Sasha cases, where we don’t typically think Sean does anything untoward in 
convincing her.  I think the differences between manipulation and persuasion are interesting and merit 
additional discussion, but I won’t pursue them further here. 
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of belief formation and revision.  In particular, it seems that the standard cases appeal to 
the notion of the agent having control over his attitude revision, and that it is precisely 
this control that Donny lacks. 
 I grant that we can distinguish between Donny’s case, on the one hand, and Sasha 
and Donna’s case on the other.  Donny cannot explain how his change in attitudes can 
about, whereas the women can.  And this feature seems to show Donny’s case to be non-
standard, since we usually can explain what led us to change our minds.  But I don’t think 
this feature makes Donny’s case different enough.  I suggested earlier that the picture we 
get of standard cases like Sasha’s and Donna’s is one where the agent is given evidence 
to consider and then it’s up to them whether to accept it and revise their beliefs 
accordingly, or reject the evidence altogether.  Such a picture makes it seem that it’s up to 
us whether or not to change our attitudes.  But I’m skeptical that much of our mental life 
is so directly under our control.  My position is consistent with the claim that we can 
sometimes believe at will, so long as most of our beliefs and other mental attitudes are 
not under our control in this way.186 
 When I have evidence that, say, there’s a computer screen in front of me when I 
can see it there, I cannot help but believe that it is there (barring other beliefs that might 
weaken such visual evidence).  Similarly, if I am given a valid bit of reasoning, whose 
premises I believe to be true, I cannot help but accept the conclusion.  I may resist the 
conclusion; I may look for flaws in the argument, or try to find reasons against accepting 
                                               
186 There is a vast literature on believing at will, most of the discussions center on its very possibility.  
While I’m skeptical of such a claim, it is not my focus here, nor do I require believing at will to be 
impossible in order to mount my objection.  Rather, it just has to be the case that we rarely do believe at 
will; specifically, that Donna and Sasha do not believe at will, but rather in a significant sense, do so 
involuntarily (though the sense in which this is so will obviously differ from my use of involuntary actions 
throughout this dissertation).  For some of the relevant arguments on the possibility of believing at will, see 
Williams [1973]; Naylor [1985]; and Winters [1979].  For a discussion of the possibility of desiring at will, 
see Shemmer [2004]. 
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it, or insist that it isn’t true.  But all of these are efforts on my part to find a way so as not 
to believe it.  By hypothesis, Sasha takes the argument for vegetarianism to be sound.  
She, I submit, cannot but accept the conclusion.  She is forced by rational pressure to do 
so.  I suppose we might allow that she can fail to accept the conclusion, but only on pain 
of gross irrationality.  We would think something has gone seriously wrong with her 
reason, or that she is being disingenuous.  And in most cases of apparent irrationality, I 
suspect that Sasha would still believe the conclusion reluctantly, though she might fail to 
assent to its truth.  But no one would deny that we have significant control over our 
speech acts. 
 I don’t think Sasha can but believe in the conclusion that eating meat is immoral.  
Nor do I think that she can choose whether or not to accept each premise of the argument.  
She can perhaps choose to weight the evidence in favor of each premise to some degree.  
As Naylor notes, we can “rethink our assumptions about what counts as evidence.”187  
And so perhaps it is possible to deceive ourselves into believing some proposition by 
managing the evidence for that proposition in various ways.  But this isn’t how things 
usually go.  In standard cases, we find ourselves presented with evidence that either 
supports the proposition or doesn’t, and we find ourselves either compelled to accept it or 
unconvinced. 
 Donna comes to her attitudes about opera even more gradually than does Sasha.  
But even here, I don’t think she exerts that much control.  Remember she first 
reencounters the opera because she’s taken there on a date.  She certainly chose to go out 
on the date; but once we examine the reasons many of us choose who we date, I think we 
find a laundry list of factors typically outside our control.  We can embellish Donna’s 
                                               
187 Naylor [1985], p.434. 
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story to observe the point.  She is typically attracted to men who dress a certain way, who 
drive a certain type of car.  She isn’t sure why this is the case, and she has often thought 
that it might be better to widen her scope.  She’s even endeavored in this direction, 
agreeing to dates from guys she isn’t attracted to in order to try and combat her bias.  She 
has at times lamented her “type” and wished it were different.  Nevertheless, she is often 
attracted to guys of a certain type, and it is just such a guy who takes her to the opera.  As 
he drives her to the opera house, Donna is dreading the evening.  (Remember, at this 
point she still hates the opera, and she is sure she’s going to have a terrible time).  
Though her date is regaling her with the many finer points of operas (as he considers 
himself quite the aficionado), she is highly skeptical (at least to herself).  As they are led 
to their seats, she is imagining all the ways she can cut the night short, to try and find 
ways to get out of having to withstand the entire opera.  But as the performance begins, 
she is amazed.  Much to her chagrin, she finds herself enthralled by the costumes and the 
sets, the voices are rich and impassioned, and the score is truly outstanding.  Throughout 
the performance, she is honestly surprised to be having such a good time.  In the car ride 
after the performance, she admits as much to her date, and speaks freely about how she 
had previously disliked the opera. 
 Now Donna does take active steps to encourage her newfound appreciation for 
opera.  She goes to the library and gets books to further her understanding, she buys 
recordings of famous operas, and she attends more live performances.  But the ways in 
which the performances and recordings strike her are not really under her control.  After 
all, she was planning to have a bad time on her opera date.  And we can imagine that the 
second time she goes she again expects to have a bad time, thinking the last experience to 
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be a fluke.  But she is surprised again to thoroughly enjoy herself.  And her experiences 
at these performances contribute significantly to her changing her attitudes toward the 
opera.  They are, I think, the most significant contributing factor. 
 I think Donna’s case helps illustrate that while one can attempt to direct one’s 
attitudes, or to take steps to modify or limit their influence, especially when one considers 
them to be problematic (as in the case of certain prejudices), we do not have the sort of 
control over our attitudes we might think we have.188  And if we don’t have such control, 
we might not think that in cases in which the agent’s reflective consciousness is bypassed 
responsibility is undermined.  We can still distinguish between Sasha and Donna, on the 
one hand, and Donny, on the other.  Donny’s brain is manipulated by the neuroscientist, 
and he can’t explain how his new attitudes came to be.  Nevertheless, it doesn’t seem as 
though he has radically less control over his attitudes than Sasha and Donna, because it 
isn’t clear that they have much control over theirs. 
 Obviously, this doesn’t mean the differences in Donny’s case aren’t important.  
Quite the contrary.  The neuroscientist violates Donny in a very serious manner, changing 
core aspects of his personality.  Donny seems a different person, and this result was 
brought about by the neuroscientist’s plan.  The neuroscientist is responsible for the way 
Donny is, for “messing around” with his psychological set, for invading his brain to make 
him into a lover of opera.  Sasha’s interlocutor and Donna’s date are not invasive at all.  
What the neuroscientist did is unimaginable, horribly wrong, and worthy of our harshest 
reprisals.  Donny has been changed, without his consent or knowledge, into someone who 
holds attitudes radically opposed to those he had before.  We can condemn such 
                                               
188 Again, this doesn’t support the stronger claim that it is impossible to believe at will, or to directly 
influence our attitudes.  I only claim that we don’t typically revise our attitudes with such control. 
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alterations, even in cases in which the newly acquired attitudes are superior to those 
previously held; for example, if the neuroscientist had changed a racial bigot into a more 
tolerant individual.  As I mentioned above, the role of the Intervening Immune Agent 
plays a significant role in how we see Donny’s case.  But even though he bypasses the 
usual routes to attitudes adjustment, I don’t think that these routes matter in 
distinguishing Donny from Sasha and Donna in terms of their responsibility for their 
donations. 
 
 I think that even bypassing fails to show why Donny isn’t responsible for his 
donation.  Donna and Sasha come by their new attitudes in the standard manner, but this 
way seems to lack significant control on their parts, just as in Donny’s case.  While there 
are still important differences between the cases, I think the differences trade on features 
irrelevant to Donny’s responsibility for his donation to the opera company.  Donny’s case 
is unfortunate; it implies that it is possible that some devious agent could change us so as 
to make us responsible for what he wanted us to do.  I think this is right, partly because in 
persuasion and non-undermining manipulation cases the same general story is true, and 
partly because I think this feature supports why we think so badly of the neuroscientist. 
 While the neuroscientist is likely responsible for how Donny is, Donny is 
responsible for what he does.  Those who know him will likely think him a significantly 
different person because his change is so radical.  His sudden reversal will strike them as 
strange, but this is true in cases of attitude revisions that don’t undermine responsibility.  
The neuroscientist’s involvement as an Intervening Immune Agent skews our intuitions, 
since he plausibly shares responsibility for Donny’s actions by altering Donny with the 
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intention of bringing those outcomes about.  He is also primarily responsible for how 
Donny is psychologically.  But so are the intervening agents in Sasha and Othello’s cases.  
Indeed, not even the fact that the neuroscientist’s meddling deviates from standard cases 
by bypassing Donny’s psychology seems to establish the necessary difference. 
 I conclude that Overnight Opera Lover as a case of manipulation fails to establish 
that Donny’s responsibility for his donation is undermined, and thus fails to threaten my 
conditions for responsibility as jointly sufficient.  But it is an important example 
nonetheless.  It shows that we have less control than we might have thought over our 
psychological sets, and that those who influence those sets can play an important role in 
what we ultimately do.  Still, I do not think that Overnight Opera Lover forces us to 
abandon my conditions on responsibility.  Perhaps Zygote Zapper can do better. 
 
5.3.3. Zygote Zapper 
RECALL THE DETAILS of the case: 
 
Zygote Zapper:  Donna loves the opera just as before.  Additionally, an opera 
loving geneticist wants to ensure that his local opera company 
continues to prosper in the future, so he manipulates a particular 
zygote such that on June 1st, 30 years from now, the individual the 
zygote becomes will donate $1,000 to the company.  The 
geneticist, too, has studied Donna to find out why she donates 
money to the opera.  So he arranges the zygotes genetic code so as 
to produce Donna’s psychological “match” 30 years from now.  
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Sure enough, in 30 years, the zygote, now a man named Danny, 
donates $1,000 to his local opera company.189 
 
We are supposed to find that Danny isn’t responsible for his donation, as a result of the 
geneticist’s manipulation.  In many ways, Danny’s case is harder to diagnose than 
Donny’s.  It’s more difficult, I think, to specify how he comes to love the opera, since I, 
at least, am fuzzy on just how genetic manipulation can lead to a specific action 30 years 
later.  Obviously, operating in the background is some notion of determinism, that given 
the facts as some point in time and the laws of nature, every truth after that point in time 
is guaranteed.  This is necessary for the argument, since it must be the case that Danny 
necessarily comes to have the same psychological set as Donna, simply as a result of his 
genes.  We needn’t assume, however, that Danny was determined to donate the money, 
though this point will not affect the argument, I think, nor my rebuttal. 
 My response is in many ways more simple than in the previous section.  First, I do 
not think that the suddenness feature or bypassing feature is present in this case.  Danny 
comes to love the opera at least as gradually as Donna does, in fact we might imagine he 
does so in a very similar way.  So similar, in fact, that his conscious mind isn’t bypassed 
in the course of his attitudes being revised.  So it must be other features of this case that 
are doing the work.  I suspect it is the IIA feature, which leads me to the second reason 
my response is shorter here.  I will not repeat my concerns about the Intervening Immune 
Agent.  I will simply note at the outset that the geneticist seeks to secure a donation for 
the opera company through his manipulation of Danny.  This is all I need to draw out 
                                               
189 If the reader finds it implausible to suppose that a geneticist could be able to manipulate genes so as to 
guarantee a particular result, the reader is free to alter the example, for instance, so that instead of a 
geneticist, it is an all-knowing, all-powerful being that does the genetic manipulation. 
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why the geneticist’s inclusion is problematic if the thought experiment is to succeed.  I do 
not think that the geneticist’s intervention should lead us to think Danny’s responsibility 
is undermined unless we already think that incompatibilism is true.  That is, when 
properly diagnosed, Zygote Zapper should persuade only those who are antecedently 
committed to incompatibilism.  But incompatibilists do not need to Zygote Zapper; they 
believe Danny is not responsible anyhow.  So Zygote Zapper does little to convince those 
who are not already convinced of its conclusion.  To put it another way, Zygote Zapper is 
only as convincing as our incompatibilist intuitions are.  To the extent that one rejects 
incompatibilist intuitions, Zygote Zapper fails. 
 
 I think the most salient feature of Danny’s case, the one the tugs at our intuitions 
the most, is that Danny’s life seems preplanned by the geneticist.  A major (we may 
suppose) facet of his life, his love of opera, was “implanted” in him in the genetic level.  
He seems to be a product of genetic tampering, not the “source” of his passions or the 
decider of what he values.  I’ve already suggested in my discussion of Overnight Opera 
Lover that our evaluations of the amount of control we have over deciding such things is 
likely over-inflated; nonetheless, there is something true about the claim that Danny’s life 
is unduly influenced by the geneticist.  The geneticist determines a significant fact about 
Danny, his love of opera, and does so for specific ends.  The geneticist loves the opera 
and wants to secure its future support, and so he uses Danny, without Danny’s knowledge 
or consent, to help achieve that aim.190 
                                               
190 The geneticist could have very different aims, of course.  He could have engineered Danny “on a 
whim,” or because he likes the idea of making creatures who do very specific things.  These points do not 
affect the example, the argument, or my reply. 
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 While the manner of the manipulation is most definitely different, Danny’s case 
seems sufficiently similar to Othello’s.  Indeed, the geneticist manipulates the beliefs, 
desires, and values that Danny has to the same effect as Iago manipulates Othello’s.  The 
way in which he does it is different, but the result is the same.  And so too, I think, are 
many of our reactions to the case.  The geneticist is responsible for how Danny is 
psychologically, and perhaps partially responsible for the donation.  He is also guilty of 
manipulation, though not of the deceptive sort Iago is.  But similar to the neuroscientist in 
Donny’s case, the geneticist tampers with features central to Danny (his genes), and 
violates him in a most egregious manner.  And as was the case with Donny, while I think 
this is more than enough to put the geneticist on the hook for Danny’s being the way he is 
(at least with respect to his love of opera) and partially for what Danny does, it does not 
get Danny off the hook for what Danny does.  This line of response marshals the same 
resources as in the previous section.  I will rehearse this line of response no further. 
 Instead, I want to consider a slightly different response, though it admittedly 
builds off of my comments about the Intervening Immune Agent.  Let’s compare Danny 
to Donna.  Both come to love the opera.  Both were created with a particular genetic 
makeup, and both have been subject to the same laws of nature.  Let’s also assume that 
determinism is true.191  If that’s the case, then there is even less difference between 
Danny and Donna.  Both have genetic makeups that guarantee they’ll come to love the 
opera, and donate money to their local opera companies.  If this is the case, then only the 
                                               
191 Only libertarians, incompatibilists that believe determinism is false, will balk at this assumption.  But 
recall (from the Introduction chapter) that I don’t consider libertarianism much in this dissertation because 
its conditions on responsibility, whatever they are, will be stronger than those I lay out here.  As such, I 
think their arguments will have to be tougher to demonstrate and likely subject to more objections than 




role of the geneticist can make a difference.  Now there are two things to say.  First, if 
determinism is true, than his genetic manipulation of Danny is also determined by the 
way he is (as I’m treating it here, the past) and the laws of nature.  This is a complicating 
wrinkle that I think can be ignored.  Second, if I’m right that the mere inclusion of the 
geneticist does not suffice to undermine Danny’s responsibility, then we can effectively 
eliminate him from the scenario.  But if we do that, then Danny’s situation looks identical 
to Donna’s.  Both are born with a certain genetic makeup, grow to love the opera, and 
donate $1,000 dollars as a result.  But if Donna’s case doesn’t arouse our incompatibilist 
intuitions, I don’t think that Danny’s case should.  The geneticist’s role is inconsequential 
to Danny’s responsibility, and thus his responsibility is only undermined if his action’s 
being determined undermines responsibility.  One is only committed to this claim, 
however, if one thinks incompatibilism is true.192  We can emphasize this point by 
tweaking Danny’s case just a bit.  Suppose that instead of a geneticist (or supreme being) 
manipulating his genes, suppose a random photon passes through the zygote that 
becomes Danny, altering his genes in a way that determines he will donate the money.  
Here, I think, we should be much less inclined to judge his responsibility undermined, 
for, if determinism is true, there will always be some “just so” story for why someone did 
something.  More to our purposes here, Donna may have come to love the opera in part 
because of circumstances in utero that determined she would be that way.  But if 
compatibilists are not worried about causal determinism independent of manipulation 
arguments, I see no reason they should be within such arguments. 
                                               
192 Mele makes the same observation.  See Mele [2006], pp. 189-192.  But he suggests a better measure of 
intuitions would be to see what “reflective agnostics,” people who have thought long and hard about 
responsibility but remain agnostic about the correct position to take, think about zygote manipulation cases.  




 Compatibilists, therefore, need not worry about manipulation arguments of 
Zygote Zapper’s type.  These arguments themselves require the truth of incompatibililsm 
in order to establish undermined responsibility.  Moreover, as a general rule, we 
shouldn’t rely on arguments about when responsibility is undermined that depend upon 
assuming the conditions on when responsibility is undermined.  In other words, Zygote 
Zapper and its ilk only succeed if we already think incompatibilism is true; they don’t 
give us additional reasons for its adoption.  By itself, Zygote Zapper can’t establish 
undermined responsibility in Danny’s case, thus it too fails to show that the set of my 
conditions is insufficient. 
 
5.3.4. Pereboom’s Four-Case Argument 
DERK PEREBOOM HAS given an abductive argument for incompatibilism that involves 
responsibility-undermining manipulation.193  The general structure of the argument is as 
follows: Pereboom purports to give us a case of responsibility-undermining manipulation, 
but in which the agent otherwise satisfies any compatibilist conditions on responsibility 
you like.  Next, he gives us a diagnosis of why the manipulation undermines 
responsibility.  It is because the agent’s action was causally determined by factors beyond 
his control.  But Pereboom goes further.  He then present two further cases in which he 
thinks there is responsibility-undermining manipulation, but of a weaker sort than in the 
first case, and in which, again, the agent satisfies all extant compatibilist conditions on 
responsibility.  He suggests that it is causal determinism doing the undermining work in 
these cases too.  Pereboom concludes his argument with a normal case of action in a 
                                               
193 The latest presentation of this argument, and some illuminating discussion of it, can be found in Fischer, 
et al. [2007], esp. pp. 93-101. 
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deterministic world, and challenges the compatibilist to distinguish between this case and 
at least one of the previous three.  If the compatibilist cannot, Pereboom claims, than it 
would seem that responsibility really is incompatible with determinism.  If determinism 
really is the best explanation for the undermined responsibility in the cases of 
manipulation, then we can generalize from these cases to an incompatibilist conclusion: 
determinism must undermine responsibility everywhere. 
 I don’t think causal determinism is the best explanation for the intuition that the 
agent in the manipulation cases is not responsible.  Nor do I think that Pereboom’s 
generalization strategy works here.  I’ll elaborate on both these point shortly.  First, I 
want to briefly present the four cases.194  In each case, Prof. Plum decides to attack Ms. 
White with the intention of severely injuring her for some personal gain.  He does so 
satisfying all compatibilist conditions on responsibility.  His action is caused by desires 
that flow from a stable character (Hume), the desire conforms with his higher-order 
desires (Frankfurt), and he is receptive and reactive to the relevant pattern of moral 
reasons (Fischer & Ravizza).195 
 
Case 1: Professor Plum was created by neuroscientists, who can directly 
manipulate him by radio-like technology.  They manipulate him to 
                                               
194 I’ve modified the cases only slightly from Pereboom’s presentation and the details I’ve changed do not 
affect the argument at all.  Instead of Plum killing White, as in Pereboom’s examples, in my cases Plum 
severely beats White, but White survives.  I find it unfortunate that so many examples in the responsibility 
literature involve agents killing each other.  No doubt this is to invoke the strong moral judgments we have 
when faced with murder.  Nevertheless, I don’t think our judgments are much weaker when it comes to 
aggravated assaults.  And so I’ve taken pains throughout this dissertation to limit my examples to cases of 
severe harm, but short of death, wherever possible.  I do the same here. 
195 Pereboom takes pain to insure that Plum meets all the relevant compatibilist criteria in his cases, and 
even if he doesn’t, I’m confident similar cases could be constructed that did.  I’ll discuss this aspect of the 
argument no further. 
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reason in a particular way so as to bring about his particular desires, 
which in turn cause him to attack and injure White. 
 
Case 2: Plum is like ordinary humans, except neuroscientists programmed 
him at birth to weigh and act on reasons in an extremely egoistic way.  
As a result, in his current situation, he is causally determined to 
deliberate in the particular way he does, with the determined 
consequence being his attacking and injuring White. 
 
Case 3: Plum is like ordinary humans, except he was conditioned from birth 
by rigorous training practices of his community to be incredibly 
egoistic in his reasoning.  He was too young to prevent or alter this 
training from determining his egoistic character, which now 
determines him to reason egoistically, and causes him to attack and 
injure White. 
 
Case 4: Determinism is true, and every event is completely causally 
determined.  Plum is an ordinary human, raised in normal 
circumstances, who is extremely egoistic.  He reasons normally and 
attacks and injures White. 
 
With these cases before us, Pereboom claims that it is Plum’s action being causally 
determined by factors outside his control in Case 1 that undermines his responsibility.  
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Likewise, it is his being causally determined in Cases 2 & 3 that undermine responsibility 
there, and so in Case 4, since there is no relevant difference between it and Case 3, 
responsibility must be undermined as well.  Thus, responsibility is in fact incompatible 
with determinism. 
 I disagree.  First, I want to challenge Pereboom’s abductive claim that it is 
determinism doing the undermining work.  As Mele has noted,196 if one thinks that 
Plum’s responsibility is undermined in Cases 1-3, this thought is unlikely to change if the 
manipulation has only a 99% chance of success.  So it seems unlikely that it is 
determinism doing the work, since intuitions are likely to be preserved even in 
indeterministic scenarios.  Moreover, as I have argued above, there are a number of other 
plausible considerations that may be doing work in generating judgments of undermined 
responsibility in manipulation cases.  And these considerations seem to be present in 
Pereboom’s cases as well.  Pereboom’s abductive move seems to me to fail as a result, 
and the generalization to Case 4 fails as well. 
 Second, however, I think there’s a larger problem with Pereboom’s strategy.  
Pereboom admits that he’s giving a generalization argument.  So, he claims that here’s a 
case of undermined responsibility (the neurological manipulation in Case 1), and that it is 
such a case because of causal determinism (his abductive move).  Well, now, if that is the 
right diagnosis, then of course incompatibilism follows.  But that’s not how 
generalization arguments are supposed to work.197  They are supposed to work by 
pointing to an independent condition that would globally obtain if causal determinism 
                                               
196 Mele [2006], pp. 138-144. 
197 For a wonderful discussion of generalization arguments, see Wallace [1994]. 
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were true.198  If one’s purported condition was “causal determinism,” the structure of the 
generalization argument falls flat, especially because compatibilists are under no pull to 
accept it as the explanatory condition in the first place.  The force of generalization 
arguments is that we can generalize from an uncontroversial undermining feature (not a 
case) to a claim that determinism would globally instantiate such a feature.  If 
determinism were true, such arguments conclude, then the all of our actions would have 
this uncontroversial (or at least strongly supported) undermining feature as well.  
Pereboom’s argument doesn’t do this, instead it argues that if causal determinism 
undermines responsibility in a given case, it does so in all other cases.  But this isn’t a 
terribly impressive argument, especially against compatibilists, since they can simply 
reject the antecedent.  This is much easier to do in Pereboom’s case, since the antecedent 
is precisely what the disagreement between the two camps is about.  And Pereboom has 
given us no other reason other than intuition-pumping supporting the claim that it’s 
causal determinism doing the work (and Mele’s objection has severely weakened the 
plausibility of this claim).  Compatibilists are likely to make different judgments anyhow, 
so Pereboom’s Four-Case Argument does nothing to advance the dialectic.  
Compatibilists are always free (pardon the pun) to argue the other way, claiming that 
Plum is responsible in Case 4, so he is responsible all the way back to Case 1.199  This is 
my preferred position since I don’t think manipulation undermines responsibility.  But, 
more importantly, Compatibilists are not forced to do this, since it is up to them to give a 
                                               
198 This is the move made by incompatibilists like van Inwagen, who argue that if determinism were true, 
we wouldn’t have the ability to do otherwise.  Most indirect arguments for incompatibilism are 
generalization arguments. 
199 Indeed, we might think there is a line that divides Case 1 from the others.  For instance, we might think 
that the continuous and invasive control of Plum by the neuroscientists at each and every step render Plum 
a non-agent.  And we might think that he is at least an agent in the other three cases.  In a personal 
exchange, Mele has suggested the same point to me. 
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different explanation for why manipulation of the sort involved in Cases 1-3 undermines 
responsibility. 
 
 For these reasons, I prefer Mele’s manipulation arguments, since they are directed 
at compatibilists from an agnostic position, and argue that there is something about 
manipulation that requires compatibilists to revise their views (at least insofar as 
demanding the addition of a historical condition on responsibility).  I’ve shown why I 
think these arguments fail.  Thus, manipulation does not require any amendments of my 
conditions on responsibility. 
 
 
5.4. Ultimate Responsibility 
WE MIGHT THINK THAT responsibility for what we do depends on responsibility for how 
we are (mentally).  We might think that the reason Donny isn’t responsible for what he 
does is because he’s not responsible for the way he is (his beliefs, desires, values, etc.); 
the neuroscientist is responsible for that.  And we might further think that since what we 
do is in large part determined by how we are, then in order to be responsible for what we 
do we have to be responsible for how we are.  Robert Kane has argued that the lack of 
responsibility for how we are is the most significant lacuna in compatibilist accounts of 
responsibility.  Kane sees the compatibilist as failing to take seriously, as Bernard 
Berofsky puts it, “our deep-seated yearning to be the ultimate source of our own 
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natures.”200  Capturing this phenomenon, our sense of ourselves as ultimate sources, is 
what Kane calls the condition of Ultimate Responsibility (UR).201 
But some compatibilists seem to worry about “sourcehood” conditions on 
responsibility as well.  One way to understand Frankfurt’s discussion of a hierarchy of 
values is as an outline of what conditions would have to be met to be responsible for 
one’s values and therefore ultimately responsible for what one does.202  It would seem, 
then, that UR is not a point of interest peculiar to any one side of the traditional debate.  
Nevertheless, incompatibilists like Kane are unlikely to be satisfied with a compatibilist 
answer to sourcehood concerns.  They are likely to insist that compatibilist answers like 
Frankfurt’s, while they might capture something of what is important about “owning” our 
inner selves, they fail to capture fully the notion of agents as “ultimate” sources.  The 
disagreement, then, would hinge on how “ultimate” a source one must be of one’s nature 
in order to be responsible.  I focus here on Kane’s stronger worry, since it more directly 
constitutes an objection to my account. 
 To have UR, then, requires being responsible for how one is mentally.  But why 
should we require such a condition?  The thought is that what we are responsible for 
doing can be explained by references to our beliefs and desires (and other mental states).  
These explain why we do what we do.  But if these mental states weren’t in some 
important way “up to us,” then we would fail to exercise the appropriate control over 
them.  They would seem to be “forced” upon us or “spawned” within us, and this would 
call into question our responsibility for them.  But if they form the impetus and grounding 
                                               
200 Berofsky [2000], p.135. 
201 Kane [1996], [2005]. 
202 See Frankfurt [1971].  My thanks to Manuel Vargas for directing me to this point. 
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for why we do the things we do, then this lack of responsibility for our thoughts seems to 
imply a lack of responsibility for what we do. 
 I think we are responsible for what we do (much of the time).  Moreover, I think 
we are responsible for how we are (much of the time).  Nevertheless, I don’t think either 
of these claims depends upon our being the “ultimate sources” of our action, in the way 
UR implies.  This section defends this claim.  I begin by laying out Kane’s view about 
UR and how agents might satisfy that condition.  Then I show why even his argument 
fails to capture much of what is intuitive about UR (4.1).  I then present Galen Strawson’s 
argument for the impossibility of UR (4.2).  Understanding this argument not only shows 
why “our deep-seated yearning” for UR may be just that, an unfounded desire, 
diagnosing why UR is impossible suggests a solution to the problem.  But both Kane and 
Strawson seem to agree that a view without UR is in some way impoverished as a result.  
I conclude by showing why my view (and, in principle, any view) isn’t worse for having 
failed to secure UR (4.3). 
 
5.4.1. Kane, UR, and Self-Forming Actions 
KANE FACES A PROBLEM.  He believes that what we do is largely dependent on how we 
are, and he believes therefore that to be responsible for what we do requires being 
responsible for how we are.  Furthermore, he thinks that in order to be responsible for 
how we are it would have to be the case that we somehow made ourselves that way.  But 
this seems a difficult thing to do.  As I noted when criticizing manipulation arguments, it 
seems that much of what we think comes to be largely without our influence, at least 
without our conscious control, in stark opposition to what we usually think is required for 
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responsibility.  Nevertheless, Kane believes that we do make ourselves to be certain ways 
whenever we perform what he calls a self-forming action (SFA). 
 A self-forming action occurs when an agent is forced with a dilemmatic-type 
choice, one between two alternatives of seemingly equal weight. Consider one of Kane’s 
examples, that of a businesswoman who on her way to an important meeting sees a 
mugging taking place in an alley.203  She experiences an inner struggle between stopping 
and calling for help (her moral conscience) and attending the meeting (her career 
ambitions).  She resolves this struggle by turning back to help the victim. 
 Kane thinks that in such cases there is an indeterminate neurological struggle 
going on; what is essentially the physical manifestation of two separate psychological 
struggles.  The first is to decide whether or not to attend the meeting, where the reasons 
for helping the victim act as “thwarters” to a solution; the second is to decide whether or 
not to help the victim, where the reasons for attending the meeting act as the “thwarters.”  
Kane thinks that the businesswoman’s own efforts of will to solve these two questions are 
the cause for the struggle.  Her desire to advance her career prevents her desire to help 
from solving that decision, and vice versa.  So, Kane thinks there’s two processes going 
on, and that the results are indeterminate.  Moreover, Kane thinks, when she turns back to 
help the victim, her choice, the “winning out” of her desire to help, means she is 
responsible for helping and for being the sort of person who helps.204  In short, through 
self-forming actions an agent can come to be responsible for how they are with respect to 
                                               
203 Kane [1996], p.163-164. 
204 This is a simplification of the view.  Kane actually believes it takes an unspecified number (but more 
than one) of SFAs before an agent has free will.  But the picture above is intended to illustrate how it is that 
Kane thinks agents can come to be responsible for how they are. 
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the motive issuing in action.  Helping the victim, on Kane’s view, amounts to the 
businesswoman taking responsibility for her motive to help. 
 I must confess this strikes me as an odd account for the simple fact that it seems 
to mis-describe the phenomenology of such choices.  The businesswoman isn’t making 
two separate decisions; just the one, between helping and attending.  Of course, the 
reasons for each have different sources, but that seems beside the point.  Still, I’m willing 
to grant Kane his picture for my purposes here.205  Instead, I want to criticize a different 
point.  Let’s suppose Kane is right, and individuals can come to be responsible for how 
they are through engaging in SFAs.  The first remark is that it seems utterly plausible to 
think many people will not engage in any (or only a paltry few) SFAs in their lifetime.206  
An SFA requires an internal struggle, a conflict between two choices of equal weight.  
But we can easily imagine an individual who never faces such a conflict.  She is 
moderately reflective, but always comes to reaffirm the beliefs and worldviews she grew 
up with.  It’s not as if she puts such views to tough scrutiny, though, she merely considers 
in various cases whether she ought to do differently than those views suggest and the 
answer is always a resounding “no.”  Indeed, her overall view is also consistent, so it 
isn’t that circumstances are all that likely to produce a case in which her view itself 
contributes to conflict.  Perhaps she grew up a utilitarian, and seeks always to maximize 
the good, and, by chance, has never encountered an instance in which she was pulled by 
competing forces.  She has never engaged in sufficient SFAs in order to be responsible 
for how she is, but when she acts voluntarily, intentionally, and without mistake, she 
                                               
205 And, for all I know, the physical manifestation of that choice could fit Kane’s description. 
206 Petit and van Inwagen have debated the rarity of SFAs.  Here I obviously side with those thinking it 
likely many people would not experience enough to take responsibility for their mental lives on Kane’s 
view.  See Petit [2002] and van Inwagen [1989] for the respective positions.  My thanks again to Manuel 
Vargas for pointing me to this debate. 
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surely is responsible for the outcome she brings about.  So the first objection to Kane’s 
picture is that only some people end up responsible for how they are.  This is a rather 
unsatisfying picture.  Indeed, I would hazard to suggest that quite a lot of individuals 
don’t engage in SFAs in their lifetimes.  This is obviously an empirical matter, but given 
Kane’s characterization, I just don’t think it all that likely. 
 My second observation is that Kane’s view still doesn’t secure what he was after.  
UR rests on an agent being the “ultimate source” of what he does, and this, it is thought 
(intuitively, at least) requires being responsible for the ways in which one is (mentally) 
that issue in action.  But Kane’s picture doesn’t get us this.  All he is able to secure is 
responsibility for some of the mental states of some agents.  More specifically, he is able 
to show responsibility only for those mental states issuing in the outcomes of SFAs for 
those agents who engage in SFAs. 
And even in those cases that fit Kane’s model, it is hard to see how the sheer 
indeterminacy of the outcome is sufficient for rendering the individual responsible for the 
outcome.  Consider Kane’s businesswoman again.  Suppose she was raised by divorced 
parents.  Her mother always drilled a desire to compete and succeed into her.  Indeed, the 
businesswoman’s career ambitions are a direct result of her mother’s influence.  Her 
father, on the other hand, always sought to encourage his daughter to help others in 
whatever way she can whenever she can.  Indeed, the businesswoman’s desire to help the 
mugging victim is a direct result of her father’s direction.  Now, in the supposed case, the 
resolution of these two competing desires is indeterminate; we cannot settle ahead of time 
what she will do, which desire will “win out.”  But this fact alone doesn’t seem to get 
Kane what he’s after.  For if the businesswoman isn’t responsible for the competing 
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desires, it is hard to see, to my mind, how the sheer indeterminacy of their conflict 
generates such responsibility by itself. 
Kane may suggest that indeterminate neurological processes are the “source” 
we’re after when looking to ground UR, that the control one must exert to be responsible 
for his mental states is just to have competing mental states conflict indeterminately.  But 
it is hard to see why indeterminate neurological processes are “up to the agent” in the 
way UR was supposed to require.  We also might notice that the businesswoman’s 
motives in my elaborated example seem to have resulted in large measure due to her 
parents, and we might then ask why some indeterminacy in her brain makes her 
responsible for one of these motives.  This result, to my mind, falls far short of the 
original goal.  Perhaps Kane can still claim superiority over other views that don’t get as 
near to UR, but this is a concessionary conclusion at best.  But there is good reason for 
Kane’s failure.  UR is extremely difficult to attain.  The next subsection illustrates just 
why that is. 
 
5.4.2. Strawson on the Impossibility of UR 
GALEN STRAWSON HAS given an argument on the impossibility of UR.  His argument is 
helpful here for two reasons.  First, it shows why Kane’s project is likely doomed.  
Second, and more importantly, it helps draw out how the problem can be fixed.  While 
we may not be able to secure UR of the sort Kane seeks, we can establish a weaker sort 
of responsibility for how we are, and this may be all that we need.  I’ll consider this last 
point in the final subsection. 
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 Strawson’s Basic Argument is as follows:207 
1)  You do what you do because of how you are (mentally). 
2)  If you do what you do because of how you are, then to be ultimately 
responsible208 for what you do requires being ultimately responsible 
for how you are. 
But, 
3)  You cannot be ultimately responsible for how you are. 
So, 
4)  You cannot be ultimately responsible for what you do. 
 
This is the Basic Argument in its simplest form.  In defense of Premise 3, Strawson offers 
the following: 
5)  If you are ultimately responsible for how you are (call this 
psychological set X), it must be because you intentionally brought it 
about that you had X. 
6)  To have intentionally brought it about that you had X, however, 
requires a previous way that you were (call this psychological set Y, 
including, at least, an intention to make yourself have X). 
But, 
                                               
207 Strawson gives four separate versions of the “Basic Argument”, which he thinks are all restatements of 
each other, some with more detail than others.  I have summarized them into the version I present above, 
which I think effectively captures the main thrust of Strawson’s argument, and makes clear the place of the 
argument in my overall discussion.  For his four versions, see G. Strawson [2001], pp.443-449. 
208 Strawson actually uses the term “URD”, which means “ultimately truly and without qualification 
morally responsible and deserving of praise or blame or punishment or reward," where I have used the 
simplified UR (meaning “ultimately responsible”).  I will discuss the differences between these two uses in 
Section 4.3.  My simpler version is sufficient, I think, and does no disservice to Strawson’s argument. 
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7)  If you are ultimately responsible for having Y, it must be because you 
intentionally brought it about that you have Y. 
And, 
8)  To have brought it about that you had Y requires a previous way that 
you were (i.e., psychological set Z). 
9)  And so on… 
Strawson believes this to be an infinite regress that shows ultimate responsibility for how 
we are to be impossible, and thus that ultimate responsibility for what we do is also 
impossible, since the latter depends on the former. 
 Premise 2 captures what UR is all about; a yearning to be the “ultimate source” of 
our actions.  To be truly and deeply and most meaningfully responsible for what we do, 
we’d have to be responsible for how we are in a true, deep, and meaningful way.  The 
argument essentially relies on the conflict between two premises to get the regress going.  
Premise 2 sets out the conditional that demands responsibility for how one is, and 
Premise 5, which claims that responsibility for how one is requires some action on the 
agent’s part.  Thus, Kane thinks SFAs are something an agent can do to become 
responsible for at least some aspect of the way they are. 
 Interestingly, Strawson does not argue for either Premise 2 or Premise 5.  He 
takes them to either be obvious or self-evident upon reflection.209  For the moment, I’ll 
grant Strawson these assumptions.  Notice that this is all it takes to generate the regress.  
If we have to do something to be a certain way, and to bear a certain relation to what we 
do requires bearing that relation to the way we are, the regress immediately follows.  For 
every way we might be that could bear the relation, we’ll always have to look for what 
                                               
209 See G. Strawson [2001], p.443-446. 
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we did to get that way, which in turn will suggest a new way we are.  To specify this a 
bit: for each motive we might be responsible for, we’ll always have to look for what we 
did to come to be responsible for it, and that action will suggest a new motive on which 
we acted.  The regress follows. 
 There are two interesting conclusions to take away from this.  The first concerns 
the prospects for UR.  Kane suggests that we have a “deep-seated yearning” to be the 
“ultimate source” of what we do.  This, he and others think, requires responsibility for 
how we are.  Strawson has extended that notion of deep responsibility to the way we are 
and shown that it would be impossible to achieve it.  But notice that it seems that not only 
could humans as we know them never be achieve UR, few beings could.  At least, it 
would be a mysterious sort of power to be able to manage UR, for it would require being 
responsible for how you are from the moment you are that way, and presumably from the 
moment of existence.  This looks more like a supernatural power than the sort of ability 
ordinary creatures might have.  Of course, this isn’t a knockdown argument against UR; 
perhaps agents do have special abilities.210  The conclusion to draw, I think, is that UR 
isn’t the sort of responsibility we should be looking for.  Indeed, our deep-seated 
yearning may be just that, an unfounded desire to be some sort of causa prima of 
ourselves (or at least a causa sui).211  This standard is plausibly too high for most beings, 
much less imperfect creatures such as ourselves, ones who often come to have beliefs and 
desires and thoughts quite inadvertently (or without conscious control).  Obviously, this 
is Strawson’s point: it would be impossible for us to be this way.  But far from leading us 
                                               
210 The literature on agent causation claims that agents are capable of a special sort of causation, one that 
grounds free will and responsibility.  For a summary of such views, see Clarke [2004], Section 3. 
211 One of the versions of Strawson’s Basic Argument turns on the notion of ultimate responsibility 
requiring us to be causa sui (meaning “the cause of itself”). 
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to the conclusion that UR is responsible, I should think it invites a certain skepticism that 
he’s described a notion of responsibility worth wanting. 
 The second interesting conclusion to take away concerns the prospects of 
rejecting of the regress’ two essential premises.  If we reject either that responsibility for 
what we do requires responsibility for how we are or that to be responsible for how we 
are requires that we do something to make ourselves that way, then we can avoid the 
regress.  We may not end up with UR, we won’t be the “ultimate source” of what we do, 
but that doesn’t mean such a view is worse off for it.  I think Premise 2 is likely flawed.  
But I will not argue against it here.212  I only need to present the case for rejecting one of 
the two premises, and I believe we already have some reason for rejecting Premise 5. 
 Premise 5 requires that we do something consciously to bring it about that we are 
a particular way in order to be responsible for being a particular way.  This is a natural 
thought.  The paradigm for responsibility is voluntary, intentional action.  So if we want 
the conditions on responsibility for how we are, why not just use the conditions on 
responsibility for what we do?  But there is a glaring asymmetry between these two 
phenomena, one we already uncovered in discussing manipulation arguments.  It doesn’t 
seem as if many of the thoughts we have we bring about advertently.  I’ve suggested that 
we virtually never have robust control over forming a belief, and I think this holds true of 
many of our other mental states.  But if this is true, it seems foolish to require that 
intentionality is necessary for responsibility for those states.  It would be a fool’s errand, 
as Strawson’s Basic Argument so starkly illustrates.  Instead of simply using our 
conditions on action for mental states, the more promising strategy would be to use our 
methodology for arriving at those conditions on action in the first place.  Recall that we 
                                               
212 For a critique of both premises, see Clarke [2005]. 
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looked to those considerations that seem to undermine responsibility (or blameworthiness 
and praiseworthiness).  Then we thought that perhaps each type of consideration suggests 
the absence a necessary condition on responsibility.  So to get the conditions on 
responsibility for what we do, we needed to look at the undermining factors in cases of 
action, and work our way back to conditions those considerations suggested were absent. 
 A similar methodology might work in the case of responsibility for how one is.  
The first thing we would note is that advertence doesn’t seem as if it would be required, 
for the very reasons we’ve already discussed.  Suppose Clyde is a bigot.  He hates 
minorities.  And suppose that he came to have this belief from his upbringing, coupled 
with a few bad experiences in his early teens.  A few times he’s sat down and reflected on 
whether he should be prejudiced and decided that the evidence is in favor of being that 
way.  Now, it seems to me that Clyde is surely blameworthy for his bigoted attitudes.  
But suppose Clyde has been reading up on his philosophy.  He knows of Strawson’s 
Basic Argument, and of the points I’ve made about manipulation arguments.  Clyde 
reasons that his coming to his racist attitudes weren’t really under his control.  At every 
step his was a captive to the way in which the situation struck him, and though he took 
steps to consider how he ought to be, the answer never seemed in doubt.  Still, Clyde is 
blameworthy for his attitudes.  His appeals to the inadvertence of his attitude acquisition 
stand as no defense.  And this suggests that advertence is not required. 
  What is required?  I’m not prepared to provide an extensive defense of any view 
here.  I’m not particularly committed to one. My preferred method would be to examine 
the considerations that would undermine our ascriptions of responsibility for mental 
states.  Such a task would be too lengthy for present purposes, however.  Instead, I’ll 
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offer a preliminary response, one that I think is natural, though I won’t explicitly defend 
it.  We can get a sense of the sort of view that might work by holding some sort of 
identification view.  Roughly, suppose A is responsible for attitude x so long as A 
identifies with x in some way suitably specified.  Obviously, much more would have to 
be said about what identifying amounts to, but so long as it wasn’t an action (and I see no 
reason to suppose the notion would have to be an action), then the regress no longer 
threatens.  Plus, I suspect that failure to identify with an attitude could be one of the few 
considerations that might actually undermine responsibility for that attitude.  Much more 
needs to be said in defense of such a view; I merely sketch it here in the hopes of 
suggesting a plausible way out of the regress. 
 Now, Strawson might suggest that inadvertence should undermine responsibility 
for mental states.  He might insist that responsibility for how we are should be the same 
sort of notion as responsibility for what we do, and we should expect the same conditions 
to govern both.  Thus, my examples of inadvertent belief only serve to further undercut 
confidence in responsibility.  I think the notion of responsibility for how we are is similar 
as the notion responsibility for what we do, but I think that they concern two radically 
different classes of objects: mental states on the one hand, actions and outcomes on the 
other.  Moreover, Strawson’s argument concerns only UR, not responsibility in any 
reasonable form, that is, of a sort that might serve a suitably explanatory theory.  If a 
theory can preserve a notion of responsibility that explains the core phenomena we’re 
concerned with, it is a small criticism that it doesn’t explain everything one might be 
interested in.  So, evaluation of this concern would then rest on evaluating whether UR 
represents a core phenomenon worth explaining, or perhaps is not so central after all. 
 
 194 
The worry remaining, then, is that in avoiding the regress we’ve been forced to 
weaken our notion of responsibility such that we no longer get UR.  If so, Kane may be 
correct in thinking that a view such as mine fails to capture an important and compelling 
phenomenon of our reflections about responsibility.  Section 4.3 addresses and rejects the 
concern that a view such as mine is impoverished as a result. 
 
5.4.3. Ultimate Responsibility vs. Responsibility 
IN GENERAL, I THINK, compatibilists are likely to be confused about the desire to be the 
“ultimate sources” of our actions.  Once we fill out a bit what it would take to be an 
ultimate source, it looks like perhaps such a notion requires the sort of “panicky 
metaphysics” compatibilists are traditionally wary of, in part because it suggests that 
agents have mysterious powers.  If so, it’s hard to take seriously failing to win UR.  But 
this isn’t a victory for incompatibilists or impossibilists213 if it turns out UR isn’t worth 
having.  This would suggest that it is the wrong notion to be after in the first place, rather 
than highlighting a deficiency of a particular type of view. 
 It is all too likely that much of what determines how we are is beyond our control.  
Our genes and other biological factors no doubt contribute, as do social and 
environmental factors, especially as we develop into adults.  So it should be no surprise 
that we would have difficulty in establishing ourselves as the “ultimate sources” of our 
actions.  But we can still be the sources of our actions, and we can still be responsible for 
how we are and for what we do, even if it isn’t for the same reasons in both cases. 
                                               
213 Impossibilists hold that responsibility (specified in some way) is impossible.  One can be an 
impossibililst for a variety of reasons, but these normally do not turn on the thesis of determinism, since an 




 Moreover, I think that a picture of responsibility for how we are that rests on 
identification (of some sort or other) with our attitudes provides a natural and plausible 
story, one that meshes well with a story about responsibility for outcomes.  Despite the 
influence of genetic and environmental factors, most ordinary agents tend to come to 
identify with their psychological sets.  And in the same way that adults come to be 
responsible for more of what they do, so too do they become responsible for more of how 
they are.  We may like to change some tendencies (like being forgetful or being quick to 
anger), but we also often accept these tendencies as part of who we are.214  We also tend 
to be proud of certain attitudes and dispositions (e.g., kindness or adventurousness).  I 
think a theory is impoverished if it cannot account for these phenomena; that we can 
justifiably be proud of certain traits, and it is no mistake to see others as blameworthy for 
them.  I think this requires responsibility for how we are.  But it doesn’t require UR. 
 The previous section illustrated that the insistence that the conditions on how we 
are match those on what we do leads to a regress.  We can avoid the regress by giving 
different conditions on responsibility for how we are, and I’ve sketched a rudimentary 
position concerning an agent’s identification with his attitudes.  Such a view I think fits 
nicely with the conditions on responsibility for outcomes, and a natural story about how 
responsibility “increases” with maturity.  Though many more details need to be 
developed, there is, I think, a promising position here.215  Perhaps we would be better off 
if we could secure UR; it does seem that having such abilities would make us more 
powerful.  But it isn’t clear that failure to secure such powers impoverishes a theory.  
Instead, I think separate stories about responsibility for outcomes and responsibility for 
                                               
214 We are especially apt to do so in relation to those we care about, forgiving them their flaws, or even 
loving them flaws and all. 
215 Working out the details is a project that I’d like to work on after the dissertation. 
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how one is are sufficient for our purposes.  We can explain all the relevant phenomena 
save our “deep-seated yearning” for UR.  If we instead focus on ordinary agents, a 
plausible and natural picture of responsibility emerges, one that seems sufficient for 
creatures like us. 
 
 
5.5. Alternate Possibilities Condition 
THERE IS A FINAL CONDITION waiting in the wings, the veritable 800-lb. gorilla of 
proposed conditions necessary for responsibility.  Many have claimed that if the agent 
could not have done otherwise, then he isn’t responsible.  Therefore, responsibility 
requires that the agent have genuinely alternate possibilities (or, the ability to do 
otherwise).216  The literature (both for and against) concering this condition is vast, and 
full discussion of it would require much more attention than can be given it here.  
Authors like van Inwagen have urged that responsibility requires an ability to make some 
fact not be the case.  To be able to do otherwise then break a vase, I must have the power 
to make it such that the vase doesn’t break (under the present circumstances).  Some, 
most notably Frankfurt, have argued that agents can be responsible even if they couldn’t 
have done otherwise than they did.  And some authors, most notably Fischer & Ravizza, 
hold that even though one can be responsible without alternate possibilities, one cannot 
have free will.  Sorting through these various approaches, the slightly different construal 
                                               
216 Historically, classical compatibilists have argued that an agent could have done otherwise if he would 
have done otherwise had he wanted to do so.  This is known as the ‘conditional analysis.’  Without 
digressing to the debate over whether such an analysis is legitimate or useful for moral responsibility, I’ll 
simply specify here that the meaning of the phrase I wish to consider is that endorsed by incompatibilists, 
who wish it to mean that given the same initial conditions (including an agent’s desires, e.g.) it is truly 
indeterministic (or genuinely open to the agent) what the agent will do.  For a good survey of relevant 
articles and issues, see Widerker and McKenna [2003]. 
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each gives to the requisite condition, and the litany of objections and replies, would far 
outstrip our discussion here. 
 Instead, I propose to show (1) that the Alternate Possibilities condition is 
undermotivated, and (2) that the core of Frankfurt’s original insight is true.  The 
conjunction of these two claims is sufficient, I think, to place the burden on the defender 
of the AP Condition, rather than on a theory of responsibility that lacks such a condition. 
 
5.5.1. What the Condition Requires 
TO GENERALIZE, THE ALTERNATE Possibilities Condition states that to be responsible for 
some action or outcome, the agent must have had genuine alternate possibilities open to 
him at the time of action.  The condition derives its plausibility, I think, from an intuitive 
self-conception of choice.  It seems to us that when we deliberate we face a “garden of 
forking of paths,”217 a series of genuine choices, where it is open to us to go left or right, 
say, at each fork.  If we were in a maze of hallways and doors, where at each choice one 
door was always locked, it seems as if we’d have no genuine choice at all.  Indeed, we 
would be “forced” to take the unlocked doors at each junction, and the result, whatever it 
was, would not be of our own making.  It would be determined by the arrangement of the 
locked doors.  This picture of deliberation and choice, it seems, supports a condition that 
requires a genuine possibility of choosing differently than one does.  To be responsible 
for taking Door #1, I must have been able to take Door #2.  In short, I had to have been 
able to do otherwise. 
                                               
217 This is a phrase introduced by John Fischer, borrowing, I believe, from Jorge Luis Borges. 
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 If the above picture is right, then my account would require modification.  I would 
have to add the additional condition that the agent could have done otherwise than he did.  
But I don’t think the above is right.  I think the Alternate Possibilities Condition is 
undermotivated.  That is, we need to have good reasons for thinking that agents without 
genuine alternate possibilities are not responsible because they lack alternate 
possibilities.  But, I argue, we have not been given these reasons yet.  So, until it can be 
shown that the lack of possibilities itself undermines responsibility, we have insufficient 
evidence in support of the Alternate Possibilities Condition (AP Condition), despite its 
pretheoretical appeal. 
My argument is thus a burden-shifting argument.  I don’t think I’ll convince those 
who find the AP Condition deeply intuitive, because it is rather hard to shake loose of 
such judgments.  Nevertheless, in the larger dialectic surrounding the significance of the 
AP Condition, we always face conflicting judgments.  Incompatilibilists are more likely 
to think scenarios without genuine alternate possibilities lack responsibility, while 
compatibilists are much more likely to find responsibility preserved.  So we need 
something more than pretheoretical intuitive plausibility to tip the balance.  My argument 
here, therefore, doesn’t show that responsibility doesn’t require genuine alternate 
possibilities.  It is rather intended to show that the case for the AP Condition rests on 
pretheoretical conceptions of human action, not on careful consideration of core cases of 
undermined responsibility.  While such cases are not the only relevant data points, we 
have already seen how fruitful their examination can be, and I again turn to these cases to 
show that the AP Condition is undermotivated.  If I’m right, then an account that explains 
responsibility without such a condition is not obviously lacking.  The burden then rests 
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on the defender of the AP Condition to show that its absence is damning for any theory of 
responsibility. 
 
5.5.2. Examining the Evidence for the AP Condition 
WHY MIGHT WE THINK that responsibility requires genuine alternate possibilities?  One 
reason one might think so is by citing cases in which the agent doesn’t seem to have 
genuine alternate possibilities and isn’t responsible for that reason.218  But such cases, I 
think, are often misrepresented.  I’ll consider a few such cases here.219 
 For instance, recall my discussion of coercion.  There, I noted that in cases of 
coercion people often say that they didn’t have a choice.  They couldn’t have done other 
than they did on pain of death.  To repeat my claim there, however: this is really 
hyperbole.  It isn’t that coerced agents don’t have a choice; it’s that they don’t have a 
good choice.  The alternatives open to them are all bad in one way or another.  So it is a 
mistake to think that coercion implies the lack of genuine alternate possibilities.  Even if 
we concluded (contra my argument from Chapter 3) that coercion does undermine 
responsibility, it wouldn’t be because it eliminates genuine alternate possibilities.  It 
would have to be for some other reason.  Therefore, cases of coercion do not support the 
AP Condition. 
 We might instead look to cases where the agent is incapacitated.  For instance, 
suppose Irene is tied up in her basement.  She promised to meet her friend for lunch, but 
                                               
218 A similar observation is central to Frankfurt’s original article, Frankfurt [1969], pp.18-20. 
219 It is remarkable, I think, that so little attention has been given motivating the claim that responsibility 
requires the ability to do otherwise.  It is often assumed to be obvious and uncontroversial.  Indeed, even 




fails to, since she cannot escape her bindings.  Here we may be tempted again to claim it 
is the lack of genuine alternate possibilities that undermine Irene’s responsibility for 
breaking her date.  We might think that Irene couldn’t but fail to meet her friend, since 
she was unable to do anything but remain tied up.  But it isn’t obvious that it is due to this 
inability that Irene’s responsibility is undermined.  If we have plausible alternative 
explanations, for example, that Irene doesn’t choose to miss the date or that her breaking 
the promise evinces no ill will, then pressure is placed on the defender of the AP 
Condition to explain just why it is Irene’s lack of genuine possibilities that does the work. 
 Still another set of possible exemplary cases concern compulsion.  If the urges 
compulsions like kleptomania or agoraphobia present are really irresistible, perhaps our 
tendency to excuse, say, kleptomaniacs counts as support for the AP Condition.  In 
Chapter 4, I suggested that our reasons for not blaming kleptomaniacs may come from 
the fact that we ought not blame them rather than with facts concerning their 
responsibility.  Nevertheless, I didn’t assume there that compulsions really were 
irresistible.  How likely is this claim?  First, it is important to note that a kleptomaniac 
will not always steal no matter the situation, nor will an agoraphobe remain inside 
regardless of his circumstances.  If there is a security guard standing right in front of the 
kleptomaniac, then perhaps he won’t steal.  Or, to take a bizarrely contrived example, 
suppose that if he eats waffles for breakfast, he is able to resist his urges to steal.  
Similarly, we can suppose that there are some particularly strong reasons that might get 
an agoraphobe out of the house; for instance, setting his house on fire.220  We should 
conclude, therefore, that the mere presence of a pathological compulsion is not by itself 
enough to show that the agent could not do otherwise. 
                                               
220 This example is borrowed from Al Mele. 
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 It would seem, then, that ordinary instances of potentially undermining factors do 
not provide evidence for the AP Condition.  They do not suggest that the agent’s 
responsibility is undermined due to the lack of genuine alternate possibilities.  It is not 
from examining these core examples that leads one to suspect that responsible agents 
must be able to do otherwise.  Instead, it is more likely that the AP Condition is 
supported mainly from our pretheoretical conception of deliberation and action.  It seems 
to us that our futures are “gardens of forking paths,” and that a vital power of human 
agency is the ability to choose between genuine alternatives. 
Suppose most people do believe that genuine alternative possibilities are 
necessary for responsibility.  It is highly likely that this is because they both believe that 
they in fact have genuine alternate possibilities and that most agents are responsible for 
most of what they do.  That is, it is because they are antecedently committed to 
responsibility and the ability to do otherwise that implies a commitment to the AP 
Condition.  Suppose also, as is often the case, that the truth of determinism would mean 
that we do not have genuine alternate possibilities.221  Now, we have several possibilities.  
It could be that most people do not believe human action is determined.  This is a natural 
assumption, especially given their commitment to the AP Condition.  We might then 
wonder what would happen if most people were convinced of the truth of determinism?  
It seems they could either give up the AP Condition or give up responsibility.  One of 
Strawson’s key insights was that people are much more likely to retain a commitment to 
responsibility itself than to any conditions on it.  Indeed, without independent support for 
the AP Condition, its intuitive appeal may simply rest on a mistaken picture of human 
                                               
221 This is, as with most claims about the ability to do otherwise, a controversial claim.  But it conforms to 
the typical layout of the debate, with incompatibilists most in favor of the AP Condition, and using it to 
argue that determinism conflicts with responsibility as a result. 
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action.  And we may welcome a theory of responsibility that doesn’t require so strict a 
requirement for its obtaining. 
5.5.3. Frankfurt’s Key Insight 
FRANKFURT HAS MOST famously contested the AP Condition.  His examples take on a 
simple structure and have come to be known as Frankfurt-type cases.222  We can 
construct such a case by returning to our previous example involving the maze of doors.  
Suppose that at each junction, there are two doors, one of which is always locked.  Thus, 
for any choice between doors, an agent can only go through one; the locked door prevents 
him from actually choosing that door (or what lies behind it).  It would seem, then, that 
an agent in such a maze lacks genuine alternate possibilities.  At every junction, there is 
only one door he can open.  Now, suppose an agent goes through the maze always 
selecting unlocked doors.  At every junction, he deliberates, and chooses the unlocked 
door.  It is of course somewhat lucky for him, since he only ever has a 50% chance of 
choosing “correctly.”  Despite his odds, however, he always chooses the unlocked door.  
Frankfurt asks us to consider why such an agent isn’t responsible for his path.  He 
deliberates and chooses to go through a particular door.  Of course, he had to go through 
that door, since the other door was locked, but why should these counterfactual facts 
matter, when in the actual sequence of events223 he chose the door he did. 
 Frankfurt’s key insight, therefore, is that when considering ascriptions of 
responsibility, it is sufficient to examine what was true of the agent in the actual sequence 
of events, whatever counterfactual facts might hold.  Our agent in the maze lacks genuine 
                                               
222 John Locke many, many years before Frankfurt identified the same insight, but did not develop it as 
Frankfurt has. 
223 To my knowledge, Fischer and Ravizza are the first to make explicit the distinction between 
counterfactual considerations and the “actual sequence.” 
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alternate possibilities, but when he chooses to take a particular open door, the fact that the 
other door was locked does not obscure his responsibility.  We can make the example 
more palpable.  Suppose Jones wants to injure Smith.224  So he plans how to get Smith 
alone in a secluded spot, does so, and then beats him severely.  Now suppose that Black 
also wants Jones to injure Smith, and has a device that allows him to exercise some 
control over Jones’ brain.  Should Jones fail to decide to attack Jones, then Black will 
activate the device, making Jones decide to attack Smith.  As it happens, however, Jones 
deliberates and decides to attack Smith, and Black never needs to use the device.  Again, 
as in the maze case, it seems that no matter what Jones does, he will choose to attack 
Smith.  His action is unavoidable.  Yet, despite this fact, in the actual sequence of events, 
Jones deliberates and chooses to attack Smith.  Frankfurt thinks that in such cases we 
cannot find fault with an ascription of responsibility.  Jones is surely responsible and 
blameworthy for injuring Smith, even though he could not have done otherwise. 
 Frankfurt’s conclusion has been contested.  But I need not endorse his conclusion 
to make my point.  Frankfurt’s key insight is that we don’t examine the counterfactual 
scenarios when evaluating an agent’s conduct.  Jones kills Smith deliberately and 
purposefully.  Nothing else is required for an ascription of responsibility, and indeed, 
blameworthiness.  Had Black intervened, or had our agent in the maze tried a different 
door, then perhaps our conclusions would change.  But given the actual scenarios, we 
have sufficient cause for ascribing responsibility. 
                                               
224 This formulation of a Frankfurt-case is more traditional, since it involves a “counterfactual intervener” 
(Black), someone who will intervene to ensure something happens, but in the actual sequence doesn’t need 
to.  I prefer cases like the maze example above because Black is an Immune Intervening Agent, and can 
adversely affect interpretations of the case for the same reasons as in manipulation arguments.  Those 
problems can be safely ignored in the present context, however, and this traditional example gets our moral 
engine running since it is a morally loaded case, as opposed to the opening of doors. 
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Responsibility may still require the AP Condition.  But the case must be made for 
this condition, and it must rest on more than a pretheoretical notion of human action.  For 
we may well be wrong about such a picture.  And given theoretical reasons for examining 
core cases of undermined responsibility, and the fact that such cases do not imply that the 
lack of genuine alternate possibilities undermines responsibility, the case of the AP 
Condition appears undermotivated.  When combined with the crux of Frankfurt’s insight, 
I think there is sufficient pressure to place the burden with the defender of the AP 
Condition to show why responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise, rather than 
with theories that lack such a condition.  I take it, then, that if my account succeeds in all 














IN CHAPTER 1, I outlined what I take to be the Strawsonian Compatibilist Program, which 
is a two-pronged endeavor.225  The First Prong is to explain the metaphysically 
worrisome notion of responsibility in terms with which we are much more familiar, 
namely, blameworthiness and praiseworthiness.  The program understands these notions 
through our normative practices of blaming and praising.  The Second Prong is to distill 
the conditions on responsibility from those considerations that undermine it.  So long as 
no such considerations are present, the agent is responsible.  Part of the aim of Chapter 2 
was to show that we have good reason to reject the First Prong because of careful 
examination of the Second Prong.  Once we attend to the considerations that undermine 
blameworthiness and praiseworthiness, we see that the same considerations undermine 
                                               
225 Both of these prongs owe their origins to Strawson’s original essay, “Freedom and Resentment.”  On the 
First Prong he says, “I want to speak…of something else: of the non-detached attitudes and reactions…of 
offended parties and beneficiaries; of such things as gratitude, resentment, forgiveness, love, and hurt 
feelings” (p.62).  On the Second Prong he says, “Then let us consider what sorts of special considerations 




both notions symmetrically.  Indeed, the same considerations appear to operate 
symmetrically across an immense range of cases, even in non-moral cases of 
blameworthiness and praiseworthiness.  The hypothesis I drew from the data was that 
blameworthiness and praiseworthiness share some important component that the 
undermining factors operate on.  And since it seems an individual must be responsible for 
something in order to be either blameworthy or praiseworthy for it, I concluded that in 
order to explain the wide set of undermining cases an account must appeal to some notion 
of responsibility that is both explanatorily prior to blameworthiness and praiseworthiness 
and significantly independent of our practices of praising and blaming. 
 The remainder of the dissertation has been a development of the Strawsonian 
Program’s Second Prong.  Rather than settle for a negative condition on responsibility 
(that when no undermining factor applies, the agent is responsible), in Chapter 3 I 
suggested three positive conditions on responsibility.  If we closely attend to a 
categorization of the undermining factors, sorted by the specific features of agents and 
actions that seem to be missing in cases of undermined responsibility, we can posit the 
presence of those same features as being necessary for responsibility.  Still, I retain the 
basic negative notion of Strawson’s Second Prong by insisting that so long as all three 
conditions are met, we need not require any more for responsibility.  The subsequent two 
chapters were a defense of these conditions as individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient.  Chapter 4 defended them as necessary for responsibility from the objection 
that negligent agents fail my conditions but are still responsible for outcomes.  And 
Chapter 5 defended them as jointly sufficient from a set of objections suggesting that my 
conditions left something out. 
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 This chapter has a very different aim.  In the long-standing debate between 
compatibilists (who think responsibility is compatible with the truth of determinism226) 
and incompatibilists (who think it is not), it is of crucial importance what capacities 
humans must possess in order to be responsible.  For if individuals don’t have the 
capacity to fulfill the conditions on being responsible for things, then it would seem that 
we could never be responsible for anything.  Thus, hard incompatibilists (incompatibilists 
who believe we are never responsible) think that whatever the conditions on 
responsibility are, the world is such that we never satisfy them.  One standard way of 
demonstrating this is by illustrating that, were determinism true, we wouldn’t have the 
capacities needed to satisfy the conditions.  For example, if one thinks the ability to do 
otherwise is required for responsibility, then one could attempt to show that a 
deterministic universe would make such an ability impossible.227  An immense amount of 
ink has been spilled over whether or not we have such metaphysical capacities as being 
able to do other than we did.228 
 Within the dialectic, then, there is a premium on the demandingness of the 
conditions on responsibility.  What must the world be like for creatures such as we are to 
be able to satisfy the conditions on responsibility for particular things?  Are they such 
that the truth of determinism would put responsibility beyond our reach?  Compatibilists 
are committed to answering “no;” the world as it’s currently configured is such that 
creatures like us are responsible most of the time (or at least could be).  Or, to put it 
                                               
226 Determinism itself is the thesis that all of the present facts about the world plus the laws of universe 
entail all future truths (including truths about human actions and choices). 
227 Van Inwagen, among others, gives an argument like this.  See van Inwagen [1975].  For a similar view 
I’ve already discussed (but doesn’t rely on determinism being true), see G. Strawson [2001]. 
228 To get an idea of the extent of this debate, one needs only look for the articles spawned by Frankfurt’s 
original paper.  See Frankfurt [1969; 2003], for his original statement, and Widerker and McKenna’s 
[2003] for a sampling of the secondary literature. 
 
 208 
another way, it must be the case that even in the face of determinism, creatures like us 
have the necessary capacities to meet the conditions on responsibility, whatever these 
happen to be.  It is to the compatibilist’s advantage, therefore, to have conditions that are 
easy to meet.  The easier they are to meet, the less likely determinism will pose a threat to 
their satisfaction. 
 Part of what has been so appealing about the Strawsonian Program is its ability to 
simplify the conditions on responsibility.  By avoiding a metaphysical notion of 
responsibility, the Strawsonian Compatibilist avoids much of the intractable debate 
surrounding whether or not agents have those metaphysical abilities such a notion 
requires.  Whether or not agents actually have, say, the robust ability to do otherwise, it is 
surely no uncontroversial matter.  Indeed, no matter which position one takes, all parties 
would seem to agree that demonstrating the truth or falsity of such a claim is no easy 
task.  So it has been a virtue of Strawsonian Compatibilism that it side-steps this thorny 
issue, by mediating explanation of responsibility via our social practices and the norms 
governing them.  Strawson originally put the point in terms of our confidence in holding 
each other responsible.  Given the norms governing our practices, we should be confident 
that we’re responsible, and this confidence would remain unshaken even were we to learn 
of determinism’s truth.229  Thus, on Strawson’s original proposal, all we need to be 
responsible is not to be subject to any undermining factor.  If the outcome wasn’t an 
accident, or inadvertent, or a mistake, etc., then the agent is responsible.  Determinism 
has no grip here.  These conditions are quite easily met, and don’t appear to rest on any 
“panicky” metaphysics.230 
                                               
229 See Strawson [1962], pp. 73-76. 
230 To use Strawson’s phrase.  Strawson [1962], p.80. 
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 My compatibilist view rejects the Strawsonian Program’s First Prong, the one that 
avoids the metaphysical worries.  I claim that we need an independent notion of 
responsibility, one not mediated through our practices.  And, indeed, there are positive 
conditions that must be met in order to be responsible for outcomes on my view, so it 
isn’t just the case that we can perform a check to see whether or not any of the 
undermining factors apply.  One might fear that as a result my compatibilism gets us a 
better account of the undermining factors only to lose compatibilism to the dangers of the 
metaphysical debate.  Again, whether or not it can be demonstrated that we have the 
requisite abilities, a theory that can do the work without taking on such a difficult task 
would seem to have quite attractive advantages.  Thus, if my brand of compatibilism is to 
be a serious alternative, I must find a way to retain this attractive quality of the 
Strawsonian Program.  I must show that our confidence that we are responsible for much 
of what we do is well-founded; that metaphysical worries about our abilities won’t get 
enough traction to prove problematic even in the face of determinism. 
 Fortunately, we should be confident that we are responsible for much of what we 
do.  My three conditions are quite easily met.  Indeed, they are met so long as human 
agents possess three corresponding capacities (which I’ll outline below in Section 2).  So, 
we should be confident that we are responsible to the extent that we are confident that we 
are human agents possessing those basic capacities.  Thus, while my view rejects the 
Strawsonian Program’s particular method for avoiding the metaphysical entanglements 
associated with free will and responsibility, it retains the basic attractive advantage of the 
program’s position: we should be highly confident that we are responsible for much of 




6.2.  Conditions and Capacities 
I HAVE STATED THAT an agent is responsible for an outcome just in case: 1) the outcome 
was brought about voluntarily; 2) the outcome was brought about intentionally; 3) the 
outcome was brought about without mistake.  These conditions are really quite weak.  
They are so weak, in fact, that all ordinary agents satisfy them most of the time.  The 
Voluntariness Condition can be met so long as most actions of agents are explainable by 
belief-desire sets.  The Intentionality Condition can be met so long as agents can foresee 
the consequences of their actions (or that they recognize they can affect the world so as to 
bring specific things about).  And the No-Mistake Condition can be met so long as agents 
have the capacity to recognize factual features of their actions.  So, for it to be the case 
that ordinary agents can be responsible, ordinary agents must possess the following three 
capacities: (a) a capacity to act on belief-desire sets; (b) a capacity to foresee 
consequences of their actions; (c) a capacity to recognize factual (non-moral) features of 
their actions.  These capacities need not be constitutive of agency, nor exhaustive of it; all 
I require is that, whatever else is true of them, ordinary agents indeed possess these three 
capacities.  Moreover, these capacities need not be infallible, or always engaged, or 
applied in every instance.  Indeed, the capacities presumably won’t all be exercised 
precisely in cases of undermined responsibility.  All that has to be true is that ordinary 
agents have such capacities and that they exercise them regularly.  If this is true, then I 
think it clear that ordinary agents can be responsible for much of what they do. 
 How plausible is it, then, to suppose that ordinary agents possess all three 
capacities?  I find it eminently plausible; indeed, it seems simply obvious that we have 
 
 211 
such capacities, and that we exercise them regularly.  Not to belabor the point, but I do 
want to emphasize just how uncontroversial these capacities should be.  They should be 
uncontroversial largely because to imagine a creature who lacked any one of them is to 
imagine a human far outside the norm.  The capacity to act on belief-desire sets is 
satisfied so long as belief-desire sets function in explaining action.  Such a capacity need 
not specify how beliefs and desires function in the actual etiology of action, beyond 
committing itself to some causal role.  This capacity, then, is compatible with a large 
range of realist theories about the mind.231  Furthermore, someone who lacked this 
capacity would be a strange creature.  Even lots of animal behavior can be explained by 
reference to their belief-desire sets, so a human being who lacked such a capacity would 
be an aberration indeed. 
 The capacity to foresee the consequences of one’s actions is just the capacity to 
recognize the differences one makes (and can make) to the world.  We recognize that we 
can affect the world in certain ways, either by taking steps in order to fulfill our ends or 
as consequences of our taking steps to fulfill our ends.  My dog may not realize that in 
jumping on the couch to bark through the window at the mailman he’s damaging the 
fabric, say.  Indeed, my dog may not have the capacity to recognize that in fulfilling 
certain desires, like barking at the mailman (or, say, defending his territory), he can affect 
the world in other ways (like damaging the couch).  Unlike our dogs,232 however, we do 
                                               
231 Someone like Dennett, who takes an interpretationist stance towards beliefs and desires, might find this 
commitment contentious.  On an interpretationist view, the capacity above could be modified so as to 
merely require that the belief-desire set be explanatorily efficacious, not that it actually cause behavior.  If 
Dennett turns out to be right, then the following worries I discuss won’t turn out to be worries at all.  But 
since I think that this view of the mind is more controversial than realism about beliefs and desires, I’ve 
opted for a commitment to beliefs and desires being real and playing a causal role in action. 
232 This point is speculative.  I use dogs as an illustrative example, rather than a substantive one.  I intend it 
only to show the distinction.  This caveat notwithstanding, I’ll assume that at least some non-human 
animals lack this capacity. 
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have this capacity.  It’s the one that let’s us plan in complex ways for complicated and 
far-reaching goals.  And it’s the self-awareness we have, that when we do absent-
mindedly or by accident cause harm or bring about some effect, we recognize that it is 
our doing.  Now, possession of such a capacity doesn’t amount to satisfying the 
Intentionality Condition on responsibility; that requires a conscious entertaining of the 
possible outcomes.  But regular satisfaction of that condition seems quite reasonable 
given this general capacity and our experience with human action.  Note as well that 
someone who lacked such a capacity would not see herself as having an effect on the 
world around her.  It seems difficult to even imagine this, and yet, if it were to happen, it 
would surely seem to evince a terrible cognitive deficiency in such a subject.  Again, 
such a creature would be a severe aberration from the norm. 
 Finally, the capacity to recognize factual features of their actions is just a capacity 
to possess appropriate concepts relevant to one’s action.  Those who possess such a 
capacity are able to see that they are taking someone else’s property, or that pushing the 
button will cause pain, or that driving this fast is dangerous.  Such a capacity need not be 
infallible; we can, of course, make mistakes.  And we can fail to consider factual features 
of our action, as in cases of inadvertence.  But the general capacity remains nonetheless, 
just as I retain the capacity to ride a bike though I’m presently too dizzy to succeed at this 
moment.  One who lacked such a capacity might be able to act, and might see herself as 
affecting the world, but would fail to see the different ways she was affecting the world.  
In short, it would seem she’d be unable to see how she fit into the world, and how, in 
turn, the world itself fit together, at least from the human (agent?) point of view.  Again, I 
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take it as painfully obvious that such a creature would be a radical aberration from 
ordinary agents. 
 If these three capacities really are quite uncontroversial, then it should be apparent 
that satisfaction of my three conditions on responsibility, which rest on these capacities, 
should be easy to come by.  We should have extraordinary confidence, therefore, that 
ordinary agents, since they do possess these capacities and exercise them regularly, can 
be responsible for most of what they do (naturally, barring instances of the undermining 
factors).  And we should therefore only be skeptical about responsibility for outcomes to 
the extent that we’re doubtful such creatures as these ordinary agents exist. 
 
6.3. Future Threats 
IT SHOULD EQUALLY BE obvious that the truth of determinism poses no special threat to 
my conditions on responsibility.  Even were our actions determined by past facts and the 
laws of nature, the general capacities underwriting the conditions on responsibility would 
be unharmed.  No feature of our actions being determined would suggest that we don’t 
act on belief-desire sets, or that we can’t foresee the outcomes we bring about, or that we 
can’t have action-relevant concepts.  Thus, in rejecting the Strawsonian Program’s First 
Prong we do not commit ourselves to a more demanding notion of responsibility, and we 
therefore do not lose its attractive advantages.  My compatibilist conditions seem easy to 
meet and determinism poses no special threat to their satisfaction. 
 This brief discussion certainly doesn’t settle the debate between compatibilists 
and incompatibilists.  It would be gross hubris to think such a debate can be settled so 
easily.  While my dissertation is a defense of compatibilism, I have not focused much 
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attention on meeting incompatibilists on their own terms.  The reason for this is that my 
aim has been to present what I take to be the best compatibilist theory one can give.  I 
count it as a defense of compatibilism, and thus a defender of incompatibilism must find 
fault with my argument, if he is to defend incompatibilism.  Incompatibilists must show 
either that my theory cannot explain important phenomena any theory of responsibility 
ought to explain, or that I’m wrong that determinism wouldn’t invalidate one of my 
conditions.  I cannot here assume that such an effort by an incompatibilist would fail, 
though I think one advantage of my strategy is that it places the onus on the 
incompatibilist again to tell us what my view has missed.  Nevertheless, resolving the 
debate in one fell swoop is hindered in large part due to the resilience of the conflicting 
judgments held by compatibilists, on the one hand, and incompatibilists, on the other.  
Indeed, I think that the debate suffers from “dialectical stalemate[s].”233  I have tried to 
address some of these in this dissertation.234  As I have done throughout, however, I will 
chiefly ignore the long-standing traditional debate in this chapter, and target again the 
prospects of compatibilism itself.  To conclude, then, I will instead focus on some 
possible future threats to responsibility, and why compatibilists should see such threats in 
an optimistic light. 
 To put it bluntly, I believe that the toughest threats to a defensible theory of 
responsibility will challenge those capacities of agency it seems we obviously possess.  
Any thesis that, if true, entails that we don’t have one or any of the three corresponding 
capacities I’ve discussed would prove to be a serious challenge to the very possibility of 
responsibility.  But the upshot of all this is actually good news for the compatibilist 
                                               
233 To use a phrase of John Martin Fischer’s. 
234 For example, in my discussion of Ultimate Responsibility, Chapter 4, Section IV.4. 
 
 215 
because it makes the cost of living without responsibility that much more dire, and, I 
think, easier to resist. 
 First, if the impossibility of responsibility is only achieved by a thesis suggesting 
that we lack one of the capacities listed above, then this would be a radical thesis indeed.  
We have already noted how humans lacking one of the above capacities would be 
aberrant; so a thesis that made such an aberration the norm would be striking and quite 
radical.  Such a thesis would seem to be in need of stringent defense, and would face 
quite daunting argumentative hurdles. 
 Second, many hard determinists make the following general dialectical move.235  
While their view insists that we aren’t responsible for what we do, they seek to show that 
the loss of responsibility is no great loss at all.  We can retain much of what’s important 
to us in life even if we are not truly responsible for what we do.  Thus, they seek to 
minimize the costs associated with giving up responsibility.  Such an avenue would seem 
to be blocked if the only route to hard incompatibilism there is is by showing we don’t 
possess what I take to be basic agential capacities.236  It would be a quite dire cost of 
giving up responsibility if it entailed that we can’t explain action by reference to belief-
desire sets or that we can’t foresee the differences we make to the world.  These are costs 
that are worth bearing in mind when considering how to weigh potential threats to the 
possibility of responsibility. 
 Third, the more radical a thesis, and the more dire its consequences, the easier it is 
to reject.  Dialectically, the burden of argument rests on the stronger thesis, on the one 
that diverges most from our common understanding of things.  This isn’t to say such 
                                               
235 For specific examples, see Pereboom [2001], Sommers [2007]. 
236 Of course, hard incompatiblists who make this move presumably think responsibility requires more than 
satisfaction of my three conditions, but that is an argument that can’t be settled here. 
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burdens can’t be met; of course they can.  Quantum physics, for example, often flies in 
the face of our common sense understanding of the world, yet it has extraordinary 
explanatory and predictive power.  But any thesis that challenges the possibility of 
responsibility must meet similar burdens, I think.  For they will have to show that losing 
responsibility and some basic capacities of agents is worth what we gain from accepting 
the thesis.  And while it is possible positions will come along that can meet this burden, I 
think compatibilists should have some optimism that such theses are not readily 
forthcoming. 
 So the serious threats to responsibility will come from radical theories like 
epiphenomenalism, which claims that mental states are causally inefficacious.  
Epiphenomenalism, it seems, would show that my conditions on responsibility can’t be 
met.237  Similarly, eliminativists like the Churchlands, who deny the reality of mental 
states, will also think that we lack the capacity to act on beliefs and desires, and therefore 
we can’t meet my Voluntariness Condition. 
Two points are in order here.  First, requiring beliefs and desires to be causally 
implicated in action is my gloss on the Voluntariness Condition.  The condition itself is 
meant to distinguish between those actions that we perform voluntarily, like opening a 
bottle of champagne or taking a coat, from those bodily movements that aren’t voluntary, 
like sneezes and spasms.  So if epiphenomenalism or eliminativism were true, we should 
still be able to distinguish between sneezes and bottle-openings, but we might need a new 
way to capture that distinction. 
                                               
237 In particular, Eddy Nahmias has been developing a recent charge that theses like epiphenomenalism 
pose a serious threat to responsibility. 
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Second, and more importantly, even if epiphenomenalism and eliminativism are 
threats to responsibility on my account, this is no special worry for my theory.  These 
theses are threats to every account of responsibility I can think of.  In the case of 
eliminativism, the implication is that we don’t really have minds, and if this claim were 
true, it should come as no surprise that we’re not responsible for what we do.  In the case 
of epiphenomenalism, while we would have minds, they would be totally disconnected 
from our actions.  If true, this thesis would stand as an objection to all extant theories of 
responsibility, and would imply that our minds play no role in issuing action.  Such a 
thesis would pose difficulties for more than just accounts of responsibility.  Nevertheless, 
both epiphenomenalism and eliminativism about the mental seem to me to be highly 
contentious theories, and thus of less concern for those who wish to secure responsibility 
than determinism has ever been thought to be.  They are worries I think any compatibilist 
can live with, mostly because they seem highly implausible. 
 
6.4. Are Animals Responsible? 
THERE IS ONE FINAL worry I must address.  One might object that if it is so easy to meet 
my conditions on responsibility, then perhaps certain non-human animals could satisfy 
them.  But we don’t think animals are responsible, so my account must be wrong if it has 
this implication.  The worry is, essentially, that my account gives responsibility away too 
easily.  So some condition or other must be missing. 
 It is true that we don’t think clams and snails can be morally responsible.  Nor do 
we blame viruses for illness, in any morally relevant sense.  And we can work up from 
this level of biological sophistication: we don’t think deer blameworthy for eating our 
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shrubs, or bears for killing spawning salmon, and we wouldn’t likely praise dolphins who 
rescue drowning swimmers.  While some might blame or praise their dogs, it is more 
likely that this is seen in an educative light, as training the dog to behave certain ways,238 
then as distinctively moral practices.  And, presumably, many would deny moral 
responsibility right up through higher-order primates, as well.  The worry expressed 
above seems to suggest a line dividing human agents from other animals.  It is a line that 
seems at home in the free will debate, given the large tradition of seeing free will as a 
distinctively human ability.  This feature has been translated into moral responsibility 
talk, such that it seems as if only humans could be morally responsible for what they do. 
 At the same time, humans are surely animals.  We are unique in certain respects: 
our capacities for language and problem-solving place us at the top of cognitively 
sophisticated animals.  We’re the only animals, for instance, who have debates about the 
prospects of responsibility (as far as we know).  Yet there is also massive evidence that 
we aren’t as special as we might think we are.  Data has illustrated just how cognitively 
sophisticated chimpanzees and other great apes are; we know that dolphins are quite 
smart; and lots of animals display various sorts of behavior that seem to indicate various 
levels of complicated reasoning.  Even rats seem to be able to reason causally about the 
effects of their actions.239 
 So, we might ask, how special are we?  Are humans unique enough that only we 
could be responsible for what we do?  Or is this just another instance of a false, but 
strongly held, conviction about responsibility?  If a theory of responsibility implies that 
                                               
238 Similar to the way we might blame a non-responsible young child as a form of moral education. 
239 Dickinson and Shanks [1995]. 
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animals can be responsible for what they do, is this a strike against it?  Does such an 
implication rule out the theory? 
 Let me begin to address these questions by making a conjecture: some animals240 
possess the relevant agential capacities to at least as high a degree as children.241  
Coupling this conjecture with the assumption that children are responsible for at least 
some of what they do, it follows that some animals can be responsible as well.  It is 
widely accepted that responsibility will be grounded, at least in part, on the capacities of 
agents.  The first part of this chapter was devoted to my account of responsible agency: 
those capacities an individual must possess to ground the presumption that he is 
responsible for the particular things he does.  If responsibility does depend on agency, 
then if an individual is determined to have the relevant agential capacities, he may well 
be responsible for particular things.  Whether he is or not will depend on satisfying the 
conditions on responsibility, conditions that relate the individual to a particular object of 
responsibility.  But if we deem A an agent (with the right sorts of capacities), then A is 
“in the ballpark” for ascriptions of responsibility.242  If some animals are also at least in 
the ballpark regarding agency, then it seems to me no great worry that my account 
implies that they could be responsible.  For it would be the case that since many animals 
have certain distinctive agential capacities, and since responsibility is grounded largely 
on agency, it should be no surprise that at least some animals turn out to be potentially 
responsible for things they do. 
                                               
240 Despite my initial comparisons, from here on out I’ll use the term ‘animal’ in contradistinction to 
‘human’. 
241 For a discussion of this claim, see Gomez [2004]. 
242 The use of “in the ballpark” I borrow from Fischer and Ravizza, who look to me to be giving primarily 




 Nevertheless, I’m not convinced that animals would actually satisfy my 
conditions on responsibility, even if they have some basic agential capacities.  Resolution 
of the issue depends again on empirical science and what it tells us about the abilities of 
animals.  There does seem to be evidence that many animals act on belief-desire sets.243  
And we can certainly distinguish between when an animal apparently does something on 
purpose and when an animal does something as the result of a spasm or unconscious 
movement.  So I’m willing to concede animals do things voluntarily, as I understand the 
condition.  We could certainly draw the same distinction the Voluntariness Condition 
captures in human action in animal conduct as well. 
 It seems plausible that many animals can foresee some consequences of their 
actions.  Means-end reasoning is sufficient for that.  But notice that already the range of 
viable objects of responsibility begins to narrow here.  One can only be responsible, on 
my view, for an outcome one foresaw as a possible consequence at the time of action.  
Presumably, the capacity to foresee in the manner required is less developed in most 
animals than in humans.  Thus, the range of things animals could be responsible for 
diminishes as a result.  However, I will concede that when a chimp uses a stick to get 
termites out of their mound, or a raccoon gets a trashcan lid off, they act intentionally.  
More to the point, they seem to satisfy the Intentionality Condition, and could be 
responsible in each case. 
 Let’s even suppose that on a plausible understanding of animal psychology, they 
can possess relevant factual concepts of what they are doing.  I suspect that only higher-
order animals will be able to thereby meet the No-Mistake Condition.  For instance, it is 
possible that a mole believes that he is eating the roots of a delicious plant, but he 




probably doesn’t know that it is your plant.  And having that belief is crucial to 
responsibility, as Jan’s case with the coat-taking illustrated.  But many animals might 
indeed possess concepts like ‘pain’ or ‘damage,’ and thus believe that a consequence of 
their action would be causing pain or damage.  If so, it is possible that these facts would 
be sufficient for the relevant moral verdicts,244 and thus animals could satisfy the No-
Mistake Condition after all. 
 Indeed, we might still wonder about very sophisticated animals, like chimps and 
dolphins.  Is a chimp blameworthy for purposefully killing another chimp?245  Are 
dolphins who rescue shipwreck victims praiseworthy for their deeds?246  I puzzle over 
these questions still.  One stumbling block is that between humans we have the benefit of 
language.  Our shared practices of blaming and praising are shared largely due to how 
language holds them together.  Indeed, Michael McKenna has claimed that the 
framework of responsibility depends on communication.247  I agree to a point.  To hold 
each other responsible requires communicating our demands and expectations, of having 
these known by others.  Holding others responsible requires being able to communicate 
our attitudes when they violate these expectations or surpass them.  But, as I’ve argued 
throughout the dissertation, the important features of holding each other responsible are 
of derivative importance to the features of being responsible.  So it could always be the 
                                               
244 Then again, perhaps our moral verdicts only range over human conduct and enterprises.  I have no 
argument for why this would be the case, but if it were, then either animals would fail the No-Mistake 
Condition, or they could be responsible but never blameworthy or praiseworthy. 
245 There is evidence chimp groups do kill their own, as reported by primatologist David Watts.  His 
hypothesis is that these “group kills” reinforce social bonds among the participating members.  If true, this 
hypothesis might match sociological explanations of gang behavior among humans.  Indeed, we might 
expect this to be the case given the similarities between humans and chimpanzees. 
246 I don’t know the prevalence or accuracy of such reports.  But we can examine the question as a 
hypothetical nonetheless. 
247 See McKenna [1998]. 
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case, on my view, that some animals are responsible, even though there’s no sense in 
holding them responsible. 
 Here, again, we have the distinction between an individual being responsible for 
something and it’s being the case that we ought to blame him.  It might be the case that at 
least some animals (maybe many) are responsible for (some of) what they do, it just 
doesn’t make any sense to hold them responsible, since it would have no effect on 
behavior.  This thought really isn’t as strange as it might initially sound.  The notion of 
responsibility, as I noted in the Introduction to this dissertation, has been developed as a 
central aspect to a vast array of human relationships and social practices.  Responsibility, 
the fact of an individual’s being responsible, has a distinctly human importance.  It lacks 
this importance in our relationships with animals, and in turn animals lack the practices 
and relationships between each other that would require such a notion.  So it would 
certainly seem that even if animals were actually responsible for some of what they do, 
this fact would not imply that we ought to go about blaming or praising them. 
 Nevertheless, some of us humans do blame and praise animals.  Those 
sportswriters who suggested Secretariat’s performance in the Triple Crown merited 
inclusion in “The 50 Top Athletes of the 20th Century”248 were, deliberately or not, 
praising Secretariat for his performance.  And much of the talk about the way he raced, 
the interpretation of his actions, suggest a commitment to his acting very much like a 
human athlete, possessing the same admirable qualities (at least with respect to athletic 
performance).  Similarly, a friend of mine noted in discussion that he and his wife do in 
fact blame their dog for transgressions of behavior.  He said that the dog knows she isn’t 
allowed to do certain things, and when she does them she deserves certain forms of 
                                               
248 ESPN [1999]. 
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sanctioning treatment.  In this case, it seems to me, my friend is assuming that he and his 
dog do share a network of commitments and expectations, and are participating in a 
shared practice that does depend on the importance of responsibility.  Of course, his 
understanding of the practice may be much different than his dog’s, but he saw no 
problem in holding his dog responsible for her conduct (at least in specific cases). 
 This anecdotal evidence is not meant to prove the point, only to show that 
reluctance to accept the implication that animals can be responsible can be mitigated by 
reflection on our experiences with those animals that hold special significance to us. 
 So, why not think the chimp blameworthy for killing, and the dolphin 
praiseworthy for saving?  The worry may be that these animals are not really deliberating 
when they act.  They just behave according to nature’s programming; they don’t choose.  
But this is a dangerous path to start down.  For we mustn’t forget a simple truth: all 
humans are animals.  And we are programmed by nature as much as chimps and 
dolphins, or so it seems.  The general conclusion, then, is to the degree that other animals 
come close to the cognitive sophistication of humans (at least regarding the three 
capacities discussed in this chapter), I think they approach the capacity to be responsible 
for things they do. 
This is not a popular position; but then again, the question of animal responsibility 
is not much discussed.  It seems to me that most assume only human agents can be 
responsible, and this is because responsibility is so tightly connected to morality and only 
humans are in the business of morality.  But it’s hard for me not to see the chimps’ action 
as expressing an ill quality of will towards the other chimp, and the dolphins expressing 
good will towards the shipwreck crew.  I don’t take this to be evidence in favor of either 
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actually being responsible.  I merely mention these appearances to highlight my initial 
response to the worry: given that so much of the normative domain, especially things like 
responsibility and morality, depends on our nature as agents, then it wouldn’t be 
surprising to find that those animals who are most similar to us as agents should be “in 
the ballpark” for being responsible.  Perhaps dolphins are praiseworthy for rescues.  
Perhaps they are not.  In any case, I submit that the answer to the question depends on 
whether they are agents like we are.  And unless one thinks that because dolphins don’t 
go into the business of praising they can’t be praiseworthy, I don’t think an affirmative 
answer would be all that striking or worrisome.  It certainly wouldn’t imply that we 
should actually start praising dolphins.  Instead it would suggest that perhaps humans do 
not have the exclusive rights (pardon the pun) to the business of morality.249 
 
6.5. Conclusion 
COMPATIBILISM OFFERS US the most promising theory of responsibility, and I have argued 
for what I take to be the most promising compatibilist account.  It secures for us 
responsibility for much (indeed, most) of what we do, and so even should science tell us 
the world is thoroughly deterministic, we can still retain the robust notions of friendship 
and love, the complicated social practices of blaming and praising, and our genuine sense 
of accomplishment at artistic creation or scholarly achievement, all of which depend on 
our being responsible for what we do. 
                                               
249 To be clear, all that I would require for dolphins to be in the business of morality is that they see 
something good in saving the shipwrecked crew.  More would have to be said to fully work out the details 
here, but I don’t find it too implausible a suggestion.  And, in any case, I certainly wouldn’t consider such a 
result worrisome for a theory of responsibility. 
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My particular brand of compatibilism also has the advantage of securing responsibility 
given the satisfaction of some fairly uncontroversial conditions and capacities, making it 
all the more likely that we satisfy them, and making my compatibilism that much more 
defensible in light of potential future threats.  Indeed, as easy as it is to meet my 
conditions on responsibility, it seems the likely threats to my account will come from less 
and less plausible positions in action theory and philosophy of mind. 
 I’ve also shown that issues that currently worry compatibilists needn’t worry us.  
Normative competence, manipulation, and the ability to do otherwise, don’t pressure us 
away from a thoroughly compatibilist program.  The compatibilist has resources to 
explain just why these issues seem problematic, but those same resources help explain 
why they needn’t remain impediments to a simple and explanatorily powerful 
compatibilist position. 
 My goal from the start has been to defend an account of responsibility that 
explained what was essentially important to our lives as human beings.  What is crucial 
about being responsible for what we do, and what must be true of us and our actions to 
secure that notion?  My answer is simple.  To be responsible for an action or outcome, it 
must be the case that: (1) the outcome is the result of an action explainable by a belief-
desire set; (2) the outcome was at least a foreseen possible effect of that action; and, (3) 
the agent had no false beliefs about the nature of his action or outcome necessary for 
generating an evaluation by the relevant normative standards.  Satisfying these conditions 
is necessary and sufficient for being responsible for a particular outcome.  If the outcome 
is bad, the agent is blameworthy.  If the outcome is good, the agent is praiseworthy.  
Responsibility is primarily a relation tying individuals to the things they do or bring 
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about, such that the individual is evaluable by that action or outcome’s lights.  To be so 
evaluable, my three conditions must be met, and they are quite easily met even if the 
world should be thoroughly deterministic.  Indeed, I believe my three conditions can be 
met even should the world be partially indeterministic.  In any case, I think nothing more 
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